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THE BRITISH ACADEMY

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The *British Academy Review* contains articles illustrating the wide range of scholarship which the British Academy promotes in its role as the UK's national academy for the humanities and social sciences.

Views of named writers are the views exclusively of those writers; publication does not constitute endorsement by the British Academy.

Suggestions for articles by current and former British Academy grant- and post-holders, as well as by Fellows of the British Academy, are very welcome. Suggestions may be sent to the Editor, James Rivington, at pubs@britac.ac.uk

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Cover image: The Prophet Daniel, Sistine Ceiling. See article on page 64.

Contents

Welcome to this issue of the *British Academy Review*. The articles reveal the British Academy's wide range of interests and varied programme of activities.

The articles show the Academy concerning itself with the health of the disciplines that it represents, and supporting academic research and exchange. But as importantly, they demonstrate the Academy's role in communicating scholarly insights to policymakers and to a broader public.

There are articles dealing with UK politics and economics. Others show humanities and social science scholarship engaging with issues of global significance. And others offer intriguing perspectives from the study of history and culture.

The articles provide links to a wealth of supporting material available via the British Academy's website, which will enable the reader to explore further the ideas discussed here.

The British Academy

The British Academy, established by Royal Charter in 1902, is the UK's national academy for the humanities and social sciences. It is funded by a Government grant, through the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.

The Academy is an independent, self-governing organisation of 900 Fellows (with a further 300 overseas) elected for their distinction in research. The British Academy's mission is: to inspire, recognise and support high achievement in the humanities and social sciences throughout the UK and internationally, and to champion their role and value.

The British Academy's work is shaped by six strategic priorities.

1. *Championing the Humanities and Social Sciences*: our objective is to take a lead in representing the humanities and social sciences, promoting their interests and vigorously upholding their value.

2. *Advancing Research*: our objective is to provide distinctive and complementary funding opportunities for outstanding people and innovative research.

3. *Fostering Excellence*: our objective is to strengthen, extend and diversify ways of recognising and celebrating high achievement in the humanities and social sciences.

4. *Strengthening Policy Making*: our objective is to provide independent contributions to public policy development, enhancing the policy making process.

5. *Engaging with the Public*: our objective is to stimulate public interest in and understanding of the humanities and social sciences, and to contribute to public debate.

6. *Promoting Internationalism*: our objective is to promote UK research in international arenas, to foster a global approach across UK research and to provide leadership in developing global research links and expertise.

Further information about the work of the Academy can be found via www.britac.ac.uk

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The British Academy 2009-2013: reflections

ADAM ROBERTS

In these extracts from his address to the Annual General Meeting on 18 July 2013, the outgoing President of the British Academy, Professor Sir Adam Roberts, reflects on how the Academy has made progress on the objectives that he set for it four years ago.

NATIONAL ACADEMIES ARE CURIOUS BODIES. Their functions are not always obvious. A self-governing body of eminent academics may make claims to distinction, but what use is it to the wider world of scholarship, or indeed to society generally?

At the Annual General Meeting in July 2009, I identified specific priorities for my four-year term as President. These included: raising the profile of the Academy as a champion of humanities and social sciences; and engaging the expertise within the Fellowship with the wider world.[1] I believe we have made progress on these priorities.

Raising the Academy's profile

This first priority – raising the Academy's profile as champion of our subjects – was in some ways the trickiest. It involved taking public stances on major issues: not easy for a diverse group of scholars. It was important both to come up with clear points of view, which Council or the Officers could sign off, and to note the disclaimer that not every Fellow would agree with the view advanced, and was certainly not bound by it.

These four years have been a period of extraordinary uncertainty in higher education, with almost everything up for grabs: tuition fees, research assessment and funding, open access publication, immigration restrictions, language learning – the list is endless. We consulted widely and took an active part in all those debates. We were early in pressing the case for strengthening postgraduate funding.[2] Some wanted us to take an absolutist stance of rejecting particular policies outright. I sympathised, but we had to consider three questions. Was straightforward rejection actually justified in a particular case? Did we have a clear alternative? And how would the public perceive us if the British Academy, alone among the four major national academies, were to reject, say, the whole idea of assessing the impact of research? In the end we often took positions which could not satisfy everyone, but which were, I believe, the appropriate ones for a national academy.

Throughout, we emphasised the importance of learning for its own sake. At the same time, we pointed out that there is in fact considerable evidence, of many different kinds, for the usefulness of our disciplines. We have consistently urged that it is more appropriate to focus on the public value of our subjects than to concentrate more narrowly on the impact of specific pieces of research.

There has been progress in recognition of the Academy's leadership in representing its disciplines: the most obvious is the formal invitation by two successive Directors-General for Knowledge and Innovation to submit evidence – on behalf of the humanities and social science communities throughout the country – for two successive Government Spending Reviews. So too there have been invitations to submit evidence to and appear before numerous parliamentary select committees. The Higher Education Funding Council for England has acknowledged the Academy's expertise in relation to vulnerable subjects. In the Open Access debate the Academy's lead has been noted, and influential (Figure 1).

The Academy has also sought to strengthen language and quantitative skills in UK education and research, with a particular focus on influencing the development of



Figure 1. *'Debating Open Access', a collection of eight essays discussing the challenges of open access for the humanities and the social sciences, was published by the British Academy on 1 July 2013. The essays can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/openaccess*

[1] Adam Roberts, 'Rising to the Challenge', *British Academy Review*, 14 (November 2009), 1-3. All the publications referenced in this article are available to be read via the Academy's website, www.britac.ac.uk

[2] 'Postgraduate funding: the neglected dimension', British Academy Position Statement (July 2012).

national policies and strategies. The Academy's leadership in this area has received strong support. For example, the Academy's position statement on the need for a national strategy to address the UK's quantitative skills deficit – 'Society Counts'[3] – was accompanied by a supporting statement from 10 learned societies and subject associations.

In November 2012, the Academy held its first Language Week – a series of events, championing the use of languages in schools, universities, policymaking and public life.[4] In the past year we have produced several excellent and very well received publications addressing the need to improve the teaching of languages.[5] The Academy has now agreed a major new media partnership with the *Guardian* newspaper, to raise awareness of the importance of language learning and to inform educational policy and practice.

In the external consultations that we undertook as part of the development of the Academy's new *Strategic Framework* document (Figure 2), I was struck by the number of bodies that responded constructively – indicating support for our aspirations and a willingness to partner with us to help achieve them.



Figure 2. *The text of the British Academy's 'Strategic Framework 2013-2018', adopted at the Annual General Meeting on 18 July 2013, can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/about*

Throughout these four years I've never wavered from the belief that the British Academy must work as closely as possible with the other national academies – the Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering, and the Academy of Medical Sciences. Our collaborations have covered everything from shared services to human enhancement. They have been particularly close, and beneficial, regarding the Government Spending Reviews of 2010 and 2013. This year the four academies drew up a shared case for maintaining UK research spending even at a time of general austerity; and on 6 June we jointly presented that case to the Chancellor of the Exchequer at a meeting at number 11 Downing Street.

In the Chancellor's announcement of 26 June 2013 the government appears to have accepted the case: the cash level of research funding was maintained, much to the surprise of those who had predicted cuts. We do not yet know how the humanities and social sciences will fare in the sharing out of the cake – the detailed allocations of the science and research budget will not be known until September – but I am confident about the outcome.

Relations between a self-governing Academy and the government are by nature likely to be challenging. One of the many tricky issues we have had to confront was the invitation in 2011 to participate as a 'competent body' in assessing academic applicants for 'Tier 1' visa status. After much discussion in Council and elsewhere we agreed to do so. In making decisions about this we were not breaking wholly new ground. We have recently discovered in the archives that we performed a similar role in the Second World War. When many foreign nationals in the UK were held as detainees, the Academy established a committee to make recommendations to the Home Office 'regarding interned aliens of enemy nationality who possess special scientific or academic qualifications'. Very many were released under this scheme. We have a sheet listing 'Pevsner, N.' as one of the beneficiaries.[6] Twenty-five years later Nikolaus Pevsner (author of the famous *Buildings of England* series) was to feature on another Academy list – this time of those to be elected as Fellows of the British Academy.

There has been much international recognition of the British Academy's roles: the European Commissioner for Research announcing at the Academy plans concerning the new EU funding programme;[7] a renewed agreement with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; an approach from the Indian government for advice on setting up an Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences; and ongoing discussions with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for a conference in London next year on the value and role of the humanities and social sciences. We have also responded to requests for support from various academies that have faced the threat of unwelcome state control – most notably in Turkey and Russia.

Over the past four years we have strengthened the Academy's communications activities in many ways – building relationships with journalists, securing far more national press and broadcast coverage, developing new kinds of high profile public events to reach wider audiences, producing corporate publications, and redesigning the website. Increasing numbers of people visit the site, and the Academy's social media profile grows apace. (I did not imagine four years ago that I would be discussing the Academy and social media in the same sentence!)

[3] 'Society Counts: Quantitative Skills in the Social Sciences and the Humanities', British Academy Position Statement (October 2012). See also page 6 of this issue for 'Stand Out and Be Counted'.

[4] See 'British Academy Schools Language Awards 2012', *British Academy Review*, 21 (January 2013), 44-6.

[5] *Languages: the State of the Nation. Demand and supply of language skills in the UK*, a report prepared by Teresa Tinsley (February 2013). See also page 6 of this issue for 'Talk the Talk'.

[6] Letter dated 29 August 1940 from Sir F.G. Keynon, Secretary of the British Academy, to Sir Alexander Maxwell, Under Secretary of State, Home Office, reporting further recommendations made by the 'British Academy tribunal' for release from internment (BA 361). Pevsner is one of eight individuals listed as the highest priority – 'Persons whose contributions to learning are of the highest quality, and whose personal character is well vouched for'.

[7] Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, 'The future of social sciences and humanities in Horizon 2020', *British Academy Review*, 19 (January 2012), 20-3.

Engaging the Fellowship's expertise

This second aim concerns what we call public policy: and it reflects the fact that our disciplines have much to give to inform and supply evidence for policymaking. Here I should distinguish *HE policy*, where the Academy is engaged and seeks to advance a point of view, to champion certain interests, from *public policy*, where we do not seek to take sides, are not politically partisan, and are not a lobbying organisation. Our role, like that of the other national academies, is to put forward, in a disinterested and authoritative way, what the major issues appear to be, what the evidence is, and what, if any, the consensus of researchers is.

The beginning of my presidency marked a new level of engagement in public policy activities, including the establishment in September 2009 of the Academy's Policy Centre. Drawing on the expertise of our 900+ Fellows and other academics we have invited to take part, we have produced a series of reports on a wide range of public issues. These include UK voting systems,[8] stress at work,[9] and league tables.[10] Our reports, and their favourable reception, prove that the idea that policy should be evidence-based is not dead.[11]

There is of course much more to do. My successor, Nicholas Stern, will bring new ideas and energy to take the Academy forward. His renowned work on the environment is proof of the proposition that I have been pressing for four years: that none of the great problems that humankind faces can be successfully addressed without taking into account the contributions of the humanities and social sciences.

[8] See Simon Hix, Ron Johnston and Iain McLean, 'How to Choose an Electoral System', *British Academy Review*, 15 (March 2010), 1-3.

[9] See Tarani Chandola, 'The recession and stress at work', *British Academy Review*, 17 (March 2011), 4-5.

[10] Beth Foley and Harvey Goldstein, *Measuring Success: League tables in the public sector* (March 2012). Also Harvey Goldstein, 'School league tables: A short guide for head teachers and governors' (January 2013).

[11] See also page 7 of this issue.

A drawing of Sir Adam Roberts, newly commissioned by the British Academy, was unveiled at the Annual General Meeting on 18 July 2013. The artist, Andrew Tift, visited Sir Adam at the Academy and took hundreds of photographs of him. Together they then selected the photograph from which the drawing would be made. The medium is charcoal, graphite, carbon, ink and etching tool on 300g paper. The artist took further photographs of the work in progress, some of which are reproduced on the facing page.

‘Stand Out and Be Counted’ and ‘Talk the Talk’

As part of its four-year programme targeting deficits in Languages and Quantitative Skills in UK education and research, the British Academy has published two new student guides. *Stand Out and Be Counted* and *Talk the Talk* are aimed at school and university students – each using inspirational examples of the benefits, experiences and opportunities that language and quantitative skills can provide.

L&QS



Stand Out and Be Counted: A guide to maximising your prospects

In February 2013, the Academy published this guide for undergraduate students in the social sciences and humanities to spell out the value of data-handling skills. Produced in partnership with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the guide seeks to challenge many of the myths that surround quantitative skills.

Stand Out and Be Counted illustrates the concrete steps that can be taken to become adept at handling numbers and statistics, using personal stories from journalists, entrepreneurs, lecturers, and civil servants. Contributors include: James Daunt, CEO of Waterstones (right); Sharon Witherspoon, Director of the Nuffield Foundation; and Simon Rogers, Editor of the *Guardian*’s Datablog.

The guide can found at www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Stand_Out_and_Be_Counted.cfm

If your occupation has any quantitative aspect to it – and very few do not – to get a firm QS grounding will be of immense value. It will also help keep household expenses in line which makes most people sleep better and saves the odd domestic – in itself not to be sniffed at!



Talk the Talk: A guide to maximising your prospects using languages

In June 2013 the Academy, in collaboration with the European Commission, published this guide for school pupils and undergraduate students to illustrate the value of language learning.

Talk the Talk brings to life the excitement of languages, and demonstrates how perseverance with language study can open doors to an array of careers and life experiences. It offers personal endorsements from leading figures in the arts, sport, media, business, and politics. Contributors include: Arsène Wenger (right); Ellen MacArthur; Baroness Jean Coussins; and Richard Hardie, Chair of UBS Ltd.

The guide can be found at www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Talk_the_Talk.cfm

Every time you learn a new language, the next one is easier to learn. When you speak Italian, Spanish becomes easier. With German, English gets easier.

Public Policy at the British Academy

The British Academy has a programme of activities that engage expertise within the humanities and social sciences to shed light on wider public policy issues. Here are some recent examples of that work.

New Paradigms in Public Policy

Climate change, demographic shifts, the response to greater ethnic and religious diversity, debates about community and local politics, democratisation, nudge, the international financial crisis, popular disillusion with politics and politicians: these are among the most challenging developments in British society that face policy makers. Academic debates may identify a range of ways in which such issues can be understood and tackled, but policy is typically based on a narrow subset of possible approaches.

A new publication, the culmination of a British Academy public policy project, contributes to our understanding of how the ideas that lead the policy agenda emerge and are reinforced. It will assist the academic study of policy debate, and help develop understanding of the various policy issues that it examines. Written by leading academics, the essays draw on the most recent research in economics and social and political studies.



The volume is edited by Professor Peter Taylor-Gooby FBA. Further information about the book can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/



Schumpeter's nightmare? Legitimacy, trust and business in Britain

A report issued by the British Academy in January 2013 examines whether the legitimacy of business – its ability to command some sort of moral authority – is in decline. Written by Professor Michael Moran FBA, the report discusses whether the current mistrust and disgruntlement towards British business is just a straightforward reaction to the recent financial crisis, or whether this is part of a longer-term decline that could threaten its long-term survival, as predicted in the 1940s by renowned Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter.

Drawing on the work of some of the 20th century's most influential thinkers, Professor Moran explores the growing pressures on business, how they have responded to these pressures, and the apparent contradiction in the public's mistrust of 'big business' but willingness to place a surprising amount of trust in particular institutions and business personalities.

The report may be downloaded via www.britac. ac.uk/policy/Public_Policy_Publications.cfm

'Research in Action' event with UpRising

At an event held at the British Academy on 20 June 2013, established academics and members of the policy community engaged in a roundtable discussion with alumni of the UpRising Leadership Programme (members of UpRising's Emerging Leaders Network). The occasion allowed an exchange of ideas about where research can add to policy, encouraging the policymakers of tomorrow to recognise and use good quality research in their careers. This select event was led by Professor Steve Machin FBA.

A video about the event can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

Ever looser Union: The future of the UK

RICHARD WYN JONES

WITH JUST OVER A YEAR until the ballot boxes are opened and the votes counted, what is most striking from any comparative perspective is the equanimity with which the prospect of the referendum on Scottish independence is currently viewed by the overwhelming majority of the British political class. To be sure, a relatively small coterie of civil servants – assisted by sympathetic academics – continue to produce dossiers outlining the case as they see it for the continuing Union. Or more correctly, perhaps, the enormous risks they believe would accompany a move from home rule to full independence. But their contents receive only cursory and fleeting attention in a London media that appears to have largely relegated consideration of the referendum to their Scottish outlets – be they the Scottish editions of the 'national' newspapers, or television's 'regional' programming and opt-outs. It is as if the territorial integrity of the state – including, *inter alia*, the fate of a quarter of its land mass, almost all of its oil, and the only base capable of servicing its so-called independent nuclear deterrent – is considered to be a matter of only limited, sectional interest! They may even be right in this calculation. Television executives cite an apparent lack of audience interest south of the border as a reason for the paucity of serious 'national' coverage of the independence issue.

All this tells us a great deal. About the parochialism and lack of intellectual ambition of a metropolitan media, who appear more comfortable covering the latest ephemeral tittle tattle from the Westminster village than dealing with an event of genuine world-historical importance. About the extent to which, in practice, the recognition of the popular sovereignty of the nations of the Celtic fringe now trumps the British constitutional dogma – the 'crown-in-parliament' and all that – that we continue to teach our students.

It also tells us something very important about the self-understanding of those who populate the institutions of the central state and the vast majority of that state's non-Scottish inhabitants.

Consider for a moment the contrast between the relative equanimity with which the prospect of Scottish independence (not just the referendum itself, but even an affirmative vote) is viewed in London, and the neuralgic reaction in Ottawa or Madrid, say, at the prospect of a sovereign Quebec or Catalonia. Unless I am very much mistaken, the view in the Canadian and Spanish capitals is that those states could no longer be meaningfully regarded as 'Canada' or 'Spain' if territories were to secede from them. Territorial integrity is itself integral to the self-understanding and self-identification of the state. In London, and in the English heartlands of the state more generally, even if there might be some confusion about what the continuing state should be called – 'Little Britain' is one tongue in cheek suggestion – there would seem to be little prospect of the kind of existential crisis that secession would almost certainly precipitate in Spain and Canada. The state's core identity would remain intact. In this sense, the pervasive tendency in the rest of the world to use England as a synonym for Britain or the UK, while clearly the source of annoyance to the state's Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish inhabitants, speaks to a deeper truth.

Another reason for the equanimity with which the prospect of the independence referendum is currently viewed may well, of course, be the opinion polls that consistently show the 'No' side commanding a comfortable lead. But even if this lead is maintained and the pro-independence forces are defeated on the 18 September 2014, polls and survey research also suggest that the direction of travel for the UK is set fair in the direction of 'Ever looser Union'. Not only because of

Richard Wyn Jones is Director of the Wales Governance Centre and Professor of Welsh Politics at Cardiff University. On 31 May 2013, he participated in a conference held at the British Academy on 'Welsh Devolution in Perspective'. It looked at the historical and social ties between Wales, the rest of the United Kingdom and Europe, and asked 'What next for devolution?' Audio recordings of the presen-tations can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Welsh_Devolution_in_Perspective.cfm

This conference was part of a series, 'Wales, the United Kingdom and Europe', held in partnership with the Learned Society of Wales. A summary report of the conference may be downloaded via www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Public_Policy_Publications.cfm

attitudes in Scotland, but because of attitudes in Wales and England also.

Scotland

While the referendum will pose the choice facing the Scottish electorate as one between independence and the status quo, the surrounding political campaigning poses the choice in different terms: between independence and further self-government. This was presaged in a carefully worded statement in Edinburgh in February 2012 by Prime Minister David Cameron, who strongly implied that a 'No' vote would lead to further devolution. The Unionist political parties have all established various internal processes aimed at formulating their own enhanced schemes. Indeed, it appears that there are moves afoot behind the scenes to try to agree a joint-unionist alternative offer to be announced before the referendum. To the extent that a positive case is being put forward for the Union, it is for a Union in which the already powerful devolved Scottish parliament enjoys more autonomy and control over Scottish life.

The reasons for this become apparent on perusal of the polling evidence. Opponents of independence do not tire of pointing out (quite correctly) that there is no evidence that there has ever been more than minority support for such an outcome among the Scottish electorate. But even if they are more reticent of admitting it in public, they are also well aware that the constitutional status quo also enjoys only limited support. Rather, survey after survey demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Scots wish to see their devolved parliament enjoy substantially more powers. Indeed, it appears that only in the case of foreign and defence policy competences do we find a majority of Scots believing that competence should remain at the Westminster level (Table 1). If these sentiments are not somehow assuaged then unionists are in danger of winning the battle but losing the war.

Table 1. *Scotland: Which level of Government should have most influence over the following policy areas, 2012 (%).*

	Scottish	UK
Health	66	26
Schools	62	14
Welfare benefits	62	25
Taxation	57	37
Defence and Foreign affairs	31	63

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes.

Herein lies the rub. Viewed in retrospect, the Unionists' most recent attempt to redraw the Scottish settlement – via the Calman Commission and the subsequent 2012 Scotland Act – was poorly judged. It produced a financial package that appears to have been designed to force the Scottish authorities into taking politically contentious decisions, while at the same time granting them little or nothing by the way of additional, genuinely usable policy autonomy. So while the Scottish parliament will now have no option other than to take decisions on tax rates in Scotland – in itself, an entirely sensible development – it has not been entrusted with the ability to vary any changes between tax bands. This is hardly the kind of arrangement that one would associate with a genuine attempt at empowerment. This impression is confirmed when it is also recalled that, beyond the financial aspects of the settlement, the headline 'extra powers' granted to Edinburgh were over air guns and speed limits: important in their way, no doubt, but small beer in constitutional terms.

Will the Unionists do better this time? They surely have the incentive to do so. This is hardly the time for niggardly attitudes. But they also face genuine dilemmas, especially if as seems to be the case, they are determined to maintain cross-party unity while doing so. Not least because devolving significant elements of Welfare appears anathema to Labour, even while it rails against the various reforms and cuts being introduced by the Conservative-

The British Academy and the Royal Society of Edinburgh have been holding a series of focused events to look deeper into the issues that will affect Scotland and the United Kingdom following the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence.

On 17 April 2013, a British Academy Forum considered 'Taxation and Spending after the Scottish Referendum'.

On 24 July 2013, a British Academy Forum considered 'Currency, Banking and Financial Services after the Scottish Referendum'.

Reports of these two discussions may be downloaded via www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Public_Policy_Publications.cfm

Liberal Democrat UK coalition government. Moreover, even if they can agree and enact a more generous dispensation, it appears almost certain that it will fail to match the aspirations of the Scottish electorate. Assuming Scotland stays in the Union, its relationship with the central state will be looser than has been the case until now, and that there will remain substantial pressure for yet further devolution of power.

Wales

Given the relative lack of interest even at the prospect of Scottish independence, it is no surprise that developments in Wales enjoy even less prominence in the London media. Yet between 1999 and 2011, at least, it was Wales that provided much the most dramatic changes in both public attitudes and institutional architecture across the post-devolution UK.

From very unpromising beginnings, characterised by weak public support and a constitutional design that proved to be utterly inadequate, the National Assembly for Wales has rapidly gained both popular legitimacy and additional powers. This culminated in a very one-sided referendum campaign in March 2011 fought on the issue of additional powers. A referendum that saw an easy victory for the pro-devolution camp, with their opponents reduced to a small, rather chaotic rump.

Yet passing that milestone appears to have done nothing to quieten the clamour for further devolution. Rather, the Silk Commission, established by the UK government in October 2011, has already recommended the devolution of tax powers to Wales, in terms that are analogous to – but more generous than – those recommended to Scotland by the Calman Commission. The UK government's (delayed) response is now expected in early Autumn 2013, but the mood-music from the Liberal Democrat side of the coalition, at least, has been very positive.

Meanwhile the Commission itself has turned its attention to the second part of its mandate, and is considering the Welsh devolution dispensation more broadly. The Welsh Government has taken the opportunity to call for further, substantial changes. These involve, in part, correcting the continuing inadequacies of the Welsh dispensation, by moving from a 'conferred powers' (as envisaged for Scotland in the 1978 Scotland Act) to a 'reserved powers' (as eventually implemented by the 1998 Scotland Act) model of devolution. But in addition, Cardiff has called for the devolution of policing and – as a longer-term objective – criminal justice as a whole. As can be seen from the opinion poll evidence in Table 2, both these developments apparently enjoy strong support among the Welsh electorate at large.

Other ideas put forward to the Commission include the establishment of a separate legal jurisdiction for Wales, and (by the Conservative opposition in the National Assembly, no less) the devolution of broadcasting. While there is no direct evidence of public attitudes on these latter possibilities, it is nonetheless clear that, among both the Welsh political class and the population at large, the appetite for the further devolution of power is far from sated. Even if the country's parlous economic condition means that there is far less appetite in Wales than in Scotland for devolving Welfare functions, it is nonetheless clear that the country's future relationship with the UK state will be characterised by greater autonomy and self-government. In other words, a looser Union.

Table 2. *Wales: Which level of Government should have most influence over the following policy areas, 2013 (%).*

	Welsh	UK
Health	63	23
Schools	62	16
Police	60	23
Defence and Foreign affairs	12	75
Policy about Law & order	58	28

Source: YouGov, February 2013.

England

Until recently the perception had been that the English viewed the devolution process across the rest of the UK with what might be termed benign indifference. Broadly speaking they were relaxed about developments elsewhere in the state, so long as they continued to be governed by the familiar institutions of Westminster and Whitehall. This prevailing wisdom has been challenged by research carried out by a team from Cardiff and Edinburgh Universities and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), under the banner of the 'Future of England Survey' (Table 3).

Whatever the situation that pertained in the early years of devolution, it appears support in England for the territorial status quo has now fallen dramatically to no more than 1 in 4 of the population. In the context of a widespread perception that it is unfairly treated following devolution (what we have termed 'devoanxiety'), it appears that a majority wish to see England explicitly and positively recognised by the governmental system, rather than the present situation of being a kind of residual category left over as a result of devolution elsewhere. There is, however, no consensus as to what form such recognition should take.

Not only that, but it appears that English national identity is being politicised. The more exclusively English a person's sense of national identity, or the more strongly the English element of a joint or 'nested' Anglo-British identity is stressed, the more likely a person is to feel that England is unfairly treated by the current arrangements, and the more strongly they want to see a positive recognition of England *qua* England by the political system.

English dissatisfaction with the internal territorial constitution of the UK is also, it transpires, closely related to dissatisfaction with the state's external relationship with the European Union. Thus, even if Eurosceptic rhetoric posits 'Europe' as a threat to British values and traditions, it is in fact those who feel most exclusively English that are more hostile to the UK's membership of the EU. Indeed, counterintuitive though it may be to

many, given Eurosceptic rhetoric that posits Europe as a threat to British values and traditions, the most exclusively British a person's sense of national identity the more pro-European they tend to be.

The overall picture emerging strongly from the latest research is therefore of significant English discontent with both of the political unions of which their country is a part: with the United Kingdom as well as with the European Union. All of which suggest not only that pressure will continue to mount for an attempt, at least, to develop a looser relationship between the UK and the EU (as already promised by David Cameron), but also that pressure to redraw relationships within the UK in ways that grant the various national units more autonomy will emanate not only from Scotland and Wales, but increasingly from England too.

All of which poses a profound challenge of political and constitutional imagination. Can the institutions of the UK state actually adapt in ways that would give expression to the apparent public desire for 'Ever looser Union'? Thus far the devolution process, while leading to radical if not revolutionary changes at the periphery, has left those central institutions almost entirely unchanged. So, for example, even the UK government's territorial offices for Scotland and Wales have survived, even if it is hard to fathom how this could possibly be justified now those nations have their own law-making parliaments and powerful governments. But a further, more generous package of devolution to Scotland, in particular, would surely require major reforms at the centre – up to and including a written constitution – in order to ensure the proper functioning of what would then be a highly decentralised state.

In their way, however, England and English sentiments provide an even more profound challenge to the state. If the current fusion of UK and English functions in UK-level institutions is somehow brought to an end – which is, after all, what an increasing proportion of the English population seem to want – then institutionally speaking, everything would change. Indeed, while our attention will naturally focus on Scotland over the coming year, English discontent with both of the Unions of which England forms a part may well ultimately prove a greater threat to the state than nationalist sentiment north of the border.

Table 3. *England: Constitutional attitudes by national identity (Moreno scale), 2012 (%).*

	All	English not British	More English than British	Equally English and British	More British than English	British not English
'Devoanxiety'						
Scotland gets more than fair share of public spending	**51**	64	62	50	46	41
Scottish Parliament to pay for services from own taxes (strongly agree)	**81(49)**	85(76)	90(58)	82(45)	78(43)	64(33)
Scottish MPs no longer to vote on English laws (strongly agree)	**81(55)**	91(77)	88(62)	82(52)	81(52)	71(37)
Don't trust UK Government to work in English interest	**62**	72	62	60	55	62
Constitutional preferences for England						
Status quo	**22**	10	17	25	37	29
'English votes on English laws'	**33**	39	38	32	33	25
English Parliament	**18**	25	25	16	7	16
England independent inside the EU	**7**	5	6	6	8	8
England independent outside EU	**8**	13	7	8	7	7
Don't know	**12**	9	7	13	8	15
Vote in Referendum on EU membership						
Remain	**33**	17	28	33	45	49
Leave	**50**	72	58	48	37	35
Wouldn't vote	**5**	3	3	6	5	3
Don't know	**12**	8	10	13	13	13

Source: Future of England Survey 2012.

HISTORY at the British Academy

The British Academy has a varied programme of publications and events for communicating scholarship. Here are some recent examples relating to the study of history.

Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the 21st Century

How do we write about the history of a place, a person, an event or an idea in its context in the world? How do we do history in the current age of globalisation? In January 2013, the British Academy published a volume of essays which presents historians at a crossroads: enjoying the great excitement of moving out of national borders and reconnecting parts of the world once studied separately, but also facing the huge challenge of new methodologies of comparison, collaboration and interdisciplinarity and the problems of rapidly disappearing tools of foreign languages. The volume is edited by Professor Maxine Berg FBA. Further information can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/



Teaching History in the Twenty-First Century

During the 20th century, traditional concepts of objectivity and narratives of Western exceptionalism have been challenged forcefully. Does that mean that our relationship with the past and the content and purpose of history are now less self-evident than before? Which historical problems appear most urgent for contemporary societies to explore critically? What and how do historians in an age intensely aware of

global interconnections teach in universities? On 29 January 2013, the British Academy hosted a panel discussion that considered the controversies over current visions of the discipline.

The panellists were Sir John Elliott FBA, Professor Christopher Clark FBA, Professor Maxine Berg FBA (*pictured*), and Professor Michael Bentley. The event was chaired by Dr Ulinka Rublack. Video recordings of the discussion can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

From Plunder to Preservation: Britain and the Heritage of Empire, c.1800-1940

What was the effect of the British Empire on the cultures and civilisations of the peoples over whom it ruled? A book published by the British Academy in May 2013 takes a novel approach to this important and controversial subject by considering the impact of empire on the idea of 'heritage'. It reveals a dazzling variety of attitudes on the part of the imperialists – from frank 'plunder' of American, Asian, African and Pacific peoples' cultural artefacts and monuments, to a growing appreciation of the need for 'preservation' of the world's heritage in the places it originated. But it goes beyond the empire-centred view to consider how far colonised peoples themselves were able to embed indigenous understandings of their heritage in the empire, and how indeed the empire was very often dependent on indigenous knowledge for its own functioning.



This volume of essays is edited by Dr Astrid Swenson and Professor Peter Mandler. Further information can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/

The Middle Ages in the Modern World

What it is to be 'modern' has always been shaped by ideas about what was 'medieval'. 'The Middle Ages' is perhaps one of the most powerful metaphors for how shared senses of history, culture, and international relations have been understood in the West. In an event held at the British Academy on 1 July 2013, Terry Jones (of *Monty Python* fame) and Professor Patrick Geary (Princeton) discussed today's uses and abuses of the idea of the medieval.

The discussion was chaired by Dr Chris Jones (of the University of St Andrews, which jointly sponsored the event). A video recording of the event can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

The immediacy of a remote past:

The afterlife of Widukind in the Third Reich

PETER LAMBERT

IN THE EARLY YEARS of the Third Reich, Nazi ideologues and propagandists loudly proclaimed the rebirth of the German nation. But when exactly had it first been born, and when had it first died? Numerous Nazis – including Rosenberg, Himmler and Darré – looked back to the late 8th and early 9th centuries, constructing an originary myth of a pristine Germanic and pagan Germany, championed by the Saxon war-lord 'Duke' Widukind, and its destruction at the hands of Charlemagne, Romanism and Christianity. But, even within the Nazi Party's leadership, this proved a highly controversial view. Just as the regime seemed poised to begin to fulfil its totalitarian ambitions and impose ideological uniformity on Germans, a furious public debate broke out. It was about the origins and meaning of German history, and ultimately about what it meant to be German. No Nazi doubted that events from which modern Germans were separated by more than a millennium posed urgent questions for the present, and Charlemagne's Saxon wars acquired other kinds of immediacy in Nazi historical imaginations.

In this article – an edited extract from the paper[1] I gave at the June 2013 British Academy Conference on 'Uses of the Past in Past Societies: A Global Perspective' – I argue that Himmler was by no means unique among Nazi ideologues in his belief in reincarnation. I trace fantasies of reincarnation through the celebration of Widukind by the prominent Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, and through two of the several historical novels heroising Widukind. As a genre, historical novels flourished in the Third Reich, conveying enthusiasm for the past by making it seem familiar.

Alfred Rosenberg

Battle-lines drawn in the 8th century were held to be essentially *the same* as those of the 20th century. The conflicts were constructed as racial and religious, and so as ancestral. Rosenberg established a chain which ran from Widukind back in time to Arminius – Hermann the Cheruscan, whose forces had annihilated two of Caesar Augustus's legions – and forward to Hitler himself. The Nazi Party's daily newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, proclaimed that, in the wake of 'the rebirth of the nation' and after an interval 'of 1,100 years, Widukind's spirit has come back to life in the German people. It is only today that the Saxon struggle for freedom finds its historical appreciation and continuation.' Here, the *Völkischer Beobachter*'s journalist echoed Rosenberg's view: the Third Reich did *not* pick up where the First Reich had left off. Rather, it completed the work of a string of 'rebels against the Reich' and, by extension, connected with a pure Germanic past before 'oriental' contamination had set in.[2]

Dr Peter Lambert and Professor Björn Weiler – both of the Department of History & Welsh History at Aberystwyth University – were joint organisers of the British Academy Conference on 'Uses of the Past in Past Societies: A Global Perspective', held at the British Academy on 11-12 June 2013. The conference brought together an international group of historians, anthropologists and art historians with expertise ranging from the 11th century to the 21st, and from Byzantium to post-colonial Ghana. They asked how societies have engaged with, debated, refashioned and used their pasts. Among the several themes to have emerged repeatedly in the course of the conference were two which Lambert's extract exemplifies: first, an obsession with ancestry; second, a willingness to imagine or invent pasts which transcended divides between quasi-professional historians and others pursuing historical interests. More information can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013

Each year the British Academy holds up to six 'British Academy Conferences' – pivotal events of lasting significance, at which leading-edge research of the highest calibre can be presented and discussed. Held over one or two days, these conferences provide particular opportunities for multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary perspectives.

[1] 'The proximity of a remote past: the afterlives of Charlemagne and Widukind in Nazi Germany'.

[2] *Völkischer Beobachter* (North-German edn), 16 August 1934, Supplement: 'Ältester deutscher Adel in Westfalen. Die sieben Sattelmeier von Enger.'

Figure 1. *The 'Saxon Grove' at Verden an der Aller: the Nazis' monument to the 4,500 Saxons allegedly executed on Charlemagne's orders. Why did the Nazis commemorate an event of the 8th century with a monument that seemed to echo stone circles and avenues of the Neolithic or the Bronze Age? Photo: Patricia Duncker.*

And, in what was trumpeted as an epoch of national rebirth, a belief in reincarnation shaped appreciations of Widukind and Charlemagne. Widukind may have been 'defeated in the ninth century' but, according to Rosenberg, 'in the twentieth, he triumphs in the person of Adolf Hitler.'[3] Even more striking in their literal-mindedness, other Nazis used the motif of reincarnation to establish Widukind's place in German history.

Fritz Vater

In the Third Reich, dividing lines between genres of historical writing and historical fiction, and between historical evidence and products of the imagination, were programmatically blurred. Fritz Vater's Widukind-novel, *Weking* (first published in 1938), has been described as an 'SS-novel'.[4] It is not only manifestly underpinned by a considerable body of research, but exposes the research in a scholarly apparatus. As well as maps and genealogies, there are ten pages of endnotes, incorporating references to primary sources and to secondary literature. The book's premise, namely that the contemporary documentary record comprises nothing but a catalogue of Carolingian falsifications, legitimised Vater's representation of his fiction as conveying a deeper historical truth. Early on in the tale, he introduced his readers to the Godenhof. Functioning partly as Saxon military training academy, partly as school in politics, and partly as a sort of pagan priestly seminary, it was an unmistakable forerunner of the Nazis' would-be elite schools. Widukind was one of its graduates. At first sight, the Godenhof appeared like any Saxon noble's farmstead. But at its heart was a domed building which boasted glass panes in its windows. This Saxon institution, then, was not some archaic remnant of a barbarian people about to have civilisation thrust upon it: the glass panels were intended by Vater to serve as windows into an 8th-century modernity. Through them, one might see the leather-upholstered chair in which Godwin, the establishment's director, would recline in cultivated comfort after his educational labours.[5]

Beside the Godenhof, Vater imagined a processional path leading to the Eggestern Stone, a holy place of the Saxons. As Ruotwolt, Godwin's chosen successor, walked along it with the sword-companions of the Godenhof, he 'grew conscious of the fact that for centuries the ancestors … had trodden this path …, urged on by the same sense of holiness' as now began to overcome Ruotwolt himself. 'Almost unconscious of his own self', he

> lived for a while beyond space and time: things past and things yet to come flowed toward him, meeting within him; he felt close to eternity, and knew it to be laid into *his* hands, entrusted to *his* spirit, and the weight of the responsibility and sacrality of this task seized his being.
>
> 'We are the ancestors' he whispered to himself – and reeled under the shock of the grandeur of this idea. Yet he could not withdraw from it: it was right. We are the ancestors and are our descendants too. Nothing will be able to make us deviate from our path. We will pursue it to the end – because the Guardians wish it. … We cannot err, neither we nor our grandchildren, if the ancestors live in and work through us.

The site was simultaneously also where the cremated remains of Arminius were preserved. Thus, beyond the common postulation that the Chersucans had dissolved into the Saxon tribe, he posited a more direct link between 1st-century rebels against Rome and 8th-century rebels against Charlemagne's romanising empire. 'Surely', Ruotwolt mused, Arminius too had been guided by a presentiment of the Reich.[6]

Edmund Schopen

Published in 1936, the first volume of Edmund Schopen's *History of the Concept of the Reich* opened with a novella about Widukind.[7] Like Vater's tale, it commingled ancestry with sacrality, and used these themes to draw the ties between Arminuis and Widukind closer still. In one scene, Widukind appeared on the eve of a battle at Detmold. Having ridden at dead of night through the Teutoburg forest, Widukind dismounted to enter a silent, pitch-black ravine. He was on a quest, seeking a prophecy. But what he first encountered was the stuff of nightmares: things that were 'alive, slithering and hissing' as they fled from under his feet, and then 'metal objects … and something else that broke like old bone'. His 'chest tightened' with a 'silent

[3] Rosenberg, quoted in the front-page banner headline of the *Völkishcer Beobachter* (North-German edn), 26 June 1934.

[4] Fritz Vater, *Weking: Die Saga vom Heldenkampf der Niedersachsen* (Munich, Franz Eher, 1938; 4th edn, 1943); Frank Westenfelder, *Genese, Problematik und Wirkung nationalozialistischer Literatur am Beispiel des historischen Romans zwischen 1890 und 1945* (Frankfurt a.M., Peter Lang, 1989), p. 252.

[5] Vater, *Weking*., pp. 9-11; 17.

[6] Ibid., pp. 31-2.

[7] 'Widukinds Knappe', in Edmund Schopen, *Geschichte der Reichsidee* vol. 1 (Munich, Carl Röhrig, 1936), pp. 13-161.

dread' lest he was '*really* in a mausoleum' and being given a clear sign of the outcome of the following day's battle.

> Then Widukind nearly jumped out of his skin when into his daydream there fell a deep, clear voice. Soft and melodic as the full, mild tone of a lyre.
>
> 'Welcome, Widukind!'
>
> Silently he stood. Amazed, his gaze measured the high figure which towered above him, the mightiest of men, by a head. …
>
> Like a child, he was standing before the Wala of his people.

The Wala – variously a goddess or a priestess-*cum*-prophetess in Germanic myth – led Widukind below ground, into a cavernous shrine. She stopped at the edge of a lake, onto whose 'still mirror' Widukind's eyes rested. He began to look deep into it, until he discerned its last depths. There, he saw at first rune-like patterns in the rock – and then something else, 'like the figure of a man. Yes: a man'. The figure was 'covered by a round shield … with the same tribal device upon it as his own shield carried: the quadriskele, the emblem of the sun'. As his widening eyes 'greedily … drank in the picture', the resemblances to himself multiplied: the same 'red-blond curls', the same beard. 'Was it not the long, narrow face, the giant-limbed frame, the long-legged figure

Figure 2. *Statue of Widukind, at Herford in Germany, originally created by sculptor Heinrich Wefing in 1899 (the face may well be that of Kaiser Wilhelm I). It represents a myth in which Widukind, although already nominally Christian, challenged Christ to prove his power by letting water run at a rocky spot in Bergkirchen, Bad Oeyenhausen; the subsequent welling up of a spring played a key part in Widukind's 'inner' conversion, and the foundation of a church erected above the site was attributed to him. The statue disappeared in 1942, probably smelted down by the Nazis for the war effort. Neither the Christian associations nor the winged helmet and beard would have suited Nazi tastes. The statue in place now is a 1959 copy. Photo: M. Kunz (Wikimedia Commons)*

of his own body? Was it not he himself who lay there, a fallen dead hero?'

But just as Widukind began to fear that the seer was showing him his own fate in the imminent battle, she answered his unspoken question:

> No! It is not you yourself. You will live. Even through tomorrow, the hardest day of your life, you will survive! Your work is not yet done. Only now is it beginning. When you have overcome, it will begin. That is why I showed him to you. He had begun it. You will continue it. One who comes after will complete it. All of one lineage. Your great ancestor. Your descendant. Did you not know that it was your great ancestor, Siegfried Arminius, who fought the battle up there on this very ground 800 years before you and drove the Romans away? Yes, Widukind, you are of Cheruscan descent. For a thousand years have you lived on this soil.

All the tribes of the region had merged to become Saxons, she explained, only for the Saxons to divide into new petty tribes.

> And you want to unite them once more. And you will, Widukind! And your descendant will achieve even more than you! … You are Germanic people! The new world!
>
> 'My ancestor!' stammered the man.
>
> 'Your ancestor!'

the Wala responded. But then she immediately blurred the line between ancestry and reincarnation, explaining that 'Men of his retinue brought the murdered man down to me. To me or to another. We are all the same.' Schopen's ambiguity was studied. The precise congruity between the image of Arminius and the appearance of the living Widukind hinted strongly at something more than two links in an ancestral line spanning eight centuries, and the Wala's persisting with the first person singular to explain Arminius's conveyance into the shrine reinforced the intimation that shared blood conveyed immortality. For 'I carried the dead man's body and lowered it into this ground', she continued, 'so that his image would be preserved. For you had to see him and to know that it is your destiny to struggle as he had done against that which is foreign within us, not against ourselves.'[8]

Widukind awoke with the dawn, not knowing what to make of the Wala's parting injunction and unsure as to whether, having set out to find this 'figure of myth', he had only dreamed her. Only after the Saxons' defeat in the battle was he sure – and able to interpret the Wala's riddle. Thus far, he had been too modest in his goals. Not the unification of the Saxon tribes alone was to be his task. He must unite *all* the Germanic tribes whose internecine struggles he now recognised as civil war. 'It seemed to Widukind as if the bloody days that lay behind him pulled a veil from before his eyes. Are the Franks we ourselves? Are the Franks and Bavarians and Allemans that which we Saxons are? Yes: we are altogether only one Germania after all.' That being so, in a sense even 'Karl's Reich was his Reich.' However, if the Saxons must therefore be 'melted into' the other Germanic tribes within Charlemagne's polity, Saxony must then 'conquer this Reich, which was threatening to become Roman, from within.' Thus, it 'was necessary not only' that Widukind 'liberate his own people, but also the Franks themselves from this over-mighty power. It was not the forced rule of the state, but over the soul.' There was 'one thing that they must all kill and exterminate [*ausrotten*] in themselves and in this Reich, namely that which was alien and wanted to force itself into the Germanic soul: the Latin, the Roman, the outlandish Italianate spirit.'[9]

Preordained

For the Nazi and other *völkisch* admirers of the Germanic tribes, the discovery of an ancient past was a road to self-discovery. Their biological-racial view of history collapsed time. For them, time was not linear but flowed, like racial ancestry, in a stream. Passing back through 1,100 years involved no great journey, no discovery of a strange people in a strange period. This is what Fritz Vater captured in his hero's ringing declaration: 'We are the ancestors!' Such ancestor-worshippers were thus worshipping themselves. The 'logic' of their position was clear. Really to understand the Germanic past was an urgent duty, for grasping that past allowed 20th-century Germans to comprehend their own preordained tasks. 'We must learn to comprehend the great world-political connections which explain the present out of the past and determine the future', urged Edmund Schopen. 'The Saxon struggles under Widukind' had given rise to a 'thousand years' labour' carried by the 'great Saxon community of the blood' which had, 'constantly and in the face of setbacks, wrestled a German national Reich free of a Reich entity which had fallen under the spiritual dominance of Romandom.' The Saxons' endeavours had 'found their coronation only in the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in which the last remnants of foreign infiltration are being removed in all cultural domains and a pure Germanic state is being formed.' Therein lay '*the meaning of the saga of the Reich*.'[10]

[8] Ibid., pp. 109-15.

[9] Ibid., pp. 128-30.

[10] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

The Grenada intervention: 30 years later

GARY WILLIAMS

Dr Gary Williams, of the University of Essex, was awarded a British Academy Small Research Grant in 2006 to research into 'US-Grenadian relations 1979-83: revolution and intervention in the backyard'.

On 25 October 1983 the United States, supported by several Caribbean nations, intervened in the tiny eastern Caribbean island of Grenada. President Reagan gave three reasons for the intervention: to protect innocent lives (including around one thousand Americans), forestall further chaos, and assist in the restoration of law and order and governmental institutions. Codenamed Urgent Fury, the operation followed the violent collapse of the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) which had seen the Prime Minister and seven colleagues executed and a shoot-on-sight curfew imposed by the military. Grenada's Eastern Caribbean neighbours were shocked and concerned and requested assistance from the United States to remove the new military regime in Grenada.

Revolution

Grenada gained its independence from Britain in 1974 under the autocratic and repressive rule of Eric Gairy, the dominant figure in Grenadian politics since 1951. In March 1979 he was overthrown by the opposition New Jewel Movement (NJM) in a coup, or 'revolution' as they called it. The NJM were a radical party whose leadership was composed of young intellectuals who had been influenced by the ideas of the Black Power Movement, African socialism and Marxist-Leninism.

The Caribbean reaction was mixed. Grenada's smaller neighbours deplored the use of force and worried that they would be next. The larger and more distant countries gave the new People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) the benefit of the doubt based on promises of elections and a return to constitutional rule. The US did likewise and hoped that the realities of being in power would moderate some of the PRG's more radical views. However, within a month the constitution was suspended, political opponents detained, elections postponed indefinitely, and arms received from



Figure 1. *American troops on patrol in Grenada. Photo: courtesy Ronald Reagan Library.*

Cuba and Guyana. Washington instructed their Ambassador to Barbados to inform PRG Prime Minister Maurice Bishop that the US would 'view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba'. Bishop made a defiant speech on Radio Free Grenada: 'no country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country or who to be friendly with... We are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale.'[1] The PRG quickly established close links with Cuba and courted the Soviet Union, Eastern bloc, North Korea and radical third world countries like Libya and Iran. Health, education and basic infrastructure improved as the PRG set about transforming society. Relations with the US remained frosty as Washington adopted a distancing policy and increased aid to neighbouring countries. Under President Reagan, policy hardened into political, economic and military pressure, as Grenada was viewed as a Soviet-Cuban surrogate and therefore a matter of national security.

The revolution devours its children

By mid-1983 the revolution was running out of steam; the majority of Grenadians had become disenchanted with the authoritarian PRG, the showcase international airport project was consuming most of the foreign aid received, and the army and militia were demoralised. The Central Committee acknowledged that there was a serious problem, identified Bishop's weak leadership as the cause and proposed Joint Leadership between Bishop and his hard-line Marxist-Leninist Deputy Bernard Coard, the prime mover behind the revised leadership structure. Bishop initially agreed but later changed his mind and asked for the issue to be reopened; he was charged with defying the will of the Party and being 'without redemption', and placed under house arrest on 13 October. This staggered Grenadians who were unaware of the crisis. On 19 October hundreds of Bishop's supporters marched to his house and freed him. He led them to Fort Rupert, the army's headquarters, but when military forces arrived to retake the Fort around 40 people died in the ensuing violence, many after jumping over the walls to escape. Bishop and seven colleagues were lined up against a wall and shot. A Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) was established and the island place under curfew.

The consensual Eastern Caribbean response was horror and condemnation. Bishop's death led to a convergence of thinking in the Caribbean and Washington. On 21 October the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), joined by Barbados and Jamaica, issued an invitation to the US to 'depose the outlaw regime in Grenada by any means'. In Washington plans for an evacuation of US citizens switched to full-scale military intervention; regional support for such action was desirable and in the OECS they had supporters who were 'way out in front' and pushing the military option harder and faster than the US was prepared to respond. A request for assistance was also later received from Grenada's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, the only remaining representative of constitutional authority.

American and British diplomats visited Grenada to discuss the evacuation of foreign citizens but the RMC were evasive and stalled for time, insisting that everything would be back to normal soon. The larger CARICOM (Caribbean Community) organisation was sharply divided: the OECS members argued for a military solution, but the likes of Trinidad, Guyana and Belize ruled out the use of force and external involvement in favour of economic and political sanctions.

The UK had been invited to participate by the OECS, but concluded that action would depend on US involvement and the message they were getting from Washington was that they were proceeding cautiously and London would be consulted. Hence there was genuine surprise when a telegram from President Reagan arrived the evening before the intervention saying that he was giving 'serious consideration' to the OECS' request, followed a few hours later by one saying that he had decided to respond positively. Prime Minister Thatcher phoned Reagan and

Figure 2. *Overlooking the capital St George's, Fort Rupert was the site of the 19 October 1983 executions. (The fort has now reverted to its pre-revolution name of Fort George.) Photo: the author.*

[1] Quoted in Gary Williams, *US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 39-41.

Figure 3. *President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica take questions at a White House press conference, having announced the US-Caribbean intervention in Grenada on 25 October 1983. Photo: courtesy Ronald Reagan Library.*

asked him to call off the operation 'in the strongest possible language'. She argued that military action would endanger rather than protect foreign nationals, London had not received a formal written invitation from the OECS, and most of CARICOM had rejected a military solution. Her plea fell on deaf ears and Urgent Fury started just hours later. Victory was inevitable and within three days over 6,000 troops had landed and all major military objectives been achieved.

Aftermath

Although widely criticised internationally, the intervention was enormously popular amongst those who mattered most – the people of Grenada. Many viewed it as a 'rescue' and a chance to start again, especially economically and politically. Just as Cuba had viewed Grenada as a showcase for what their foreign aid could achieve, the US were keen to demonstrate their generosity; $3 million of emergency aid was provided in November and a further $57 million was received in 1984. This money was spent largely on infrastructure and health, education and welfare programmes, but ironically the US also contributed towards the cost of completing the Cuban-built international airport – now vital for its tourist potential, rather than military potential as Reagan had dramatically claimed just months before. Britain, stung by criticism that it had failed its friends by not participating, provided £750,000 of aid and a one million pound interest-free loan; in 1985 a five-year £5 million aid package was announced. Grenada also received assistance from Canada, Venezuela, South Korea and Taiwan, and regional and multilateral agencies.

Washington's aim was to put Grenada on a firm economic footing that would engender long-term growth. Foreign investment was seen as crucial, as the domestic sector was too small to provide the capital needed, but Grenada's weak infrastructure, high taxes and perceived political instability meant that private investors largely steered clear. By 1988 US bilateral aid was winding down and the Grenadian government was encouraged to look to multilateral agencies. Since then, Grenada has become a primarily tourist-based economy; after a slow start to the 1990s, economic growth improved, only to be reversed by the impact on tourism of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Ivan (2004) and Hurricane Emily (2005) which damaged 90 per cent of the island's buildings and devastated export crops. The country has struggled to recover, with unemployment now running at 30 per cent and the national debt reaching near unsustainable levels.

Restoring democracy

Restoring democracy after four-and-a-half years of the PRG and several decades of Gairy was a significant challenge. As the sole remaining representative of constitutional authority, Governor General Scoon assumed Executive Authority and established a nine-member Advisory Council headed by Nicholas Braithwaite, a former senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education (and future Prime Minister). Scoon and the Council stated their intention to hold elections within one year. Existing political parties were resurrected – Herbert Blaize's Grenada National Party and Eric Gairy's Grenada United Labour Party – and four new parties established. In US and Caribbean eyes the possibility of Gairy winning the election had to be removed; it would severely undermine the rationale of the invasion and mark a return to repression and corruption, and probably trigger political unrest and economic instability. The Prime Ministers of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia and Barbados, took the initiative and engineered the formation of a coalition entitled the New National Party, something the individual parties had proved unable or unwilling to do themselves. The coalition duly defeated Gairy in the 1984 election, winning 14 of the 15 seats. However, it was plain that managing the differing ideas about power-sharing, political strategy and personal relationships over the long-

Figure 4. *An abandoned Cuban airplane rusts away at Pearls airport, as a relic of the revolutionary years. Photo: the author.*

term would be a serious challenge. Grenadians also had high expectations, making it clear that they wanted strong leadership and political stability, and a government that was going to solve the problems of high unemployment, rising cost of living and poor infrastructure. Although the government did manage to restructure the economy, rebuild government bureaucracy, establish a new police force and bring Bishop's killers to trial, it could not overcome its internal differences and disintegrated after three years. From the ashes emerged the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and The National Party (TNP) and a reorganised NNP. Since then, the NDC and NNP have dominated Grenadian politics, both enjoying terms in office. For the most part the invasion achieved its aim of restoring democracy; six free and fair elections have been held since 1983 and a functioning parliamentary democracy established. However, as one Caribbean academic recently concluded, 'neither party has translated formal democracy into a deeper substantive democracy', which is what the US and OECS nations envisaged all those years ago.[2]

Reconciliation?

Whilst a new economic and political start may have been achieved, the traumatic and confounding events of October 1983 still haunt the island. Seventeen individuals (the Grenada 17 as they became known) were tried and convicted for their role in the murder of Bishop and his colleagues; 14 were sentenced to death, later commuted to life, and three given long sentences. A project by senior students from the Presentation Brothers College in Grenada about what happened to the bodies of Bishop and his colleagues which were never found, revealed via interviews the level of resentment, pain and anguish that still existed.[3] The student project attracted media interest, and in 2001 the government set up a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission into events during the revolutionary years. After many delays the Commission produced its Report in 2006; it concluded that there was a 'lack of will and desire, and even blatant refusal on the part of many – those who have done wrong ... and those who have been wronged – to actually forgive and forget.'[4] The Report did not add any new knowledge but did call for a retrial of the 17, something their supporters and human rights groups had long argued was necessary as the original trial and appeal were allegedly unfair. In February 2007 the British Privy Council, the highest court of appeal for former British colonies, ruled the original sentencing invalid and ordered a re-sentencing of the 17 by the Supreme Court of Grenada. The Court ruling released three ex-soldiers immediately, re-sentenced the others to 40 years with a parole review within two years; having already spent 21 years in prison it was expected that they would be released by 2010. The thirtieth anniversary year of the 'revolution' proved to be a controversial one; on 29 May 2009 the airport was renamed after Maurice Bishop as the government had promised in their election manifesto, and on 7 September Bernard Coard and his 13 colleagues were released from prison. Although Bishop clearly played a part in the events of October, Coard is generally considered as the evil villain, scheming to overthrow the charismatic Bishop who for Grenadians was the Revolution. Coard gave several interviews on his release talking about his torture in prison, the trial's shortcomings and blaming Bishop for reneging on the joint leadership decision which led to things 'getting out of hand'. He also stirred up the most emotive of issues – the whereabouts of Bishop and his colleagues' bodies – accusing Washington of having them. Whilst his supporters claimed his release was the closing of a chapter in Grenada's history and that it was time to move on, his release also demonstrated that emotions run deep for many people affected by the events of October 1983 and that there can be no closure or reconciliation. The final releases also demonstrated that for approximately two-thirds of the population, who have no memory of the revolutionary years and intervention, the heated discussions about the release of the prisoners were of little relevance.

[2] Wendy Grenade, 'Party Politics and Governance in Grenada: An Analysis of the New National Party (1984-2012)', *The Round Table*, 102:2 (2013), 167-176.

[3] Young Leaders of Presentation Brothers College, *Under Cover of Darkness* (St. George's, Grenada, 2002). Sections of the project pamphlet are reproduced in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report.

[4] The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, *Grenada: Redeeming the Past: A Time for Healing* (St. George's, Grenada, Government Printery, 2006), p. 53.

‘Ending the party’: A practitioner’s perspective of fiscal squeeze

At an event held at the British Academy on 9 July 2013, ***Rachel Lomax*** *recalled past examples of fiscal squeeze and compared them with current circumstances – in conversation with Professor Tony Travers.*

Rachel Lomax is an economist with long and varied experience of policy making. She was a Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and a member of the Monetary Policy Committee between 2003 and 2008. Previously she was a top civil servant, who headed three Government departments, Transport, Work and Pensions, and Wales. Her earlier career included spells as Chief of Staff to the President of the World Bank, and as Head of the Economic and Domestic Secretariat at the Cabinet Office. She was Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, in the mid 1980s, and a Treasury economist during the 1970s and early 1980s. She now serves on the boards of a number of financial and non-financial companies, including HSBC and Heathrow Airport.

Tony Travers is Director of LSE London, a research centre at the London School of Economics, and is also a Visiting Professor in the LSE’s Government Department

This is an edited version of the conversation, which ranged from the IMF crisis of 1976 to current times. A video recording of the whole event may be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

Professor Tony Travers

What is learned each time there is a crisis and then a boom and then another crisis? Is there any institutional memory? Is there any sense that, next time it happens, one can learn from what happened last time, which may only be 15 or 20 years ago?

Rachel Lomax

I was in the Treasury during the ’70s, ’80s and early ’90s, and there was a fairly stable group of people working on these issues throughout that period. As I remember it, there was a long process of trial and error. It was a case of ‘We tried that, it did not work, let us try something else.’ The road to inflation targeting is a good example. We tried different kinds of monetary targets and they did not work; then we went on to shadowing the Deutsche Mark; then we went into the ERM (exchange rate mechanism) and that did not work; so then we tried inflation targeting. There was quite a learning period – or that is how it seemed to me.

Finding a framework for setting fiscal policy was even more of a struggle. We used to play around with notions of debt sustainability, but they are very elastic, as governments have found recently. We used to argue there was a relationship between the PSBR (public sector borrowing requirement) and interest rates, but it was never easy to quantify. The fiscal rules that Gordon Brown constructed in the late ’90s were consistent with the way thinking inside the Treasury had developed. In that sense there was learning in the area of fiscal policy too.

Post-1997, a period when I have not been in the Treasury, my observation is that there has been a severe loss in the Treasury’s internal memory, principally because the turnover of staff has been so high. There was a large exodus of people during the 1990s, followed by a huge expansion of the Treasury after 1997. I can remember talking to a room full of people in the Treasury in about 2004, and saying, ‘Please put your hand up if you were here before 1997.’ About three people put their hand up at the back of the room. Now, maybe the people who turned up to listen to me talk were the people who weren’t there before. But there really was a lot of turnover in the Treasury, and that inevitably led to a loss of the

Rachel Lomax in conversation at the British Academy on 9 July 2013.

department's collective memory. Nowadays we seem to be much more dependent on think-tanks, academics, and people in the City to think about these issues. Certainly it is less possible to count on a small cohort of life-long Treasury civil servants to design policy.

Tony Travers

That is a pretty remarkable observation. The idea is that the civil service is supposed to be permanent and government is a continuous thing. And yet you are saying that government relies on outsiders in order to allow itself to have a memory.

Rachel Lomax

I think that the notion of a permanent civil service in the old sense, the sense in which it was true in the '60s and '70s, has changed quite profoundly. There has been enormous turnover in permanent secretaries; and people come in to run government departments who have never worked in government; there has been a lot more in and out. The position of the civil servants *vis-à-vis* ministers, and special advisers (who are a completely different breed now), and think-tanks, has changed a great deal. Some of it is healthy and some of it is not healthy.

The Treasury is not the institution it was, and that is scarcely surprising. The world has changed. Basically, in the 1960s or 1970s if you wanted to be a macro economist, and if you were interested in policy, the Treasury was the place to go – where else was there? The pre Big Bang City didn't employ economists – or precious few. Nor I think did the big consulting firms – that came much later. Starting in the late 80s, there has been a massive growth in very well paid opportunities for top flight graduates – the sort of people who might have once regarded a job at the Treasury as the summit of their ambitions. Of course, there are still some very smart people who do start their careers in the Treasury but nowadays they go off somewhere else after a couple of years. This process has been going on since at least the late '80s, and as pay disparities have opened up it has gathered pace. Has it now reached the point where the impact on the Treasury has gone too far? Possibly. That said, back in the '60s and '70s, I felt there were more talented people sitting around the Treasury than strictly necessary. So the correction was in part healthy and an inevitable consequence of the wider development of the economy. But what does rather depress me is the apparent hostility towards the permanent civil service on the part of some politicians. Some of it is natural – inexperienced ministers and their personal advisers have always tended to feel somewhat suspicious of the permanent civil service and maybe threatened by people who know more about the business of government than they do. Instead of realising that civil servants want to help them, they cast them as the enemy, and not infrequently appear to despise them for not having gone for better paid jobs at McKinsey or Goldman Sachs or wherever. That is not healthy and it is certainly no way for a Government to get things done.

This event was organised in connection with a British Academy Conference entitled 'When the Party's Over: The Politics of Fiscal Squeeze in Perspective', held on 9-10 July 2013. The conference – convened by Professor Christopher Hood FBA and Professor David Heald, and arranged in association with the Economic and Social Research Council – explored how the politics of fiscal squeeze has played out in different times and places. It looked in depth at nine cases of fiscal squeeze, and considered what conclusions we can draw for current debates about fiscal squeeze from earlier cases in other democracies. The closing discussion was chaired by former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Gus O'Donnell. It is intended that a volume of essays will be published in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* series. Further information on the conference can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

On the evening of 10 July 2013, there was a public event on 'Reacting to Fiscal Squeeze: Some Artistic Responses', which looked at how times of economic crisis have been reflected in cartoons, social history, art and film. A video recording of the event can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013

Cartoon by Matt (Matthew Pritchett), Daily Telegraph, *20 January 2009. © Telegraph Media Group Ltd.*

Tony Travers

Looking at the current squeeze from the outside, do you see things that you might have hoped government would avoid this time? Take an issue like whether public spending and tax policy is set politically – with a view to making life difficult for the opposition. Accusations of that kind are regularly made. Has that ever happened before? Do you think it is happening now?

Rachel Lomax

Before the 1992 election, and certainly before the 1997 election it did look as if the government was laying a bear trap for its opponents. The Conservatives thought they were going to lose the 1992 election; they knew they were going to lose the 1997 election. Gordon Brown walked straight into it by saying, 'I am going to adopt the spending targets that I am left'. The result was he inherited some eye-stretchingly difficult spending plans.

Tony Travers

Do you think there was an element of purpose in that?

Rachel Lomax

Sure. I was a Permanent Secretary at that stage, and I can remember saying to my incoming Secretary of State, 'They would never have stuck to these targets, do not be fooled.' Every Permanent Secretary around Whitehall was telling their Secretary of State that these figures were not for real. But unfortunately, the new government did stick to them, with a few exceptions, and as a result they lost two important years. And then, when the moment to ease spending came, they were trying to run very fast to catch up for lost time, and they pumped up spending too fast. If they were able to rerun history, I expect they would do it differently.

Ed Balls was about at the time, so he knows the dangers. He is smart enough to leave himself a little bit of wiggle room. And the situation is different now. I do not believe that this Government thinks it is doomed to lose the next election. The Conservatives were bone weary by 1996-97: they had not expected to win in 1992, and in 1997 they just knew they were going to lose. George Osborne will hedge his bets; he will not do anything that he will live to regret himself, because he hopes to be back. And Ed Balls has been there and will leave himself a bit more wiggle room. So, at least at the political level, there may be a bit of learning from the past.

Audience member

How often, during periods of intense fiscal squeeze, do quite wild ideas get floated? And how often do those seemingly wacky ideas, if they are actually implemented, sometimes turn out to be a surprising success?

Rachel Lomax

Undoubtedly, there have been wacky ideas and a few of them, when implemented, have been a great success. My memory of apparently wacky ideas that turned out to be a huge success dates from the Thatcher years. However, I do not think they were driven by fiscal imperatives, so much as a desire to improve what we used to call 'the supply side' of the economy.

The extent to which this Government has allowed itself to be defined by fiscal consolidation and nothing else is remarkable and possibly unparalleled. Yes, we have had periods where people have had to bear down on public spending and have tried to reduce the PSBR, but that has usually been in the service of some broader objective like reducing inflation or getting interest rates down because they are at 15 per cent. But the present Government has effectively defined the financial crisis as being primarily about fiscal policy. We have a fiscal problem for sure, but it is the consequence of the financial crisis not its root cause. And the policy that binds the Coalition together is fiscal consolidation. For political as much as economic reasons the Government's strategy is all about austerity. It is not about making the economy work better; it is not about bringing inflation down; it is not about bringing interest rates down. There has been surprisingly little attention paid even to repairing the financial system, as opposed to heading off another financial crisis. So it is a particularly austere form of economic policy, it seems to me.

Typically you bear down on spending by deciding in very broad terms which programmes to squeeze and by how much, and then asking departments to come up with ideas to achieve the required level of cuts. The Treasury will usually throw in ideas of its own, as well. Don't forget this is a negotiation. So, as a spending department, you do not say, 'We could easily do that, I have a couple of sensible ways of doing it.' You think of unattractive options; it is part of the way the argument is conducted. It is the Treasury's job to filter out those proposals that are political poison pills and focus the debate on sensible options. In practice any spending settlement may leave a lot of savings still to be itemised. So it may not be until later, when departments find themselves with shrunken budgets, that they get real and review the hardest options. They start saying things like, 'Why not sell off all our estate?' and have facilities management. That's what DSS did in the mid 1990s – and it turned out to be a very creative idea which has since been copied by many other organisations. That was radical rather than wacky, but the point stands.

So it's true that some of the ideas that come out of applying a sharp squeeze can be perfectly sensible. But not all are. As a general point, in my experience 'good' wacky ideas have usually been about for a while, and they are rarely if ever just about saving money However, the prospect that they might save money sometimes gives Ministers a bit of extra political courage.

Audience member

I worked in the Treasury from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s. Experience shows that recent downturns are very good for reminding you of lessons you might otherwise have forgotten: how best to spend money to increase employment, how vulnerable your fiscal balance is to cyclical downturns, some of which governments always underestimate by miles. How sophisticated is the system you want to run? Crucially, what is the role of the finance ministry? A finance ministry, every now and then, has to be a paid party pooper, and when it forgets that is its role, disaster strikes.

Where are we on banking reform?

On 27 June 2013, Professor Sir John Vickers FBA delivered the British Academy's 'Anglo-German Foundation Lectures'. Sir John, who in 2010-11 chaired the Independent Commission on Banking, looked at where we now stand, five years on from the start of the global financial crisis, on progress towards banking reform.

This is the third in a series of lectures that commemorates the work of the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Modern Industrial Society (which existed 1973-2009). In 2013, the lecture was hosted by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, in Berlin. A video recording of the lecture can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

Rachel Lomax

I agree with that, and when the Treasury thinks it is an economics ministry, that is usually a bad sign. You have to keep your eye on the ball. Being a finance ministry is tough enough.

The great enemy is complacency; I am absolutely certain of that. We got very complacent in the late '80s; we got very complacent in the mid 2000s. No amount of remembering that times used to be worse is a guard against feeling that, 'This time, we have cracked it, we have learned how to do monetary policy, we have learned how to control spending.' Civil servants are as prone to complacency as people in central banks, or politicians, or the general public.

Tony Travers

By common consent, the UK needs growth.

Rachel Lomax

That is precisely the issue we set out to address in the London School of Economics Growth Commission. There are three areas we pulled out, which seem to me to be absolutely key: infrastructure – and I do not mean spending money digging holes for the sake of it, I mean fixing our critical infrastructure in a way that supports the economy, for example by removing bottlenecks; improving education especially for the long tail of underachievers; and sorting out our financial system. Those are the things that are holding us back and they need fixing. But they will take time to work. Personally, I think that fixing the financial system is an absolutely necessary condition of really getting the economy moving again – far more important than almost everything else. We are still recovering from a global financial crisis that seriously damaged our core banking system. The first priority should be to sort that out. It was not Gordon Brown's fiscal profligacy that got us into this mess; it was a major banking crisis. And until you have cleaned up that mess – and I do not mean thought about how you might like to regulate an ideal banking system in the year 2025, I mean fixing the banks that failed – you are not going to get sustainable economic growth.

Future Earth:
A science agenda for sustainability and human prosperity

TIM O'RIORDAN AND CORINNE LE QUÉRÉ

On 21 June 2013, the British Academy and the Royal Society co-hosted a UK 'town hall' meeting at which researchers and a range of stakeholders were able to discover more about the new *Future Earth* initiative, which is being led by the International Council for Science (ICSU). A summary report of the event, plus videos of key participants interviewed at the British Academy, can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/intl/future_earth.cfm

Tim O'Riordan is Professor Emeritus of Environmental Sciences, at the University of East Anglia, and a Fellow of the British Academy. Professor Corinne Le Quéré is Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, at the University of East Anglia.

The planetary dilemma

In the run-up to the UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, the leaders of a global scientific convention *Planet under Pressure* concluded:[1]

> Research now demonstrates that the continued functioning of the Earth's system as it has supported the wellbeing of human civilization in recent centuries is at risk. Without urgent action, we could face threats to water, food, biodiversity and other critical resources: these threats risk intensifying economic, ecological and social crises, creating the potential for a humanitarian emergency on a global scale.

GEO 5, the Fifth Global Environmental Outlook of the UN Environment Programme, reached similar conclusions[2]

> As human pressures on the Earth system accelerate, severe critical global, regional and local thresholds are close or have been exceeded. Once these have been passed, abrupt and possibly irreversible changes to the life support functions of the planet are likely to occur, with significant adverse implications for human wellbeing

We are starting to stray outside the 'safe operating space for humanity', as described by Johan Rockström and his many colleagues.[3] They believe that we have the scientific evidence that humanity is near or past safe boundaries in the areas of climate change, biodiversity loss, nutrient cycling, and ocean acidification. Although such boundaries are fiendishly difficult to define, the concerted scientific effort on the contingent outcomes of ubiquitous climate change shows that it is reasonable to agree on some of them (in this case, staying below 2°C global warming).

The real difficulty lies in staying within the boundaries. Such boundaries are rather akin to a jagged ceiling, where the 'stalactites' display the variations of such guardrails over the planet as a whole. For example, Rockström and Klum pointed out that there are four 'slow' boundaries which are patchy in provenance and effect over the planet as a whole.[4] These are biodiversity loss, freshwater use, land use change, and human interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles. These dynamics offer a planetary boundary through aggregation of cause and effect at local scales and regional agglomerations. In many parts of the developing world, there is scope for more careful additions of fertiliser usage (one key component of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles) which could be offset by reductions in excessive usage already in place elsewhere. Hence the evidence of the jagged ceiling, the contours of which are deeply elusive to observe, measure and predict.

But equally problematic is the jagged 'floor' of this safe operating space. Here Kate Raworth, formerly of Oxfam, shows that the undulations of equality and justice are really very profound.[5] They apply to hunger, education, poverty, democratic voice, gender and health. At the heart of all of this is resilience and resourcefulness. This addresses the capability of the human family in all of its configurations to be able to predict and prepare for stresses from an ever more 'unfriendly' planet and an ever more unequal society and economy. The aim is to adjust human use of the processes of planetary dynamics so that the overall outcome of development is survival in peace, health, prosperity and companionship.

This is a hugely challenging order. In *Addressing Tipping Points for a Precarious Future*, a volume of essays they have

[1] L. Brito and M. Stafford-Smith (eds), *State of the Planet Declaration* (London, Planet under Pressure, 2012).

[2] GEO 5, *Environment for the Future We Want* (Nairobi, UN Environment Programme, 2012), p. 5.

[3] J. Rockström, *et al.*, 'Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity', *Nature*, 461 (2009), 472-5; J. Rockström and M. Klum, *The Human Quest: Prospering Within Planetary Boundaries* (Stockholm, Langenskiolds, 2012).

[4] Rockström and Klum, *The Human Quest*, pp. 168-200.

[5] K. Raworth, *Planetary and Social Boundaries: Defining a Safe and Just Safe Operating Space for Humanity* (Oxford, Oxfam, 2012). See Rockström and Klum, *The Human Quest*, p. 263.

edited for the British Academy,[6] Tim O'Riordan and Tim Lenton believe this challenge has to be addressed by the end of this decade to overcome the 'lock-in' effects of planetary unfriendly technology and inflexible political institutions which will drive the more rapid onset of 'tipping thresholds', with seriously adverse human consequences. This will especially be the case for the vulnerable and the most disadvantaged, those in the troughs of the planetary floor. Persistent and increasing inequality is the death knell of sustainability, as outlined by Wilkinson and Pickett in their award-winning book *The Spirit Level*.[7] Inequality encourages over-consumption, loss of social trust, and undermining of democratic values, and weakening any willingness to contribute to overall well-being. Disparity of income and of opportunity has to be reduced if sustainability is to prevail. This is a very tough prospect and will involve ingenious science and politics.

Future Earth

This is the setting for *Future Earth*.[8] This is a 10-year international research programme launched in the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. Its aim is to create the critical knowledge required for understanding the relationships between the dynamics of planetary processes, their tolerances for human interference, for development and greater equality, and the kinds of cultures, behaviours, and governing arrangements from micro local to global, which will be required to respond to this scientific appraisal.

Figure 1 outlines the conceptual scope of Future Earth. At its heart are pathways to sustainability for all humanity, living and still to be born. To create these pathways will require a fuller understanding of global environmental change through the coupling of earth system processes on land, air and water, with human drivers for reorganisation of these processes, linked to establishing overall human wellbeing in the form of health, prosperity, justice, co-operation and dignity.

Future Earth will build upon and integrate all existing global environmental change research. These include the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP); the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP); The International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP); and Diversitas – the biosphere science and Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP). But it will extend well beyond these established networks to include all manner of new academic and research bodies and the brightest minds from a broad range of disciplines and countries.

Future Earth will be overseen by the Science and Technology Alliance for Global Sustainability. This consists of a high profile group of sponsors. These include the International Council for Science (ICSU) (of which the Royal Society is a member) and the International Social Sciences Council (ISSC) (of which the British Academy is a member). It also includes the Belmont Forum of international funding agencies (of which the Natural Environment Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council are members), three UN institutions – namely, the UN University (UNU), the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) as an observer.

Future Earth will be run by a Governing Council. This consists of a range of representatives from the collaborative worlds of engagement and research that form the special collaborative qualities of the programme. This Council will be in turn informed and guided by an Engagement Committee. This committee will ensure the research projects are co-designed by the user communities, and address communications and general outreach so as to be sure that the fruits of the research are reaching those who need to be informed and encouraged to make the vital shifts to sustainability. Communications and genuine co-operation with a wide range of business, civil society



Figure 1. *Conceptual framework for Future Earth.*

[6] T. O'Riordan and T. Lenton (eds), *Addressing Tipping Point for a Precarious Future* (Oxford, Oxford University Press/British Academy, 2013). See also Tim O'Riordan and Tim Lenton, 'Tackling tipping points', *British Academy Review*, 18 (Summer 2011), 21-7.

[7] R. Wilkinson and K. Pickett, *The Spirit Level: why more equal societies almost always do better* (London, Allen Lane, 2009).

[8] www.icsu.org/future-earth

organisations and community groups, as well as governmental, political and regulatory agencies, will ensure the success of the programme. There will be a significant effort to widen the basis of information flows and bilateral involvement, through innovative development and use of social media as well as the conventional forms of communication.

The Governing Council will also be informed and guided by the Science Committee, which will provide scientific guidance and strategic direction. It will work with the Engagement Committee and existing and new projects to deliver the knowledge needed to support global sustainability. One of us (Corinne Le Quéré) has been appointed to serve on this Committee. All of these bodies will be managed by an executive Secretariat, which will play a key role in supporting the integration of activities across countries, scales, disciplines, and between societal actors. The Secretariat will be co-ordinated across continents in an effective regional alliance.

Challenges for Future Earth

As a global programme for scientific and humanistic understanding, Future Earth is hugely ambitious. The goal of developing knowledge and practice for responding to the risks and opportunities of global environmental change and supporting the societal transformation towards global sustainability is awesome in scale and complexity. Future Earth will strive to achieve this goal through:

- solution-oriented sustainability research;
- interdisciplinary co-operation;
- generation of knowledge to provide timely information for policymakers;
- broad-based participation in the co-production of research agendas and knowledge; and
- increased capacity-building in science and technology and innovation.

Here are the nine key challenges facing the proposed programme of research.

1. *To develop excellent science*, robust in quality and integrity, that can reach out to business, civil society organisations and governments. In so doing, this science must compellingly engage without being subsumed by the particular agendas and ways of seeing the world that shape the outlooks of any stakeholder. This will require a special form of scientific enquiry and engagement which explicitly recognises the benefits of co-operation and mutual learning. This role for applied and co-operative research depends on the effectiveness of the contacts and ways of undertaking collaborative research. Any communication needs to be sensitive and even empathetic to the styles of operating in stakeholder circles. This kind of approach could be very exciting, especially for young researchers who can now be offered the opportunity to co-design research with stakeholders and focus on solutions. Nevertheless any such innovative arrangement will require the confidence and the communications skills which are yet to be fully developed by research training programmes both at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels in most higher education academies.



Figure 2. *'Addressing Tipping Points for a Precarious Future', edited by Tim O'Riordan and Tim Lenton, was published by the British Academy in August 2013. More information is available via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs*

2. *To develop an appropriate international scope* to enable and to encourage mutual endeavour between scientists and their partners working for sustainability across the world. This approach will benefit from compatible training schemes across all universities and research institutes, sensitive to the cultures and politics of host nations. Indeed it will also look to the higher education sector to create campus-wide empathy for sustainability, where the fundamental tenets of any meaningful transition to sustainability is taught and practised throughout all courses and research initiatives. What is being looked for here is an approach to campus-wide commitment to the ideas and behaviours of the transition to sustainability being developed by the Green Academy programme in the UK.[9]

[9] Green Academy, *Curricula for Tomorrow* (London, Higher Education Academy, 2012).

Figure 3. *The Future Earth event, at the British Academy, on 21 June 2013. Left, Professor Corinne Le Quéré being interviewed. Right, Professor Tim O'Riordan leads a break-out session.*

3. *To set sustainability and human wellbeing at the heart of the research agenda*. This incorporates the connections between resilience and vulnerability, between wellbeing and democracy, and between fairness and inequality. All of these are treacherously slippery notions with aggravatingly varied interpretations. It will be by no means easy to gain traction here. Wellbeing has two dimensions. One relates to personal flourishing and capability-building, which leads to self confidence and a deep sense of self worth and aptitude. The other applies to a surrounding of nurture in families and social relationships as well as community trust building and overall security.[10] Getting measures of wellbeing to run alongside more formal economic measures to guide social progress in all nations will be a massive task, as is discussed in a report by Forward Scotland.[11]

4. *To champion integration* not only between the natural and social sciences, but also including the humanities, the professions (law, accountancy, architecture, engineering, medicine), and the deployment of adaptable technology. Here there is a conundrum. On the one hand, most established scientists call for basic discipline-focused competence. On the other, practitioners look for adaptability and flexibility especially at the boundaries of familiar knowledge and theory testing. In many instances even cognate groups of natural scientists find it difficult to establish intellectual common ground. But for social scientists, where there are many provenances of interpretation of 'problems' and 'solutions', intellectual agreement is even more intractable. Future Earth will test the social sciences and the humanities into fresh ways of communicating across the sciences, and into the murky worlds of societal transformation to sustainability. Here is where highly innovative approaches to visual styles (video imagery, drama, artistic creativity), and storytelling will be encouraged.

5. *Co-design and co-production lies at the heart of research endeavour*. The purpose here is to ensure that the private, civil and public sectors become companions in the design and conduct of research, experimental schemes and pilot studies, and that appropriate metrics are in place to test for success or failure. This is a particularly challenging area, new to the way most research has been conducted in the past. It will require particular efforts and co-ordination by the Science and Engagement Committees to approach wide-ranging and disparate groups of users, and understand and define the issues of common concerns that can progress with targeted research efforts. There are promising signs that the business world, especially in the role of social entrepreneurship, is ready for this opportunity.[12]

6. *The research agenda should be initiated by research teams dedicated to the co-production approach*. This will test the process of setting the framework for the funding 'calls' as well as for evaluating possible research proposals. Here is another critical test for Future Earth. At present there are few well-developed guidelines for research settings which explicitly encourage the styles of analysis and learning that are so very pertinent for Future Earth-type research. This will involve not only the tricky aspects of sharing interpretations of 'problem definitions' and 'solutions pathways' (by no means easy to achieve in a sustainability framework). It will also introduce interesting and exciting forms of learning. Some of these will require more critical reflection on the part of scientists as to how and why various stakeholders think and act the way they do. But some will also introduce forms of learning in the street and the field where the research partner is also a source of knowledge and measurement. It will not be easy to move whole research agendas into the particular requirements of Future Earth. This will require a special protocol involving much delicate discussion and communication.

[10] T. O'Riordan, 'Sustainability beyond austerity', *Analyse Social* (2013, in press).

[11] Forward Scotland/Scotland Foundation Council, *A Wellbeing Framework for Scotland: A Better Way for Measuring Society's Progress in the 21st Century* (Edinburgh, Forward Scotland, 2008).

[12] J. Elkington, *The Zeronaughts: Breaking the Sustainability Barrier* (London, Earthscan, Taylor and Francis, 2012).

7. *Rather than endlessly analyse the 'problems', Future Earth will be solution-oriented*. This will place an emphasis on 'doability' rather than transformability. Innovation is at the heart of its mission, on the basis that most activity and its institutional framing create non sustainability. It is very likely that genuinely radical solutions will be required. Examples include: creating not-for-profit trusts to promote and grant aid to sustainability initiatives at the local and regional scales; creating socially motivated corporations which straddle the increasingly fuzzy divide between the public, private and civil sectors; and developing legal frameworks to value the environment and the ecosystems and their associated supporting services. These examples are offered as a prospective range of approaches which will encourage a much more open solutions-driven agenda than is common in much of science nowadays, but where there is a genuine willingness to innovate.

8. *Future Earth is designed to be inclusive and enhancing*. On the one hand, this ensures that Future Earth builds on the foundations, structure and activities of the existing global programs under the ESSP, which have led to our highly sophisticated current knowledge base. On the other hand, it is a demand for a much more inclusive approach, embracing disciplines, professions, practitioners and policymakers. Much knowledge exists in these wider communities that could be fed back into the common pool of understanding. In addition, there is an even greater challenge to attract the marginalised and the unconfident into sustainability transformational actions at the personal and community levels. These normally non-participating actors are the 'quiet shadows' of humanity, who are normally neither seen nor heard. They are the poor, the ethnic minorities, recent arrivals, the disabled, the unborn, and the never-attended-to. Getting all such people into the transition to sustainability will be a huge task, embracing all aspects of learning and democratic arrangements in very unusual ways. Here is where the platform of fairness of treatment and much better redistribution will have to be faced.

9. *Styles of learning and confidence building between researchers and practitioners*. The UN Economic Commission for Europe explores 'learning competences' in education for sustainable development.[13] These relate to four main processes: *learning to know* (holism and systems thinking, envisioning, and being unafraid of transforming); *learning to live together* (enabling teamwork, compatibility, diplomacy, and mutual understanding of differing cultures, faiths and aspirations); *learning to do* (critical appraisal of current political and social arrangements, and the opening of the mind to creative consciousness as described above); and *learning to be* (to be motivated to have self awareness, to be self confident, and to flourish in achievement). Coming out of this approach are fresh ways of engaging all students and all researchers in self promotion, in empathy, in being unafraid of failing, and in being consciously self-critical as to why the world is the way it is, and what realistically, yet incrementally, can be achieved for the betterment of all. This may prove to be the greatest challenge for the success of Future Earth. For what we are talking about here is leadership for transformation beginning in the teen years and evolving through adulthood in a world which is as yet unable to offer reliable employment for the vital practitioners for any sustainable age to come.

The British Academy and the Royal Society have established a Joint Working Group of experts to take forward the discussions at this UK 'town hall' meeting. The Group will advise the two national academies by the end of 2013 on how the UK can best support, develop and engage with Future Earth, and particularly how to enshrine its principles of co-design and co-production into global sustainability initiatives.

[13] UN Economic Commission for Europe, *Learning for the Future: Competences for Sustainable Development* (Geneva, UNECE, 2012), pp. 14-15.

Mobilising the law:
Environmental NGOs in court

LISA VANHALA

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Originally published in 1972, Christopher Stone's environmental treatise *Should Trees Have Standing?* served as a rallying cry for the then budding environ-mental movement in the United States. It launched a debate about the legal rights of trees, oceans, animals and the environment among eco-activists and their adversaries. Since then, in following the logic of Stone's treatise that the environment cannot defend its own interests, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have regularly stepped into the courts in the US in order to enforce or expand environmental legal protections. The extensive legal activity of a number of NGOs has been highlighted by those within the American movement: in 1988 the executive director of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund said that 'litigation is the most important thing the environmental movement has done over the past fifteen years'.[1] For some, this resort to law in the United States is not surprising considering the nation's reputation for litigiousness more generally. However, NGOs elsewhere in the world have begun to follow suit, heralding what could arguably be coined a 'global judicialisation' of environ-mental disputes.

This mobilisation of the law by social movement activists is not without its controversies in regards to the role of courts and NGOs in democracies. By its proponents, the use of strategic litigation is an important way for engaged civil society actors to influence public policy and participate in governance processes. They see the role of NGOs as two-fold: first, protecting the (legal) interests of the 'voiceless elements in nature', and second, advocating for changes to a system that they see as inherently biased towards the interests of business and developers to ensure that access to environmental justice is affordable, fair and effective. By its critics, legal mobilisation efforts empower 'non-democratic' NGOs and 'unaccountable' judges *vis-à-vis* majoritarian institutions, such as legislatures, thus undermining democracy. This article, while focusing on the empirics and theory of legal mobilisation by the environmental movement, sheds some light on this debate. One part of my British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship examined how the environmental movement in the United Kingdom has mobilised the law over the last twenty years.[2] Two questions motivate the research presented here: to what extent have environmental NGOs mobilised the law in the UK, and have they been 'successful' in doing so?

The UK context is useful for thinking about these issues more broadly. On a general level, a number of historic and contemporary factors contribute to what at first appears to be an inhospitable environment for legal mobilisation: a traditional distaste for enshrined rights, a legal culture privileging parliamentary sovereignty, and the comparatively slow nature of new social movement development when considered in light of many other European nations. More specifically, policy research has suggested that access to environmental justice is particularly restricted in the UK compared to its European counterparts. For example, an independent study commissioned by the European Commission found that 'the potential costs of bringing an application for judicial review to challenge the acts or omissions of public authorities is a significant obstacle to access to justice in the United Kingdom'[3]. A 2002 cross-national study on access to environmental justice that looked at court structures, standing rules, scope of review, length of proceedings, costs and availability of interim relief found that the number of actual court cases brought by NGOs in the UK is among the lowest across Europe.[4]

[1] Quoted in L. Cole and S. Foster (2001) *From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement*. New York: New York University Press at p. 30.

[2] The results presented here are part of a larger analysis published in September 2012 in *Law and Society Review* 46:3 at p. 523.

[3] Milieu Environmental Law and Policy (2007) *Measures on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Article 9(3)): Country Report for the United Kingdom*. Brussels: Milieu Environmental Law and Policy at p. 22.

[4] N. De Sadeleer, G. Roller and M. Dross (2005) *Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and the Role of NGOs: Empirical Findings and Legal Appraisal*. Groningen, NL: Europa Law Publishing.

In practice, legal mobilisation can include many different types of strategies and tactics. This article focuses on the use of strategic litigation through the use of judicial reviews by NGOs. This type of legal action allows groups and citizens to challenge the decisions of public bodies that they see as contravening either domestic environmental or administrative law, or European Community (EC) law. Judicial reviews are the most common form of legal action taken by environmental NGOs in the UK.

The record of legal mobilisation (1990-2010)

The research examines four prominent environmental NGOs in the United Kingdom: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and WWF. Between 1990 and 2010, courts decided 35 legal actions in which at least one of the four NGOs examined here participated.[5] Twenty-two of these cases were lost and 13 were won. Across organisations, Friends of the Earth was the most active in its judicial review activity, as it participated – or indirectly supported groups (either financially or through provision of legal representation) – in 18 different cases. Greenpeace took 10 cases, RSPB took eight cases and WWF only took three cases in the period.[6] There has been an increase in the number of cases taken in recent years, with 15 taken in the period 2005 to 2009 (see Figure 1); this is triple the number of cases taken by these groups in the previous period. In terms of results, all cases taken in the first period examined here (1990 to 1994) were lost. In contrast, in the most recent period the split between victories and losses was relatively even: seven cases were won and eight were lost. Breaking the data down across courts also tells an important story. Figure 2 shows that any case that NGOs brought to the Court of Appeal they lost during the period under study.

In summary, each individual organisation has tended to lose more cases on substantive issues than it has won, and collectively the environmental movement is only victorious in about a third of legal actions. A puzzle emerges from the research presented here on the use of judicial review procedures by environmental NGOs. Despite significant losses in court, which have at times imposed high costs – financial and otherwise – the movement has, over time, increasingly used litigation strategies in pursuit of their goals. Why do environmental NGOs continue to pursue legal cases?



Figure 1. *NGO judicial review results by period, 1990-2010.*



Figure 2. *NGO judicial review results by court, 1990-2010.*

Two explanations for perseverance despite legal losses

First, despite substantive losses, many of the cases involve procedural victories which make it easier for NGOs and other environmental groups to turn to the courts in later cases. By continually campaigning for environmental justice, activists can contribute to broader campaigns to enhance access to justice for the environment. In the realm of environmental policy, access to justice refers to the ability for concerned citizens and social movement groups to: access the courts and judicial advice at reasonable cost; be provided with a fair and equitable platform for the treatment of environmental issues; and obtain adequate and effective remedies (including injunctive relief) for environmental offences.[7] It is only by regularly attempting to access justice that these groups credibly highlight the failings of the existing systems. If we consider judicial decisions on procedural issues, the story of legal mobilisation begins to make more sense. Courts assessed nine explicit procedural issues across seven different cases. These include: assessment of standing doctrine concerning NGOs;

[5] In some cases, two or more NGOs joined together to bring a judicial review. For example, in 2001 Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace brought a series of cases to the High Court, and then the Court of Appeal, related to the lawfulness of the manufacture of fuels by British Nuclear Fuels. Similarly, WWF and RSPB together brought to the Scottish courts a case related to development and environmental impact in the late 1990s.

[6] The total number of cases examined along these lines is greater than the total number of cases in the other analyses because of the participation by more than one NGO in some cases.

[7] Environmental Justice Project (2003) *Environmental Justice*. London: The Environmental Justice Project at p. 23.

questions regarding time limits within which a judicial review should be brought; and considerations of whether interim relief should be available and various measures on how costs should be awarded, or capped. NGOs won on five of these issues and lost on four, suggesting a more even record. The majority of these issues were raised in the first decade of litigation activity which helps to explain the increase over time.

Second, measuring whether legal mobilisation is 'successful' is not a straightforward task. NGOs in the UK, like their American counterparts, tend to see the taking of a legal claim as simply one element of a multi-pronged approach to campaigning. If campaigners bring a 'losing the battle but winning the war' mentality to any specific substantive campaigning goal, legal mobilisation (even in what they perceive to be an inhospitable legal environment) begins to make sense. The groups studied here engage (to various extents) in law reform activity, consciousness-raising, protest and fund-raising on their campaign issues in parallel with any legal efforts. Several NGO lawyers and policy officers asserted that simply participating in judicial reviews, regardless of the result, can bring multiple benefits:

> We will probably lose … it is a losing battle… We work on a number of levels and the legal action is just one level of the fight... So we say to people even if you lose the legal action, you will still raise awareness and support… So you might lose the battle but you will win the war… Even with Heathrow [a legal case decided in 2010 in the High Court on the proposal to build a third runway] … we know that a judgment can be quite complex … so although you may lose … you can still extract useful points from the judgment.[8]

> Environmental law is relatively new and many of the concepts inherent within it (precautionary principle, sustainable development, polluter pays) are new to the judiciary. As such, we are always pushing at the boundaries and perhaps, because of that, we expect to win less often, i.e. our expectations are moderated from the beginning. A QC [Queen's Counsel] once said to me 'if you start winning all your cases, you're taking the wrong cases'. His view was that we should always be moving the law forward and that, necessarily, involves winning less.[9]

Comparative findings

This research has shown many similarities with the experience of US NGOs – the benefits of expanding procedural opportunities in the face of substantive losses and an appreciation of the indirect political benefits of

Figure 3. *Protesters outside the high court in December 2011, highlighting the thousands of jobs that could be lost through the government's decision to halve solar tariff payments. Friends of the Earth and two renewable power companies were given leave by the high court for a judicial review of the ministerial decision. Photograph: Friends of the Earth.*

[8] Interview, NGO Lawyer, 6 April 2010.
[9] Personal Communication, NGO lawyer, 12 April 2011.

litigation. There are however some significant differences as well. First, this type of legal activity began much later in the UK than in the United States. Strategic litigation was a core aspect of the work of American environmental NGOs throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The British groups looked at here only began to mobilise the law from the early 1990s onwards. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the timing of relevant legislation on which claims could be based. The early 1970s saw a wave of environmental protection statutes come into effect in the United States, whereas UK and European protections only began to emerge in a significant way in the 1980s and 1990s. The impact of the introduction of new laws also likely has a symbolic dimension: the introduction of protections may have played an important role in raising awareness of the very possibility of strategic litigation as a political instrument.

A second point of distinction is the role of international law that may shape the future of legal mobilisation by environmental NGOs across Europe. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was adopted in 1998 in the Danish city of Aarhus as part of the 'Environment for Europe' process. Known as the Aarhus Convention, it represents a novel type of environmental agreement in its rights-based approach and its focus on procedural as well as substantive rights. It is also unique in its reflection of the distinctive role of citizen groups and NGOs in enforcing environmental law: it links government accountability and environmental protection, and focuses on interactions between people and public authorities in a democratic context. The Aarhus Convention grants rights to citizens and NGOs, and imposes obligations on governments in regards to access to information, public participation and access to justice. The third pillar of the Aarhus Convention is concerned with access to justice in the environmental realm. Article 9(4) of the Convention requires that procedures for rights to access must 'provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.' The importance of EU environmental legislation and the 2005 ratification of the Aarhus Convention by the UK government represent an additional source of legal opportunities to UK NGOs that is not currently available to those outside of Europe. The increasing reliance on supranational protections and the ability to turn to international judicial venues means that the scope of legal opportunity has expanded vertically for the British green movement in the last two decades.

Access to environmental justice

Access to justice matters for democracy. Unless citizens and groups are able to go to court on an equal footing to well-resourced governments and corporations to challenge the legality of decisions made by public authorities, then unlawful decisions will not be identified and overturned. Environmental law, like all law, has little purpose if it is not upheld. This is particularly important in the realm of the environment and climate change: the environment cannot defend its own (legal) interests, yet its protection is in the interest of all citizens. NGOs, as organisations with expertise and resources, therefore have an important role to play in both ensuring the effective enforcement of environmental law and in expanding legal opportunities for other groups and individual citizens. The four NGOs examined here are among the largest and best-resourced in the country; yet they regularly lose their legal battles and often have to pay the significant legal costs of their opponents. While the evidence of changes over time seems to suggest that there is hope for enhanced levels of access to justice for the environment – possibly the trickle down effects of the Aarhus Convention (that is for future research to determine) – this is a slow and frustrating process.

Income from work:
The food-population-resource crisis in 'the short Africa'

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'*Africa*' here means '*the short Africa*': excluding North Africa, islands and South Africa. All these are sharply distinct from the rest of Africa environmentally, agriculturally and economically. Mostly, they are also well ahead in mean income, poverty reduction, growth, farming (irrigation, fertiliser, seeds), and demographic transition. The short Africa is highly diverse, but no more so than India or China.

Much talk of Africa moans of stagnation or trumpets economic renaissance. Africa does not face stagnation or renaissance, but a crisis in people's ability to get income from work.

Workforce

Between 1950 and 2012, population in the short Africa rose five-fold. It will more than double again[1] in 2012-50, to 11.3 times its 1950 level. Workforces – people aged 15-65 – are rising faster still, thanks to better child survival and some fall in fertility. In 1985 sub-Saharan Africa had 106 people of prime working age for every 100 dependants; by 2012 there were 120; in 2050 there will be 196.[2] That is a 63 per cent rise in workers-per-dependant from now to 2050 – and a 3.5 per cent rise *each year* in the number of people aged 15-64. In South and East Asia, a similar rise provided a demographic window of opportunity, contributing about a third of the 'miracle' of growth and poverty reduction.[3] That happened because the extra workers found productive employment. At first, this was mainly in smallholdings. They used more labour, because it paid to apply more fertilisers, control water, and harvest green-revolution crops. Often, land redistribution also raised employment and output. Later, farm transformation both increased demand for industry and services, and released farmworkers to them as farms mechanised.

In the short Africa, will the swelling ranks of young workers produce Asian miracles – or worsening poverty, unemployment and violent unrest? Farming will decide in Africa, as it did in Asia. Farms remain the main income and work source for 70 per cent of the short Africa's economically active people – more among the young and the poor.[4]

This will change, but not fast. Official rural-to-urban migration data and projections in Africa are huge overestimates.[5] Neither mines nor manufactures have so far offered many affordable workplaces, especially to the unskilled poor.

Smallholdings

Within farming, smallholdings (below 1-5 hectares, dependent on land quality) are central. They support most farm people, and will long do so. Small farmers are efficient resource users and keen (if risk-averse) innovators. In developing countries, where farming relies more on supervised family labour than on capital, small farms usually produce more output per hectare than large farms – and provide far more employment and labour income per hectare. ('Per hectare' is crucial, because most of Africa is running out of spare land.) However, offsetting smallholders' lower unit cost to farm, they often face higher

[1] Asian populations grew less, and slowed more and faster: South Asia 489.6m (1950), 1752m (2012) and 2394m (2050, medium projection); East Asia 672m, 1586m, 1512m; South-East Asia 173m, 696m, 759m; short Africa 168m, 835m and 1902m: UN (ECOSOC), *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision*.

[2] UN 2010.

[3] R. Eastwood and M. Lipton, 'Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?', *Population Studies*, 65 (2011), 9-35.

[4] M. Lipton, 'Learning from others: increasing agricultural productivity for African human development': Background Paper, UN Africa Human Development Report, 2012, Table 2; FAO, *Statistical Yearbook 2009*; World Bank, *African Development Indicators 2008-9*, p. 8. Many farmworkers do significant non-farm work, and vice versa.

[5] D. Potts, 'Whatever happened to Africa's rapid urbanization?' (London, Africa Research Institute, 2012); M. Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: urban bias and world development* (Temple Smith, 1977), pp. 224-6.

costs to process their crops, and sometimes to reach supermarkets. However, once small farmers have enough surplus to sell, it usually pays intermediaries to provide such services.[6]

In 1977-84, when China reformed land into equal family smallholdings and relaxed price restrictions, these farms – most below 0.7 hectares – used water-control, fertilisers and improved seeds to raise rice and wheat output by over 6 per cent per year for six years. Much of India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and other parts of Asia also did extremely well. Some areas and smallholders did not benefit, but radical improvements spread far beyond the innovators and the best lands. Asia's demographics also improved sooner and faster than Africa's: child mortality

A farmer harvests part of his cassava crop, in Osun State, Nigeria. Partners such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) are working to strengthen the agricultural value chain – from the seeds planted, to improved farm management, to bringing crops to market. Their focus is on helping small-scale farm households, by bringing about sustainable, equitable development across the African continent. Photo: © Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

fell much faster, and this is the prime mover lowering fertility.[7] In 1950, most agreed that South and East Asia, near the land frontier, had been dealt a worse demographic and resource 'hand' than Africa. Yet large swathes of Asia in 1965-2000 showed that smallholders can lead transformation *within* agriculture – and hence, afterwards, transition *out of* agriculture. The conditions are public infrastructure and commitment, new science, and firms (sometimes, large farms) – and social capital – helping smallholders to co-operate, process, and liaise with expanding or globalising markets.[8]

Most of African agriculture has suffered decades of policy neglect, and extraction – from both farmers and natural resources. It faces harsher problems in resolving the demography/smallholder/resource crisis than Asia did. To produce more, sustainably, farms need enough land, water and soil nutrients. In the short Africa, below 1 per cent of cropland is irrigated (compared with 20-25 per cent in South/East/South-East Asia in 1965, and 35-40 per cent now). Below 2 kg/hectare of main plant nutrients – nitrogen, phosphorus, potash – are applied, compared with over 150 kg/hectare in South/East/South-East Asia.[9] Lack of water control makes farmers reluctant to apply fertiliser even if available. There are successes: some agronomic advances; better seeds, such as hybrid maize in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, and perhaps new varieties of cassava and rice in West Africa; 'smart' subsidies, such as Malawi's for fertiliser; the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa's pilots of improved local input development and delivery; ambitious, pre-financed land-water development in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme. However, solving Africa's workforce crisis requires a much wider spread of fast growth of farm output. This normally starts with main food crops, and requires more fertilisers and water-control. Advocating 'low-input' farm growth is seeking bricks without straw.

Land and water

Since 1950, most Africans have not enjoyed sustained, rapid growth of food staples yield. Yet there are five times more Africans now than in 1950, and most are farmers. How did they get food, income and work? Mainly by expansion into new farmland. However, this produced barely survival rations. Africa's data for output of food staples are largely worthless.[10] However, decent data for nutrition, food trade, and dollar-a-day poverty (affecting a stagnant 50 per cent of Africans in 1981-2005) imply that calorie output and intake per person in most of Africa are no higher than in the early 1960s.

Thus farmers' strategy of feeding themselves by land expansion – forced on them by insufficient public attention to irrigation, fertiliser access and seed improvement – failed to advance living standards. Moreover, the strategy is fast becoming unsustainable. In most of Africa, farmland *expansion* is inducing, or soon will induce, soil depletion that means net farmland *loss*. (That, alongside the water squeeze, burgeoning population and workforce, and scant non-farm employment prospects, is why there is a crisis.) Forced farm expansion has spread land-exhaustive, largely unfertilised crops, especially

[6] M. Lipton, *Land Reform in Developing Countries* (London, Routledge, 2009), ch. 2; R. Eastwood, A. Newell and M. Lipton, 'Farm size', in P. Pingali & R. Evenson (eds.), *Handbook of Agricultural Economics vol. 4* (Rotterdam, Elsevier, 2010); T. Reardon and J. Berdegue, 'Retail-led transformation of agri-food systems' (Washington DC, World Bank, 2007); T.W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (Yale, 1964); A. Berry and W. Cline, *Agrarian Structure & Productivity in Developing Countries* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1979).

[7] D. Conley, G. McCord and J. Sachs, 'Africa's lagging demographic transition', WP#12892 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007); Lipton and Eastwood (2011).

[8] M. Lipton, 'The family farm in a globalizing world' (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, 2005).

[9] Lipton 2005: *sub-Saharan* Africa has 3.7% and 7 kg/ha, almost all outside the short Africa.

[10] M. Jerven, *Poor Numbers* (Ithaca, Cornell, 2013), pp. 14, 79, 103.

maize, into areas that – without fertilisers or irrigation – can sustain only extensive grazing. In 2002-3 in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 per cent of farmland was losing over 60 kg/hectare of main plant nutrients each year; 95 million hectares had been severely depleted of soil nutrients.[11]

Is the short Africa's farm water position also critical? Few countries outside the Sudano-Sahel face *physical* water stress (defined as over 75 per cent of river flows withdrawn annually, net of recycling), and agriculture gets over 80 per cent of fresh water. Yet such aggregates conceal local reality. Probably, the proportion of food staple crops dying for lack of water is higher in the short Africa than in any other region. All but a few countries face *economic* water stress.[12] Without irrigation, this means that many farmers cannot get water at some crucial crop time. Further, much African land expansion has been into marginally rainfed land. Global warming boosts evaporation and transpiration in the hot peak seasons, and makes rainfall less reliable. Unlike Asia and Northern (and South) Africa, where substantial irrigation spread before (and enabled) the green revolution, in the short Africa the farmer must fight vociferous expanding cities, mines and industries for irrigation water that she does not yet have.

Supply and entitlements

But need one worry about the determinants of food *supply*? Hasn't Amartya Sen[13] shown that most famines, and most hunger, happen when there is ample food to go round – because many people lack *entitlements* to that food? The answer is that in Africa most food entitlements, especially for vulnerable people, come from farmwork, largely on family land but sometimes for other farmers. Rural non-farm work (and urban work) matter too, but their growth usually depends on earlier growth of farmers' demand. So big rises in non-farm employment usually require prior growth of farm income, output and employment. This priority is local, not just national, in much of Africa: expensive and bad transport means that local food adequacy often depends on local food supply. Further, if we look beyond hunger to national development and transformation, these have almost always followed expansion, initially in smallholder agriculture, of both work and productivity.[14]

The short Africa's swelling young workforce, its food farming that stubbornly lags far behind achievable levels, its threatened soil-water base – all these faced Asia in 1965 too. Like all crises, they offer not only risks of disaster, but

Farmers like Linet Wanzunzi help grow and sell improved bean seeds to other farmers. Linet's initial investment in seeds turned into a five-fold profit. Photo: © Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

[11] J. Henao and C. Baanante, *Agricultural Depletion and Soil Mining in Africa* (Muscle Shoals AL, International Fertilizer Development Corp., 2006); see A. Haileselassie, J. Priess, E. Veldtkamp, D. Teketay and J-P. Lesschen, 'Assessment of soil nutrient depletion and its spatial variability in Ethiopia', *Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment*, 108 (2005), 1–16.

[12] International Water Management Institute, 'Trends in water and agricultural development' (2007).

[13] A. Sen, *Poverty and Famines* (Oxford, 1981).

[14] Once a region cannot much expand sustainable farmland affordably – increasingly true of the short Africa – if all main groups are to reduce their poverty (a) agricultural labour productivity must grow, but (b) productivity of land (and in many cases water) must grow *faster*, so farm employment rises.

(as Asia's green revolution and demographic transition showed) great opportunities too. Being behind offers a chance for quick catch-up:[15] *not* to large capital-intensive farms, ideal in America and Australia but costly and often disastrous in Africa, but to skilled smallholder intensification, with controlled, carefully managed water and fertiliser. Such farms prevail in most of Asia, and parts of Africa too, but past failures show that smallholder-led development in Africa is by no means a soft option. How might Africa have a good crisis?

Stop kidding ourselves that economic renaissance has already arrived

Faster GDP growth in Africa since 2000 is mostly a statistical illusion.[16] Local evidence, and trade and nutrition data, reveal what the 'poor numbers' for aggregate GDP and food output cannot. Staples yields (and labour productivity) have not reversed the dismal trends that Timmer diagnosed two decades ago. Big, *credible* rises are seen in only a few African countries (e.g. Rwanda, Ghana). Most of the populous ones (Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo) tell a sad tale.

A few African countries have enjoyed a mining boom. Unfortunately, mining expansion alone seldom eases the employment-land-food-income crunch, and often makes it worse. 'Big mining' normally employs few, pumps up corruption,[17] and draws incentives and resources away from employment-intensive activities, especially farming. Instead, manufacturing-first strategies might create a good deal of employment (though in Africa this has seldom happened), but raises serious questions of competition with, say, Vietnam on skills and labour cost.

Unusually, analysis supports common sense: with agriculture sluggish and supporting over two-thirds of Africa's fast-growing workforces, rapid growth in agricultural output and productivity is normally a precondition for tackling the employment-land-food-income crunch. But how? Shifts of land to capital-intensive big farms (e.g. land grab) 'raise labour productivity' of those who stay employed, but slash it – and income – for many, pushed off the land before the non-farm sector is ready to absorb them. With some exceptions, big African farms are socially inefficient. Land grab will not conduce to more per-hectare employment, work income, or even output. Most of Africa has almost no empty, good, cheaply available cropland, and soil-water resources are depleting: if anything, sustainability requires *reducing* cropland. As was true in Asia, smallholder-based yield growth is a necessary preliminary to development.

Stop denigrating smallholders

The language of many economists and politicians bombards smallholders with undeserved disrespect. Family farmers and smallholders are routinely called subsistence, sub-subsistence, part-time, even 'scratch-a-patch', and contrasted unfavourably to 'commercial' farms. Yet family smallholders are highly commercial. Most buy some input; many sell some output. To survive, they make at least as good use of resources as big farmers – in the case of land, better. (That's why land in Asia and Africa has been shifting towards smaller farms.)[18] Smallholders are glibly dismissed as elderly failures, who need replacement by big farmers with machinery – and whose kids don't want to farm.

Sometimes that caricature has a grain of truth. Not so, however, with policies that respect small-farm incentives, rural infrastructure, and agricultural research. In India's Punjab in 1967 semi-dwarf wheat and rice, with fertiliser and reliable irrigation, meant that young officials and factory workers scrambled home from Delhi to double-crop family land: now, they could make good profit out of even half a hectare. In most of the short Africa, if young people flee farming – often into city underemployment or even crime – that is because the powers-that-be disrespect and under-resource smallholdings, so they can't become scientific, properly serviced or reasonably reliable. Asia in the 1960s typically allocated 20 per cent of public spending to agriculture; the short Africa today allocates 5-10 per cent.

Respect and resources are preconditions, but all economic means – composting where humus is deficient, water management, much more irrigation major and minor, better seeds (often using biotechnology), sometimes land reform – will be needed to catch up. Most of Asia and some of Africa shows this can be done – and that *afterwards* industrialisation, even so-called miracles of poverty-reducing growth, can happen.

States and 'experts', unwilling to create the preconditions for smallholder-led transformation, used to scapegoat smallholders for inefficiency. Some still do, but the great weight of evidence has made it somewhat passé. Instead, smallholders are berated for inability to co-operate, form social capital, exploit scale economies in processing and distribution, and do without the State. Smallholders need policies, not homilies: respect, land, infrastructure, semi-public goods, facilitation.

Have a coherent policy for a multifaceted crisis

We have reviewed African and Asian progress in *food farming*. However, Asia's rapid growth with poverty reduction in 1960-2010 also required transformations in *population* and *nutrition*. A fourth target area, *environment*, is crucial for sustainability, but was weakly integrated into most Asian development policy: Africa can learn from Asian errors as well as Asian successes. One should consider *together* the effect of policy options – via incentives, institutions and infrastructure – on all four target areas. This applies however little, or much, the state intervenes.

As for *population*, Malthus was right that, for sustained growth with poverty reduction, fertility must fall. Malthus also learned that this happens voluntarily in the right

[15] A. Gershenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge MA, Harvard, 1962).
[16] Jerven, *Poor Numbers*, pp. 28, 86.
[17] P. Collier, *The Bottom Billion* (Oxford, 2007).
[18] Lipton, *Land Reform in Developing Countries*, pp. 94-102.

conditions.[19] But voluntary fertility reduction, rapid in most of Asia, has been slow, late and intermittent in Africa, especially in rural areas. That is mainly because child mortality has improved more slowly[20] – and because earnings prospects for African women remain low, so they lose little income by having many children. As in much of Asia after 1965, so in Africa now: for a 'good crisis', i.e. a *resource-sustainable* transition to fast and employment-generating growth, green revolutions need complementary policies for slower population growth. Paradoxically, these demand first slashing child mortality, then maximising fertility response by enhanced female education, and spreading access to contraception.

Policy for better child *nutrition* is the linchpin. It holds together population policy (lower child mortality as the key to lower fertility) and farm policy (technical and institutional change to transform smallholder production of staple foods). Better child nutrition is advanced by malaria and dysentery control, breeding higher levels of micronutrients into main food staples, and more income (principally via more food output) for poor smallholders.

Environmental sustainability – especially, soil-water impacts – should be pre-screened for *all* policies. The imperatives, to irrigate and to fertilise, can support sustainable soil-nutrient and water use by adding resources that cultivation removes – but also can create new sustainability issues (salinity, nitrates in drinking water), and can interact well or badly with global warming. Rising energy prices, pollution problems, and faster evaporation mean that just *more* use of farm water and inorganic fertiliser – while essential in Africa – must go alongside much higher use-efficiency, and more care with water and nutrient disposal and recharge. In these matters as elsewhere, smallholders are well placed to respond to appropriate incentives.

Top-level political responsibility is needed to integrate *one* sustainable policy for all aspects of the crisis in *productive labour income*: agriculture, food; child nutrition, mortality, reduced fertility; land, soils, water. This is not a mad planner's dream: in agriculture as elsewhere, most policies will involve correcting incentives (e.g. so people bear the external costs of their water use), providing infrastructural and semi-public goods (irrigation, rural roads, much more agricultural research and the much-maligned extension), and in some cases in Eastern and Southern Africa reforming away gross inequalities of, and barriers to, secure private land access. Perhaps the main lesson of Asia is the need for a social or state-led base to support private, farm-based transformation.

What can donors do? Aid helped Asia's fast, science-based, employment-intensive small-farm growth, inducing economic transformation. Western goods face new rivals; Western power is challenged. I hope the still-low levels of aid to African farming do not indicate that, in John Mellor's bitter jest, donors won't make *that* mistake again.

[19] M. Lipton, 'Responses to rural population growth'. *Population and Development Review*, 15 (1989), 215-42.
[20] Conley *et al*., 'Africa's lagging demographic transition'.

‘ALL THE WORLD’S KNOWLEDGE’

JANE C. GINSBURG

Jane C. Ginsburg is the Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law at Columbia University School of Law, and Faculty Director of its Kernochan Centre for Law, Media and the Arts; and she is a Fellow of the British Academy.

The text of her British Academy Law Lecture – ‘From Hypatia to Victor Hugo to Larry and Sergey: “All the world’s knowledge” and universal authors’ rights’ – was one of the first articles posted to the new online open-access *Journal of the British Academy*, in July 2013. The lecture discusses the legal implications of two competing claims: the utopian aspiration to provide access to all knowledge, and pursuit of the universal protection of authors’ rights. The full article in the *Journal* may be found via www.britac.ac.uk/journal/

In the following edited extract, Professor Ginsburg provides some background to the legal discussion by describing some historical examples of ‘access to knowledge’ utopianism.

Utopian dreams of a universal archive of knowledge almost always refer to the Library of Alexandria. It is often described as a ‘universal library’. According a 2nd-century BC document from the Jewish community of Alexandria, its mission was ‘To collect ... all the books in the world.’[1] Commentators throughout antiquity and early Christianity similarly evoked the comprehensive aspirations of the library. The American classicist and historian Roger Bagnall has described the persistent power of the idea of the Library of Alexandria:[2]

> [T]he Library of Alexandria bequeathed the image of itself, the idea of a large, comprehensive library embracing all of knowledge. ... The Library ... appealed to the imagination of all who wrote about it. Its grip on the minds of all who contemplated it was already in antiquity as great as it was later, and it hardly mattered what fanciful numbers they used to express its greatness. Although the authors whose works survived antiquity told posterity little of any concrete substance about the Library, they transmitted its indelible impression on their imaginations.

Doni’s Libraria

Moving ahead some 1,500 years, with the advent of the printing press and the vast increase in the range of books, new and old, that it enabled, no single place could unite all literary and scientific productions. The urge to comprehensive knowledge did not abate, however. Rather it spawned a new kind of collection and systematisation, the thematic catalogue.[3] For example, in 1550 the Florentine man of letters and bibliographer Anton Francesco Doni published in Venice his *Libraria*, subtitled ‘in which are inscribed all the vernacular authors with one hundred discussions of them [as well as] all the translations made from other languages into ours, and an index generally laid out according to the customs of booksellers’.[4]

Doni seems to have become obsessed with his task, for a subsequent printing from 1550 tells us that it is ‘newly reprinted, corrected, and with many things added that were missing’.[5] In 1557 the indefatigable Doni produced a second edition, featuring an even more prolix subtitle,

Figure 1. *A much reproduced 19th-century imagining of ‘The Great Library of Alexandria’, by O. Von Corven. Source: Wikepedia Commons.*



[1] So says the oldest known document referring to the Library, the 2nd-century BC Letter of Aristeas. D. Heller-Roazen, ‘Tradition’s Destruction: On the Library of Alexandria’, *October*, 100 (2002), 133-53 at 141.
[2] R.S. Bagnall, ‘Alexandria: Library of Dreams’, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 146 (2002), 348-62 at 361.
[3] See R. Chartier, ‘Libraries Without Walls’, *Representations*, 42 (1993), 38-52.
[4] ‘La libraria del Doni fiorentino. Nella quale sono scritti tutti gl’autori vulgari con cento discorsi sopra quelli. Tutte le tradutioni fatte all’altre lingue, nella nostra & una tavola generalmente come si costuma fra librari.’
[5] ‘Di novo ristampata, corretta, & molte cose aggiunte che mancavano.’

informing us that his work now consists of three treatises, and stating that the second treatise includes Doni's more recent listings of the authors, the works, the titles and the substance, and that his book is 'necessary and useful to all those who need knowledge of [our] language, and wish to know how to write and think about all the authors, their books and their works'.[6] The *Libraria* went through further editions, even following Doni's death, as successive publishers sought to satisfy a vigorous demand for this kind of compendium. Thus, a 1580 edition tacks on to Doni's run-on title the information that to the current printing 'have been added all the vernacular works published in the last 30 years in Italy'. However, in a punctilious nod to the Counter-Reformation, the 1580 edition's subtitle also cautions 'and having removed all the prohibited authors and books'.[7]


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discorsi sopra quelli.
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
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
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FIORENTINO;
Nella quale sono scritti tutti gli Autori volgari, con cento discorsi sopra quelli;
Tutte le tradottioni fatte dall'altre lingue, nella nostra, & vna tauola generale, come si costuma fra Librari.
Opera vtile à ciascuno che si diletta della lingua volgare, & che desidera fornire vno studio di libri, compostti in essa lingua;
Di nuouo ristampata, & aggiuntiui tutti i libri volgari posti in luce da trenta anni in quà, & leuatone fuori tutti gli Autori, & libri prohibiti.
IN VINEGIA,
Presso Altobello Salicato. M D LXXX.

Figure 2. *'All the authors': Doni's Libraria in its first two editions of 1550 and the editions of 1557 and 1580. Sources: photograph of first edition by Jane C. Ginsburg, from the Columbia University Rare Book Room; and EDIT16, Istituto Centrale per il Catalogo Unico delle biblioteche italiane e per le informazioni bibliografiche).*

Otlet's 'Universal Book of Knowledge'

We skip forward to the end of the 19th century where we encounter Belgian lawyer and visionary Paul Otlet, a spiritual descendant of Doni, but by a power of ten (at least). He imagined a 'Universal Book of Knowledge' in which:[8]

> [A]ll knowledge, all information could be so condensed that it could be contained in a limited number of works placed on a desk, therefore within hand's reach, and indexed in such a way as to ensure maximum consultability. In this case the World described in the entirety of Books would really be within everyone's grasp. The Universal Book created from all Books would become very approximately an annex to the Brain, a substratum even of memory, an external mechanism and instrument of the mind but so close to it, so apt to its use that it would truly be a sort of appended organ, an exodermic appendage. ... This organ would have the function of making us 'ubiquitous and eternal'.

[6] 'La libraria del Doni fiorentino, divisa in tre trattati. Nel primo sono scritti, tutti gli autori volgari, con cento & piu discorsi, sopra di quelli. Nel secondo, sono dati in luce tutti i libri, che l'autore ha veduti a penna, il nome de' componitori, dell'opere, i titoli, & le materie. Nel terzo, si legge l'inventione dell'academie insieme con i sopranomi, i motti, le imprese, & l'opere fatte da tutti gli academici. Libro necessario, & utile, a tutti coloro che della cognitione della lingua hanno bisogno, & che vogliono di tutti gli autori, libri, & opere sapere scrivere, & ragionare.'

[7] 'Di nuovo ristampata, & aggiuntiui tutti i libri volgari posti in luce da trenta anni in qua, & levatone fuori tutti gli autori, & libri prohibiti.'

[8] P. Otlet, *Traite de documentation: Le Livre sur le livre, theorie et pratique* (Brussels, 1934), p. 428. The translation is adapted from W.B. Raymond, *International Organisation and Dissemination of Knowledge: Selected Essays of Paul Otlet* (Amsterdam, 1990), p. 1.

Figure 3. *Paul Otlet's documentary project, in an undated photograph before World War I. Source: Wouter Van Acker, 'Internation-alist Utopias of Visual Education: The Graphic and Scenographic Transformation of the Universal Encyclopaedia in the Work of Paul Otlet, Patrick Geddes, and Otto Neurath', Perspectives on Science 19 (2011).*



Figure 4 above right. *Paul Otlet was not only a visionary but a striking illustrator of his universalist projects. Here, the book is dissected into its components, transformed into documentation – perhaps to become a part of the 'Universal Book'. Source: Charles van den Heuvel, 'Facing Interfaces: Paul Otlet's Visualizations of Data Integration', Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 62 (2011), 2313–2326.*

Sounds like science fiction, only today's futurists would house the information in an '*endo*-dermic appendage', such as a brain-embedded microchip to which information could be uploaded, à la *The Matrix*. Otlet's frenzied efforts to capture and catalogue all the world's knowledge produced real information-processing innovations, too. He invented the great search tool of libraries of yore, the once-ubiquitous system of index card files on rods in pull-out drawers in library cabinets. And with over 12 million of those index cards he created an archive he called the Mundaneum, which he saw as a successor to the Library of Alexandria, the *Summa* of Aquinas, the *Encyclopédie*, and all the world's great libraries, museums and world expositions put together. We might perceive it as a kind of Google *avant la lettre*. Otlet declared that the Mundaneum 'is about gathering, condensing, classifying, coordinating ... finally, to represent and to reproduce'.[9] (The Mundaneum still exists physically in Mons, Belgium, and virtually at www.mundaneum.org. Perhaps fittingly, it benefits from Google's sponsorship.)

Bush's 'memex'

Otlet also co-invented microfilm, a new technology that far exceeded his principal bibliographic efforts.[10] This new, convenient and compressed storage medium could enable libraries both to preserve fragile volumes and to increase their collections while occupying far less shelf space. With microfilm we go beyond summarising the contents of books to return to the original utopian aspiration of gathering all the world's books themselves. But at this point the visionaries address the possibility that all this content could come within the grasp not only of institutions but also of individuals. In 1945, Vannevar Bush – who, as the director of the wartime US Office of Scientific Research and Development, was one of the forces behind the Manhattan Project – contemplated the revolutionary promise of microfilm. In a noted essay published in the *Atlantic Monthly* in the closing months of the Second World War, Bush proposed a 'memex', a private device for information storage and retrieval that, by responding to and storing the associations that the human



Figure 5. *Vannevar Bush's 'memex', as imagined in the 10 September 1945 edition of Life magazine. Source: Google's Life archive.*

[9] P. Otlet, *Monde: Essai d'universalisme* (Brussels, 1935), p. 450 (translation mine).
[10] See R. Goldschmidt and P. Otlet, *Sur une forme nouvelle de livre: Le Livre microphotographique* (1906), translated in Raymond, *International Organisation*, pp. 87-95.

mind produces, would transcend the 'artificiality of systems of indexing' used in libraries.[11] Bush described the device and its capacities as follows:

> A memex is a device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory.

Note the 'memory supplements' metaphor recalling the Otlet-ian 'exodermic appendage' of the mind. Mechanical storage adjuncts to the brain join the Library of Alexandria as a top trope for the bibliographically inclined. Bush continued:

> It consists of a desk, and while it can presumably be operated from a distance, it is primarily the piece of furniture at which he works. On the top are slanting translucent screens, on which material can be projected for convenient reading. There is a keyboard, and sets of buttons and levers. Otherwise it looks like an ordinary desk.
>
> In one end is the stored material. The matter of bulk is well taken care of by improved microfilm. Only a small part of the interior of the memex is devoted to storage, the rest to mechanism. Yet if the user inserted 5000 pages of material a day it would take him hundreds of years to fill the repository, so he can be profligate and enter material freely.

Digital Public Library of America

From the photographic impressions of microfilm to today's digital scanning, the prospects for the great and universally accessible compendium of content are en route to realisation. Indeed, Harvard University librarian and renowned historian of the book, Robert Darnton, last year announced the April 2013 launch of the Digital Public Library. At a lecture at Columbia Law School in April 2012, Darnton declared: 'We know that we want the DPLA to serve a broad constituency: not just faculty in research universities but students in community colleges, ordinary readers, K-through-12 school children and seniors in retirement communities – anyone and everyone with an interest in books.'[12] Darnton is confident that the DPLA will overcome any technological and funding impediments. There remains one stumbling block: many of those interesting books are still under copyright, and sorting through the rights clearance may prove daunting if not intractable.

[11] V. Bush, 'As We May Think', *Atlantic Monthly* (July 1945), 101-8, at 106-7.
[12] R. Darnton, 'Digitize, Democratize: Libraries and the Future of Books', *Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts*, 36 (2012), 1-19 at 16.

In brief

This is a selection of British Academy activity in the first half of 2013. To keep up to date with what is happening at the British Academy, follow us on @britac_news, or sign up to our mailing list at www.britac.ac.uk

Sensory Substitution and Augmentation

Since the 1960s, scientists have created sensory substitution and augmentation devices that try to replace, enhance or create a sense by exploiting another sense. In March 2013, a British Academy Conference brought together the neuroscientists and psychologists who are developing these devices and studying the brains and behaviour of subjects who use them. The conference investigated the limits and possibilities of these technologies, and explored the nature of perceptual experience and sensory interaction, in collaboration with philosophers. And on 28 March, the occasion was opened up to the general public in the form of a 'Demonstration of Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Devices'. A video presentation in which experts describe the various technologies can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

Literature Week

In May 2013, the British Academy held its third 'Literature Week' – a festival of talks, lectures and debates on different aspects of writing and authorship – organised in partnership with the University of London's Institute of English Studies, with support from the Royal Society of Literature and the *Times Literary Supplement*.

In an event entitled 'Yeats's Mother Tongue', held at the Irish Embassy, Professor Roy Foster FBA and Professor Warwick Gould reflected upon the English connections influencing W.B. Yeats's inspiration, illustrated by selected poems read by Edna O'Brien, Fiona Sampson and Grey Gowrie. At the Globe Theatre, Professor James Shapiro and Professor Jonathan Bate FBA asked 'What can those who teach and study Shakespeare learn from those who perform his plays – and vice-versa?' – with the practical help of Nick Bagnall, director of the Globe's 'Harry the Sixth' productions, and two of its cast members. And at the British Academy itself, there was a poetry reading by Anne Stevenson. Video recordings of these and the other events in the week can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

As part of its Literature Week, the Academy hosted an exhibition of work by the sculptor Justin Rowe. His paper sculptures, crafted from old volumes, explore both the importance of respecting literature and the tactile beauty of books as physical objects. A video interview in which the artist discusses the exhibition can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/



Ancient Egyptian Literature: Theory and Practice

Although the literature of Ancient Egypt is comparatively poorly known compared to its art and architectural achievements, it constitutes one of the earliest literary traditions produce anywhere in the world, and has been the subject of intense study for almost 200 years. A new book of essays published in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* series brings together work from the main researchers in the field from around the world, and reviews the numerous recent developments in the theoretical framework of interpretation. There are chapters on textual criticism, literary criticism, the social role of literature, reception theory, and new literary texts.

Professor Verena Lepper explains a display of papyri to guests at the book launch in Berlin, on 24 May 2013. Photo: Achim Kleuker, Berlin.

The volume, edited by Dr Roland Enmarch and Professor Verena Lepper, was launched on 24 May 2013 at a reception held at the Neues Museum in Berlin. Guests listened to a keynote speech by Professor Antonio Loprieno, and were able to view the largest papyrus exhibition in the world.

Further information about the book can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/

Rebirth and Revolution: The Story of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina

The Ancient Library of Alexandria captured the imagination of the world and remains one of the greatest adventures of the human intellect. On 28 May 2013, Professor Ismail Serageldin discussed the development of the new Bibliotheca Alexandrina, which aims to recapture the spirit of the ancient library in a 21st-century context. The event was held with support from the Egyptian Embassy and the British Egyptian Society. An audio recording of Professor Serageldin's lecture can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

Turkey and the Challenge of the New Middle East

On 31 January 2013, the British Academy hosted a panel discussion to consider Turkey's position as a powerful player in a turbulent Middle East. Speakers included Yaşar Yakış, a former Foreign Minister of Turkey. The event was organised in association with the British Institute at Ankara, one of the British Academy's Sponsored Institutes and Societies. Audio recordings of the discussion can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/



Liberal World Orders

Is liberal world order a *fading* international order responding to declining America hegemony? Or is it a *failing* international order riddled with internal tensions and contradictions? Either way, liberal world order is assumed to be in crisis. The contributors to a new British Academy publication contend that the crisis is primarily one of authority. This has been compounded by the relative lack of historical context supplied by liberal theorists of 'the international'. By not looking further than the 20th century, the field has ignored moments when similar tensions and contradictions have been evident.

It is proposed that the practices of liberal ordering are resilient enough to prove durable despite the relative decline in the power and authority of liberal states. Just as co-operative practices between states predated liberalism, aspects of world order today which evolved during the high point of liberal internationalism may succeed in outliving liberalism.

This volume in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* series is edited by Professor Tim Dunne and Dr Trine Flockhart. Further information about the book can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/

Constituting the Arab uprisings

MATTIA TOALDO

RECENT EVENTS IN EGYPT have confirmed the relevance of the current transitions in North Africa. The clash between revolutionary and democratic-constitutional legitimacy is evident, not only in Cairo but in the whole region.

New constitutions are either in force, as in Morocco, or are being discussed, as in Tunisia and Libya. Egypt is a case of its own, as its constitution entered into force in the last weeks of 2012, only to be repealed by the recent military coup. Even there, the constitutional process is far from over, as a new committee of experts has formulated amendments which might be approved by a referendum by the end of 2013.

The transitions that started with the Tunisian uprising in December 2010 are still unfolding, although one could argue that even 2010 is an arbitrary starting date. The Algerian uprising in 1988, which eventually led to the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front and the ensuing civil war, or the Palestinian Intifada in 1987, which led to the Oslo Accords and the birth of the Palestinian Authority, could be taken as the beginning of the unravelling of the old regional status quo that had followed decolonisation. As often happens, a broader analysis is needed in order to grasp the meaning of current events.

Against this background, the British School at Rome (BSR), the Society for Libyan Studies (SLS), and the Centre for Global Constitutionalism at the University of St Andrews jointly decided to analyse the constitutional transitions in the Middle East and North Africa in a conference held at the British Academy in London on 2-3 May 2013. Academics from Western and Arab universities attended, along with diplomats and other policymakers. Expert on Arab constitutions Nathan J. Brown delivered the keynote address, while a roundtable discussion was held with former head of the Egyptian constituent assembly, and member of the Freedom and Justice Party (close to the Muslim Brotherhood), Amr Darrag. This event was facilitated by the connections between the BSR Director Christopher Smith and the St Andrews Centre for Global Constitutionalism, which in turn provided both the intellectual background and the academic network behind the conference. The crucial support from the SLS is a further demonstration of what can be achieved when BASIS institutes co-operate and support research.

Where we started

The May 2013 conference was part of a longer process. My position was funded by the British Academy's funding for research in BASIS institutions on the Arab uprisings, and a collaboration between the BSR and SLS. Our work began with a workshop on 'Libya: what happened and what's next', held at the BSR on 25 May 2012. Although focusing on only one of the countries in transition, it highlighted some of the major themes that were later investigated on a wider range of case-studies: the link between security and human rights; the relevance of free and fair elections; the challenges connected to constitution-making and the importance of inclusive processes. The workshop was attended by more than 50 academics, diplomats and experts in Rome, who praised the event as being one of the few (if not the only) opportunity to discuss these issues from different perspectives.

The May 2013 conference in London was announced by BSR Director Christopher Smith in his introductory remarks, and in fact the organisation of the event started soon after the workshop in Rome. With the Director of the Centre for Global Constitutionalism, Anthony Lang, the decision was made to investigate the current transitions through a coherent theoretical framework, that of Political constitutionalism. Political constitutionalism extends the analysis of constitution-making beyond debates surrounding judicial reviews, to include a broader analysis of the behaviour of all actors involved in the writing of new charters and of their sources of legitimacy. Among these actors, the global context and the regional powers play a role that is often underestimated.

Rather than focusing exclusively on the existence of rights to be protected through judicial bodies, Political constitutionalism takes into account the 'circumstances of

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In May 2013, a conference was held at the British Academy on 'Constitutionalism and the Arab Uprisings: Politics and Law in a New Middle East'. The conference was jointly organised by the British School at Rome, the Society for Libyan Studies, and the Centre for Global Constitutionalism at the University of St Andrews; it was supported financially by the Academy, as part of its 'Arab Spring' funding initiative.

The British School at Rome and the Society for Libyan Studies are two of the eight British Academy-Sponsored Institutes and Societies. More about these 'BASIS' institutes can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/intl

politics' such as the legislative and executive processes or the functioning of public opinion.[1]

The major themes of constitutional transitions

Coherently with Political constitutionalism, we decided to expand the analysis of the new charters to go beyond the mere textual analysis and include the investigation of the 'hard politics' of constitution-making. We therefore discussed several themes: the transition from revolutions to constitutions; the influence of the religious discourse and of religiously-inspired actors on constitution-making; the balance between safeguarding human rights and guaranteeing security; the influence of external actors (such as the EU or the US) on the current transitions.

This structure of the panels will be reflected in the edited volume – to be published by Cambridge University Press, with the co-operation and support of the Society for Libyan Studies – under the title 'Constituting the Arab Uprisings: Transitional Politics in the Middle East and North Africa'. The relevance of this framework has been confirmed both by the discussion during the conference and by ensuing events.

The difficulties of the transition from revolutions to constitutions has been once more highlighted by the events in Egypt of summer 2013. Despite relatively free and fair elections, and notwithstanding the approval of a new constitution in November–December 2012, the gap between the new order established under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary legitimacy claimed by anti-Morsi demonstrators grouped under the umbrella of the 'Tamarrod' (Rebellion) campaign seemed evident.

Tunisia, the writing is on the wall: 'Democracy, proud to be Tunisians'.

The connection between religion and constitution-making was another important topic discussed during the conference, particularly with studies of Tunisian constitution-making and of the Moroccan example. In Tunisia the relevance of Islam in the new constitution has been the subject of a heated debate also in light of the article of the previous constitution, in place under the dictator Ben Ali, which stated that Islam is the religion of Tunisia, a formulation that leads to several conflicting interpretations. In Morocco, Islam has been used as source of legitimacy both by the king (formally and concretely the religious leader of the country) and by his opponents.

The balance between security and human rights has always been tilted in favour of the former in the Arab world. Nevertheless, as the workshop on Libya in 2012 had highlighted, overcoming the oppressive rule of the former security apparatus could imply a state of *de facto* anarchy that in fact denied the concrete exercise of human rights, particularly by social groups such as women and minorities. Libya was therefore at the heart of the discussion of this topic, with its struggle to build an efficient and independent judiciary, while ensuring that the monopoly of force be exercised by the state and not by the myriad of militias that sprang out of the messy revolution/civil war. Egypt presents the same contradiction between enforcing human rights and guaranteeing security and law and order, although under a different perspective. The balance between political and social pluralism, on the one hand, and the right of the majority to govern, on the other hand, were one major source of debate during the conference – and the discussion will continue for years to come.

The role of external actors

The relevance of external actors in the transitions in North Africa had already been assessed during the workshop on Libya at the BSR. The international intervention against Qadhafi provided fairly obvious evidence of the importance of Western and regional powers in the toppling of dictators and in the establishment of a new order – although in most cases it would be more appropriate to speak of *the failure to establish any type of order* after the overthrow of the old regime.

Although the Palestinian Territories have not been directly affected by the so-called 'Arab spring', their history since the late 1980s can be analysed as an antecedent of current events. This was the goal behind two different papers presented during the conference that highlighted the interaction between external actors (mainly Israel and the Western world) and Palestinian constitution-making in the early 1990s. As a matter of fact, the Palestinian case is all the more interesting as the constitution of the Palestinian Authority was never connected to the establishment of an independent state.

The interplay between local and external actors in the Arab transitions has been the focus of my personal work since the workshop on Libya in 2012, and throughout my postdoctoral fellowship for the British School at Rome and the Society for Libyan Studies. Libya was the clearest example of foreign intervention in the transitions through Operation Unified Protector, in which NATO joined forces with some members of the Arab League to oust Colonel Qadhafi. Nevertheless, the role of external actors has always been a crucial component of political constitutionalism, as highlighted by the study of successive transitions in 20th-century Egyptian history.[2]

[1] For a broader discussion of political constitutionalism see Richard Bellamy, *Political Constitutionalism: a Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2007). A use of this framework to describe events in the Middle East and North Africa can be found in Anthony Lang, 'From revolutions to constitutions: the case of Egypt', *International Affairs*, 89:2 (March 2013).

[2] See Lang, 'From revolutions to constitutions'.

In the past decades, the EU and the US have prioritised the preservation of the status quo over change, supporting authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East in the name of stability. Their policies towards the Arab world have highlighted the contradiction between democracy support and the pursuit of national interest, yet both are destined to be major actors also in the future. Nevertheless, dramatic changes have occurred particularly in EU policy after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings: with the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy started in March 2011, significant changes have been promoted in the EU support to Mediterranean countries to include more attention to human rights and step up conditionality in case of violations of the rule of law. A similar approach has been at least stated by the Obama administration, although many authors and several Middle Eastern commentators have questioned how much discontinuity there is between the Freedom Agenda promoted by President George W. Bush alongside the intervention in Iraq and Obama's programme of democracy support. The crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and the suspension of the 2012 Egyptian constitution by the military tested these statements and aims: the EU and the US have had a hard time using their economic and political leverage in the face of the growing repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and the reintroduction of the Mubarak-era emergency law.

One of the recent demonstrations in Egypt.

Future challenges

Although some constitutions have already been approved (for instance Egypt's and Morocco's), the constitutional process in North Africa is far from being over, with new elections and the implementation of new constitutional rights being among the first tests. The depth of the top-down reform process in Morocco will be understood only in the medium term, while recent events in Egypt seem to bring the whole process back to square one: new amendments to the constitution (now suspended), a new referendum and eventually fresh national elections. Again, rather than just looking at rules, scholars of the Egyptian transition would do well to see how inclusive of all political actors the process will be, particularly with regards to the plurality force, namely the Muslim Brotherhood. As things stand, it is hard to predict whether the new constitution will regulate the workings of a democracy or just act as a figleaf for a resurgent dictatorship.

Other countries, such as Libya, are just beginning to deal with the hard politics of constitution-making, while dealing with other problems that have been highlighted by our discussion, such as the balance between human rights and security. Tunisia, despite its recent crisis over the surge of Salafist attacks and the growing tensions between the religious and the secular trends within society, seems to have at last found a middle ground between competing visions of the constitution. Nevertheless, even there the transition rests on rather weak foundations and unpleasant surprises may well arise.

This is therefore a work in progress, as these transitions will not end soon. The idea of writing an edited volume collecting the work that was presented during the conference (and some which was not) is not meant to provide the reader with the 'ultimate narrative' of past events, but rather to experiment with a new perspective, based on past experience, in order to understand what is next.

The roots of Christian fundamentalism in American Protestantism

JAMES D.G. DUNN

On 27 February 2013, the British Academy held a conference on 'What is Fundamentalism – and What Threats does it Pose to Today's World?' The event was convened at the suggestion of James Dunn, Lightfoot Professor of Divinity Emeritus at the University of Durham, and a Fellow of the British Academy. As well as examining the origins of 'fundamentalism' in early 20th-century American Protestantism (the subject of this article), the conference asked what are the conditions that cause fundamentalism to develop in different religions and cultures in modern times. Audio recordings of the presentations can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

IN THIS ARTICLE I describe the beginnings of Protestant fundamentalism, and go on to analyse its central characteristics, also drawing attention to its continuing influence on Christianity today and on the national politics of the United States of America.[1]

The Fundamentals

We should begin, however, by at least noting some problems in any conceptualisation of 'fundamentalism'. An initial problem is that the term 'fundamentalism' may be too much of an abstraction from what are actually a wide range of traditionalist views in diverse ideological and religious systems. Is 'fundamentalism' a universal phenomenon, or should we only speak of a diverse set of fundamentalisms?[2] Should we even speak of 'Protestant fundamentalism' as though it was a single, coherent phenomenon?[3] Again, it is arguable that what we now refer to as a 'fundamentalist' attitude or mind-set can be found in earlier centuries.[4] But if fundamentalism is defined as a reaction against Modernism, then it is itself a modern phenomenon.[5] A third problem is that 'fundamentalist' has become a pejorative term in most public discourse, 'a synonym for bigotry, intellectual immaturity, fanaticism, and sometimes violence', 'an intolerant epithet for those we regard as intolerant ... a label that immediately delegitimates'.[6] So is the discussion loaded against 'fundamentalism' from the start? Should we try using another term, like 'foundationalism',[7] to describe the view that any system, religious or otherwise, needs some firm or fixed foundational truths on which to build?

Figure 1. *The origin of 'Fundamentalism': the series of pamphlets entitled 'The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth', published in Los Angeles between 1910 and 1915.*

[1] The best account of American Protestantism is G.M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture: the shaping of twentieth century evangelicalism, 1870-1925* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, [2]2006); see also E.R. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism, 1800-1930* (University of Chicago, 1970, 2008).

[2] See particularly M.E. Marty and R.S. Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* and *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (The Fundamentalism Project, vols. 1 and 5; University of Chicago, 1991, 1995); also H.A. Harris, 'How Helpful is the Term "Fundamentalist"?', in C.H. Partridge, ed., *Fundamentalisms* (Carlisle, Paternoster, 2001), pp. 3-18.

[3] See also H.A. Harris, 'Protestant Fundamentalism', in Partridge, ed., *Fundamentalisms*, pp. 33-51.

[4] M. Ruthven, *Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning* (Oxford University, 2009): 'In a sense Martin Luther, John Calvin, and other Reformation leaders could be described as "fundamentalists" many centuries before the term was coined, while the Council of Trent can also be seen as a "fundamentalist" or "integralist" response' (15).

[5] J. Barr, *Fundamentalism* (London, SCM, 1977) 175.

[6] Rightly noted by C. H. Partridge in his Introduction to *Fundamentalisms* xiv.

[7] Harris, 'How Helpful' 14-16.

In fact, the actual origin of the term 'Fundamentalism' can be dated with some precision. As is generally agreed, the origin lies in the publication of a series of 12 small matching books, almost large pamphlets, entitled *The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth*, edited initially by A.C. Dixon, and subsequently by R.A. Torrey, and published by the Bible Institute of Los Angeles from 1910 to 1915. Each volume was made up of between five and eleven essays, the authors including well-known conservative Protestant scholars of the day. The authors were mainly Americans, notably the famous B.B. Warfield, Professor of Theology at Princeton Seminary, and the equally famous revivalist, R.A. Torrey. But they also included several eminent British names: for example, the highly regarded Presbyterian apologist James Orr, Professor at the Free Church College in Glasgow; G. Campbell Morgan, a noted British evangelist and minister of Westminster Chapel, London; H.C.G. Moule, an admired commentator on the New Testament and Bishop of Durham; and W.H. Griffith Thomas, formerly Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. Three million copies of the 12 volumes were dispatched free of charge to every pastor, professor and student of theology in America.[8]

The motivation behind the volumes is clear: the editors and authors perceived that their faith, what they would have regarded as the orthodox beliefs of Protestantism, indeed of Christianity, were under attack. The attacks were seen to be multiple and all the more threatening for that reason. It was a first order priority that these attacks should be withstood and opposed.[9] One was the influence of Liberal theology which spread from Germany in the latter decades of the 19th century. This was perceived as undermining fundamental doctrines of Christianity. Hence the first two essays in the first volume of *The Fundamentals* are on 'The Virgin Birth of Christ' by Orr, and 'The Deity of Christ' by Warfield; and there is a later essay on 'The Certainty and Importance of the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the Dead' by Torrey.[10]

Here it is not unimportant to recognise that *The Fundamentals* were a Protestant equivalent to the Roman Catholic condemnation of 'Modernism' in Pius X's encyclical of 1907. For Modernism was expressive of the same Liberalism which sought to adapt Catholic faith to the intellectual Zeitgeist. In the Catholic hierarchy's view, Modernism was just another name for liberal Protestantism.[11] Ironically *The Fundamentals* riposted by asking 'Is Romanism Christianity?' and depicting Rome as 'The Antagonist of the Nation'. As a point more worthy of note, however, it is this sense that 'liberalism' inevitably involves a slackening of what should, or must be regarded as firm and incontrovertible truths, which gives the term 'liberal' such negative, and indeed threatening overtones in conservative Christian circles to this day.

The Fundamentals also contained attacks on socialism and modern philosophy, all seen as threatening to undermine divinely revealed truths. But one of the most dangerous threats was perceived to be the spreading influence of Darwin's theory of evolution, undermining a biblical view of the cosmos as divinely created and of the human species as specially created by God. Hence essays in *The Fundamentals* on 'The Passing of Evolution', by the geologist G.F. Wright, and on the 'Decadence of Darwinism'. For the contributors to *The Fundamentals* it was not just the answers which were the problem; even to ask the questions, or to think that it was appropriate to subject fundamental matters of faith to questioning, was unacceptable. The most famous or notorious early clash between fundamentalists and modernists was the so-called 'Scopes Monkey Trial', in 1925, when a high school teacher, John Scopes, was accused of violating a Tennessee legal act which made it unlawful to teach evolution in any state-funded school.[12] The still on-going issue as to whether 'creationism' or 'intelligent design' should have a place in the school curriculum marks the current phase of the same debate.

However, the key threat perceived was the threat to the Bible and to its authority. In this case the great bogey was 'higher criticism', that is, the subjection of the Bible to critical question. Here again it was German theological scholarship which was seen as most to be blamed. The Enlightenment had encouraged the application of scientific method to the study of the Bible, its historical claims subjected to scientific historical scrutiny. But 'scientific criticism' had undermined the fundamental concepts of revelation and miracle. The influence of Baruch Spinoza and David Hume was seen as destructive of faith in the supernatural.[13] To question whether Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, the first five books of the Bible, or whether there was more than one Isaiah, or whether all the letters attributed to Paul in the New Testament had actually been written by Paul himself – such questions were intolerable. Accordingly we find essays in *The Fundamentals* on the 'History of the Higher Criticism' and 'Fallacies of the Higher Criticism', and on such subjects as the 'Inspiration of the Bible' and 'The Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch'.

Inerrancy

This brings us to the heart of Protestant fundamentalism – the central role of the Bible as the infallible authority

[8] K. Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (London, HarperCollins, 2000), p. 171.

[9] Martin E. Marty, 'What is Fundamentalism? Theological Perspectives', in H. Küng and J. Moltmann, eds., *Fundamentalism as an Ecumenical Challenge* (Concilium Special; London, SCM, 1992), pp. 1-11, in an early conclusion of the multi-volume *Fundamentalism Project*, which he edited with R. Scott Appelby, sums up the character of fundamentalism as 'oppositionalism': 'Fighting back as a constitutive principle determines the shape of fundamentalist theological methods, principles and substance, just as it does the shape of fundamentalist group formation and political strategy' (1). See also Moltmann's essay in the same volume ('Fundamentalism and Modernity', pp. 99-105). George Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism* (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1991), characterises a fundamentalist as 'an evangelical who is militant in opposition to liberal theology in the churches or to the changes in cultural values or mores, such as those associated with "secular humanism"' (1).

[10] The Wikipedia article on 'The Fundamentals' gives a full list of the volumes' essays. See also Ruthven, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 10-13.

[11] 'Modernism', *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (Vol. 10. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911) – available online.

[12] A fuller account in Armstrong, *Battle for God*, pp. 175-8.

[13] See further Barr, *Fundamentalism*, ch. 8.

of Christian faith. As James Barr notes, in his devastating critique of fundamentalism, 'the question of scriptural authority is *the* one question of theology, that takes precedence over all others'.[14] Again we note the parallel with Roman Catholicism, in its similar, its similarly instinctive, conviction that for faith to be sure, for faith to be certain, the authority underpinning it must be infallible. The Catholic dogma on Papal infallibility, when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*,[15] mirrors the Protestant insistence on the infallibility of the Bible, while at the same time the distinction between Pope and Bible indicates the deep divide which conservative Protestantism sees between itself and Catholicism.

As the heart of Protestant fundamentalism this feature deserves more analysis. Its central importance is indicated by the fact that, for instance, the term 'infallibility' is soon seen to be inadequate. It can become a weasel word, taken as referring simply to the impact made by the Bible rather than to its creation.[16] Likewise the term 'inspiration' can be taken as equivalent to 'inspiring', describing the Bible's effect rather than how it came about. A stronger word is needed, and that is '*inerrancy*'. One can have complete certainty in what the Bible teaches, because it is without error, inerrant. 'If the Bible contains errors it is not God's Word itself, however reliable it may be. ... God's character demands inerrancy'.[17] The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (1978) includes Article XII – 'We affirm that Scripture in its entirety is inerrant, being free from all falsehood, fraud, or deceit'.[18] Again the parallel with the Catholic dogma is worth noting, since in the case of Papal infallibility too, 'infallibility means more than exemption from actual error; it means exemption from the possibility of error'.[19]

In Protestant fundamentalism, the assumption of and focus on inerrancy leads, naturally, to reading the Bible *literally*,[20] to take literally the Reformation's insistence on the primacy of the 'plain sense', the *sensus literalis*.[21] The Reformation's insistence on the plain sense, of course, was in reaction to the medieval Church's assumption that the *literal* was only one of the *four* senses which may be read from scripture – the allegorical, the moral and the anagogical being the others. Martin Luther had strongly insisted on the plain or literal sense and dismissed medieval allegorising as so much rubbish.[22] But in Protestant reaction to Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis, the 'plain sense' meant that when Genesis says the world was created in six days, that must mean six 24-hour periods of time. Or when one Gospel says that Jesus healed a blind man when he entered Jericho, and another that he healed a blind man when exiting from Jericho, and a third that he healed two blind men when leaving Jericho,[23] the only acceptable solution is that Jesus must have done all the healings, one on the way in, another on the way out, and another two on the way out – not one, or two, but four.

Here we see a basic flaw in Protestant fundamentalism, indicated also in the assumption that to maintain or to demonstrate the Bible's *inspiration* is all that is needed. For the fundamentalist there is no distinction between inspiration and revelation.[24] But to focus attention on inspiration fails to see the larger problem of *interpretation*: how to understand what has been written.[25] Ironically, this was an issue which the medieval Church had seen all too clearly in its use of allegorical interpretation to explain difficult passages in the Bible, an issue which the insistence on 'plain sense' and on meaning without error had obscured. But for a fundamentalist, a 'plain sense' reading of the text is not in fact an interpretation.[26] This unwillingness to take seriously the issue of interpretation includes the unwillingness to press the question of whether the Bible has different genres. Fundamentalists would certainly bridle at any suggestion that the poetic imagery in Isaiah's talk of the mountains bursting into song and the trees clapping their hands (Isaiah 55.12) should be read literally.[27] Nevertheless, the claim that the Bible teaches inerrant truth covers everything that the Bible teaches, whether doctrine, or history, or science, or geography, or geology or any other disciplines.[28] And many fundamentalists find it necessary to insist that the opening chapters of Genesis be read as straightforward history. Here the introduction of the term 'myth', to denote a different kind of literature, immediately causes fundamentalist hackles to rise. For to the fundamentalist, 'myth' can mean nothing more than 'not history', and so

[14] Barr, *Fundamentalism*, p. 163. 'Fundamentalists assume the need for a firm rational or empirical foundation upon which to rest faith, and on which to build up the doctrines of their belief system. They take the Bible to be that foundation. Their apologetic stance, therefore, is that we must know that the Bible is true before we can go on to say anything else concerning God. Without a reliable Bible, they fear either that we cannot get started in faith, or that our faith must surely collapse' (Harris, 'Protestant Fundamentalism', p. 39).

[15] See H. Küng, *Infallible?* (London, Collins, 1971), here pp. 81-2.

[16] A complaint voiced by J.I. Packer in his Preface to J.M. Boice, *Does Inerrancy Matter?* (International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, 1977). See also Packer's earlier defence of fundamentalism – *'Fundamentalism' and the Word of God* (London, Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 1958) particularly pp. 94-101.

[17] Boice, *Does Inerrancy Matter?*, pp. 8, 20. 'The inerrancy of the Bible, the entire Bible including its details, is indeed the constant principle of rationality within fundamentalism' (Barr, *Fundamentalism* 53).

[18] The claim to inerrancy refers only to the original autographs; see e.g. R. Nicole, 'The Nature of Inerrancy', in R. Nicole and J.R. Michaels, eds., *Inerrancy and Common Sense* (Grand Rapids, Baker, 1980), pp. 71-95: inerrancy means 'that at no point in what was originally given were the biblical writers allowed to make statements or endorse viewpoints which are not in conformity with objective truth' (88). And further N.L. Geisler, ed., *Inerrancy* (Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1979).

[19] P.J. Toner, 'Infallibility' in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*.

[20] G. Dollar, *History of Fundamentalism in America*: 'Historic fundamentalism is the literal exposition of all the affirmation and attitudes of the Bible' (quoted by Ruthven, *Fundamentalism*, p. 59).

[21] Packer, *'Fundamentalism'*, pp. 102-6.

[22] See e.g. W.G. Kümmel, *The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems* (London, SCM, 1972), p. 23.

[23] Matthew 20.29-34 (two, exiting); Mark 10.46-52 (one, exiting); Luke 18.35-43 (one, entering).

[24] See e.g. E. J. Young, *Thy Word is Truth: Thoughts on the Biblical Doctrine of Inspiration* (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1957).

[25] See also Barr, *Fundamentalism*, p. 37.

[26] Nicely illustrated by Harris, 'Protestant Fundamentalism', p. 40.

[27] Boice, *Does Inerrancy Matter?*, p. 11. As Barr points out, 'the point of conflict between fundamentalists and others is not over *literality* but over inerrancy'. The Bible 'must be so interpreted as to avoid any admission that it contains any kind of error' (*Fundamentalism*, p. 40; also p. 46).

[28] Boice, *Does Inerrancy Matter?*, p. 13

'not true' as denying the historical facticity of the narrative so described. The conception of 'myth' as an unfolding of an idea, or a view of the world, by clothing it in narrative form, is anathema to them, or at least the interpretation of any biblical narratives in these terms. Similarly, even to raise the interpretative possibility that the Old Testament book of Jonah is a novelistic story and not a historical account is simply unacceptable.

Most striking, however, is the typically fundamentalist reading of the last book of the Bible, the apocalypse of John, or Revelation. That the normal argument for a literal reading of a text should not apply to a book of often bizarre cosmic symbolism might seem obvious to any who are familiar with the genre of apocalypses. A book of symbols should be read symbolically, or indeed allegorically. But fundamentalists continue to insist on what they regard as a 'plain sense' reading of Revelation, as providing a prediction of events building up to the end of this world. From the beginning of Fundamentalism as such, fundamentalists in the USA have typically believed in a pre-tribulation rapture. That is, they believe that believers will be raptured,[29] transported to heaven prior to the time of great tribulation predicted in Revelation, when those remaining on earth will be subjected to the evil rule of the Antichrist.[30] The Scofield Reference Bible, first published in 1909, with notes which saw in Revelation a timetable of events leading to the end of history, gave such views a considerable boost, particularly as it was published by Oxford University Press, and not least because the soon following First World War seemed an ominous portent of Armageddon.

Belief in the rapture is amazingly widespread in the United States. Hal Lindsey's *The Late Great Planet Earth*[31] has reportedly sold between 15 million and 35 million copies. Lindsey proclaimed that the rapture was imminent, based on world conditions at the time (1970), with the Cold War figuring prominently in his predictions of impending Armageddon. He suggested, for example, that the beast with seven heads and ten horns, referred to in the book of Revelation (17.7), was the European Economic Community, which indeed expanded to consist of ten member states between 1981 and 1986 (though now, as the European Union, it has 27 member states). First published shortly after the Six-Day War, the book has done much to explain and to boost American evangelical support for the state of Israel, whose foundation they see as in fulfillment of biblical prophecy and as part of the same divine plan, 'the greatest single sign indicating the imminent return of Jesus Christ', according to Jerry Falwell, founder of the Moral Majority.[32] And the popularity of the doctrine of the pre-tribulation rapture is further indicated by Tim LaHaye's *Left Behind* series of novels,[33] 16 in number, which have sold tens of millions of copies; several of them reached number 1 in the best-selling lists and several have been made into films.

When it comes to different versions of an event or episode in recorded history in the Bible, the level of fundamentalist anxiety increases noticeably. The natural fundamentalist instinct is to deny that there can be any contradictions, and that any inconsistencies must be in the eye of the reader rather than in the text itself.[34] This applies to some Old Testament narratives, and to tensions between the accounts of the apostle Paul's activities in the Acts of the Apostles and references to the same episodes in Paul's own letters. But the main focus of concern is the different versions of what Jesus did and said in the four New Testament Gospels. Here the same natural response is *harmonisation* – not two or three different accounts of the same event, but three accounts of different events. I have already instanced the account of Jesus healing a blind man, or blind men, on entering or leaving Jericho. The fact that Jesus's 'cleansing' of the Jerusalem Temple is set at the beginning of Jesus' mission by John's Gospel, and at the end of his mission by the other three New Testament Gospels, simply means that Jesus 'cleansed' the Temple twice.[35] Another example is Peter's denials of Jesus when Jesus has been arrested for questioning by the High Priest.[36] The accounts of Peter's three denials are different, denials before different people and in different circumstances, so different that resolution of the problem by harmonisation results in the assertion that Peter must actually have denied Jesus six times.[37] Such a conclusion could be drawn, in defence of the dogma that none of the accounts could be inaccurate or wrong, even though each of the four accounts agree that Peter denied Jesus (only) three times.[38]

A further aspect of the Protestant fundamentalist mindset is the sense that orthodox belief is a complete package, an interlocked system. If questions are allowed on the virgin birth, whether Jesus was or could have been born of a virgin, that does not simply cast doubt on the virgin birth, it also picks out a thread and begins to pull the thread so that the whole system quickly unravels. Indeed, so integrated is the system that even minor details become as important as central doctrines; if an error is detected in some historical detail, the whole system collapses. The image put before students from fundamentalist backgrounds is that of 'the slippery slope'. If a person puts a foot on the slippery slope, then

[29] The idea of the 'rapture' is drawn from 1 Thessalonians 4.13-17, where it appears in reference to the coming again of Christ and the final resurrection of the dead; but in rapture theology it is integrated with the different scheme of Revelation.

[30] Armstrong describes the belief as 'a fantasy of revenge: the elect imagined themselves gazing down upon the sufferings of those who had jeered at their beliefs, ignored, ridiculed, and marginalized their faith, and now, too late, realized their error' (*Battle for God*, pp. 138-9).

[31] Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1970.

[32] See further Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 190-207; Armstrong, *Battle for God*, pp. 217-8 (quotation from p. 217); C. Chapman, 'The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Case Study in the Clash of Fundamentalisms', in Partridge, ed., *Fundamentalisms*, pp. 279-99, especially pp. 293-4.

[33] Wheaton, Tyndale House, 1995-2007.

[34] Classically illustrated in one of the foundation documents of Protestant fundamentalism – A.A. Hodge and B.B. Warfield, *Inspiration* (1881; Grand Rapids, Baker, 1979).

[35] Matthew 21.12-13; Mark 11.15-17; Luke 19.45-46; John 2.13-17.

[36] Matthew 58, 69-75; Mark 14.54, 66-72; Luke 22.54-62; John 18.15-18, 25-27.

[37] H. Lindsell, *The Battle for the Bible* (Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1976), pp. 175-6.

[38] See further Barr, *Fundamentalism* , pp. 55-72.

there is no stopping place and he will plunge directly into the abyss of disbelief or heresy. If you cannot believe all, you cannot believe at all.[39] One hears the same argument in Catholic polemics and apologetics. It is literally a case of 'all or nothing'. If a book can be fallible in what it says about astronomy or biology, how can you trust it in matters of religious faith and doctrine? If you cannot believe the story of the Israelites crossing the Red Sea on dry ground (Exodus 14.22), or in one of Jesus' healing miracles, then you have pulled the plug, and the cistern of faith will drain away completely. And, sadly, if inevitably, this presumption becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in several cases, the student concluding, 'If I can't believe everything the Bible tells me, then I can't believe anything it tells me'. Fundamentalism is antithetical to and disastrous for any open and inquiring mind.

Certainty

Underlying the rise of Protestant fundamentalism is the desire for *certainty*. If terms like 'inerrancy' and 'harmonisation' are key aspects of the Protestant fundamentalist mindset, then so also is the term 'certainty' – the assumption that if one is summoned to believe, then what is to be believed must be certain. Again, a similar observation could be made with respect to Roman Catholicism.[40] To be sure, this desire for certainty is in some ways admirable in its motivation. It wants clarity, because it wants commitment. How can we really be committed to a cause if we do not know, clearly and without doubt, what it is we are committed to? The desire is for a firm rock in a sea of otherwise constant change, for a truth unchanging in the face of so-called 'progress' with its seemingly endless confusion and dilution of moral standards. In a period marked by social, ideological and political uncertainty, the appeal of such fundamentalist certainty is obvious, and goes a long way to explain the success of conservative and fundamentalist churches in evangelism and church planting.

The focus in Protestant fundamentalism is on scripture, precisely because written formulations hold out the promise of such certainty, certainty of historical fact, certainty of worship practice and ethical prescription, certainty of theological proposition. Not least of fundamentalism's appeal for so many Protestants is this claim to honour scripture and to give it its due place as the definition and prime determinant of the religion to which it bears testimony. The assumption is that God the ultimate Absolute has revealed himself absolutely. 'What Scripture says, God says'.[41] Failure to honour God's chosen means of self-revelation is failure to honour God. For the fundamentalist, such a failure properly to acknowledge scripture is itself a kind of blasphemy. And a post-Modernism which disperses all such absolutes and makes certainty of any reading of the text impossible is simply anathema.

Where this desire for certainty, what Karen Armstrong refers to as 'this lust for certainty',[42] becomes entirely questionable is in its basic confusion of *faith* with certainty. The assumption that faith deals in divine certainties has a long history. Notably John Henry Newman preferred the term 'certitude', but it came to the same thing. Faith had to do with certitude, because it was 'divine faith', it was faith in what had been divinely revealed, the acceptance of truth revealed by divine grace. As Newman put it, 'Certitude' or 'to be certain is to know that one knows'.[43] Ironically the most famously radical 20th-century New Testament scholar, Rudolf Bultmann, posed the issue of certainty of faith in antithesis to the uncertainty of historical knowledge.[44] But a crucial question was too little asked: whether we should expect *certainty* in matters of *faith*, whether an invulnerable 'certainty' is the appropriate language for faith, whether faith is itself an 'absolute'. It was the Enlightenment assumption that necessary truths of reason are like mathematical axioms, and that what is in view is the certain QED of mathematical proof, which has skewed the whole discussion. But faith moves in a totally different realm from mathematics. The language of faith uses words like 'confidence' and 'assurance' rather than 'certainty'. Faith deals in trust, not in mathematical calculations. Nor is it to be defined simply as 'assent to propositions as true' (in Newman's terms). Walking 'by faith' is different from what Paul calls walking 'by sight' (2 Corinthians 5.7). Faith is commitment, not just conviction.

Richard Holloway, former Bishop of Edinburgh, in his recent movingly honest autobiography, *Leaving Alexandria*, points out that, 'The opposite of faith is not doubt, it is certainty. Where you have certainty, you don't need faith'.[45] The fact, too little appreciated by fundamentalists, is that faith as trust is never invulnerable to questions. Rather, faith lives in dialogue with questions. Faith-without-doubt is a rare commodity, which few (if any) have experienced for any length of time. On the contrary, doubt is the inoculation which keeps faith strong in face of unbelief. Whereas, it is the 'lust for certainty' that leads to fundamentalism absolutising its own faith claims and dismissing all others.

The basic failing of fundamentalism here is the failure to recognise that human speech, all human speech, even if inspired by the Spirit of God, is simply inadequate to express divine reality. By definition, the God in whom believers believe is beyond human sight and human comprehension, and so also beyond human speech.

[39] See also Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 68-9. Armstrong notes that the psychologist J.H. Leuba in his book *Belief in God and Immortality* (1921) 'produced statistics that "proved" that a college education endangered religious belief' (*Battle for God*, p. 175). See also her description of the Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina (p. 215).

[40] Cf. P. Hebblethwaite, 'A Fundamentalist Pope?', in Küng & Moltmann, eds., *Fundamentalism*, pp. 80-88.

[41] Packer, *'Fundamentalism'*: what Evangelicals are concerned above all to maintain' (73); 'To learn the mind of God, one must consult His written Word' (47).

[42] Armstrong, *Battle for God*, pp. 140-1.

[43] J.H. Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1865), pp. 307, 318.

[44] L.E. Keck, *A Future for the Historical Jesus* (Nashville, Abingdon, 1971), pp. 55-6, 57-8.

[45] R. Holloway, *Leaving Alexandria: A Memoir of Faith and Doubt* (Edinburgh, Canongate, 2012), p. 184.

Inevitably, then, any attempt to express God's will in human terms, however inspired, will involve a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty. Words are rarely precision instruments, except when used as rigorously controlled technical terms, that is, in narrow specialisms or in legal documents; and even then the control often slips, and lawyers, QCs and judges earn their keep. Anyone who is familiar with the problems of translating from one language into another will appreciate the point at once.

What Christian fundamentalists have forgotten is the prohibition expressly emphasised from the beginning of the Old Testament, forbidding the making of images of God in wood or stone (Exodus 20.4). For God, we are thereby warned, is un-image-able, that is, literally unimaginable. And words about God and claims to God's revelation of himself and his will, are equally images, verbal images, which can never get beyond metaphor and analogy. The point of metaphor is that it is not literal. The point of analogy is that the nearest we can get to talking about the subject is that it is something like the analogous subject. The danger of fundamentalism, then, is that it takes the metaphor as literal, it takes the analogy to be the thing itself. In short, it makes the verbal imagery of words into idols. Fundamentalism, in the last analysis, is idolatrous. To be fair, classic Christianity has gone some way down the same road, in its creedal statements which try to define the indefinable, to insist that certain words are absolute, absolutely necessary in confessing faith in God – even though theologians are well enough aware that words change their meanings and that in some creedal statements metaphors are strained to breaking point. So Christian fundamentalism is actually only pushing to extreme a tendency evident in all Christian dogmas.

The craving for certainty also ignores the historical particularity of most of the biblical texts. Even poetic and wisdom texts reflect the culture of their age. But narrative and historical texts, prophecies and epistles all have a degree of historical particularity without taking account of which the texts cannot be adequately understood. But the Protestant fundamentalist wants to hear the biblical text as the word of God now. Indeed, Christian liturgy typically says after any or all readings from the Christian Bible, 'This is the word of God' – not, 'This was the word of God in the 8th century BCE or in the 1st century CE', but 'the word of God today'. A fundamentalist mindset takes this liturgical pronouncement with all seriousness. The text can be abstracted from its historical context, and its meaning and application given a timeless reference. God the absolute has spoken his word; his word shares the same absolute character.

This is nowhere clearer than in the current debate about the potential role of women in church leadership. It counts for nothing that Deborah was one of the judges of Israel during Israel's early settlement of Canaan (Judges 4-5), or that the woman Junia was eminent among the apostles before Paul and probably founded one or more of the earliest churches in Rome (Romans 16.7). What counts decisively is that two passages in the Pauline corpus of letters seem to indicate clearly that women should be subject to men and should not teach or have authority over men (1 Corinthians 14.34-35; 1 Timothy 2.11-12). Accordingly, male headship is a prominent dogma in fundamentalist circles in the USA, with strong echoes among conservative evangelicals in this country, as the recent vote on women bishops in the Church of England Synod reminds us. In their view, no account is or should be taken of the strong patriarchal character of ancient society. On the contrary, fundamentalism can be categorised precisely as a protest against what is perceived as the assault on the patriarchal principles which fundamentalists believe should still determine the structure and operation of society.[46] Nor is the likelihood even worthy of consideration that the texts in view speak of wives and husbands, rather than of women and men in general. But the Greek word (*gynê*) can also mean 'wife': what Paul says is that 'If they (the women, *gynaikes*) want to learn something, let them ask their men (that is, their husbands) in their own home' (1 Corinthians 14.35). And the language of *submission* in both texts is the language of the standard household code of the time – the head of the household should be able to expect other members of the household, notably his wife, to be subject/submissive to him;[47] similarly children should be subject/submissive to their parents,[48] and slaves to their masters.[49] So in all likelihood, the Pauline counsel in these passages should be read not as church order but as household order, in a day when the household was regarded as the basic unit and building block of community in Greco-Roman society. In this context, the Pauline counsel is best taken as a way of affirming and reassuring all concerned that the early Christians did not want to be heard as challenging the pattern of household order which gave the ancient city its social stability. It has nothing to do with church order or a more general patriarchy as such.

There is equal or greater angst on the subject of homosexual practice. For the Christian fundamentalist, and not only the fundamentalist, the decisive fact is that Leviticus pronounces a death sentence on homosexual practice, as also on adultery and incest (Leviticus 20.10-16), and that the apostle Paul also condemns homosexual practice (Romans 1.26-27; 1 Corinthians 6.9). The possibility that this ruling was culturally conditioned, or that Paul was reacting against the uninhibited sexual licence of the Hellenistic world, or against pederasty in particular, is not to be considered, since it blurs what is otherwise a clear-cut ethical ruling. The fact that Christians no longer observe the practice of circumcision and animal sacrifice, even though they were equally fundamental to Israel's religious code, provides no precedent for fundamentalist antipathy to homosexuality. Similarly, the fact that the social mores, which took slavery for granted in both Old and New Testament, have been long abandoned by Christians,

[46] Ruthven, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 103-4, 113-4; see also G. McCulloch, 'Women and Fundamentalisms', in Partridge, ed., *Fundamentalisms*, pp. 202-19.

[47] Colossians 3.18; Ephesians 5.22; Titus 2.5; 1 Peter 3.1, 5.

[48] Luke 2.51; cf. Colossians 3.20; Ephesians 6.1.

[49] Titus 2.9; 1 Peter 2.18; cf. Colossians 3.22; Ephesians 6.5.

cuts no ice. Here again, even to raise the possibility that this ruling is other than an absolute is to undermine the absolute, the infallible authority which the Protestant fundamentalist vests in the Bible.

Intolerance

Equally disturbing are the consequences for the fundamentalists' attitude to others, including other Christians. As James Barr puts it, fundamentalists 'want to think of their own position as *the* or *the only* Christian position: there is, for them, no other truly "Christian" position that can be contrasted with their own'.[50] Because they have the truth, those who disagree with them are simply wrong. When a community recognises that the truth is often multi-faceted, that the truth is bigger than particular formulations of that truth, it also recognises that the coming together of differing perceptions of truth will inevitably involve compromise. That, after all, is what politics is all about. But for fundamentalists truth is univocal, black and white, and compromise is a denial of truth, of the truth that they cling to as the only truth. Where one has absolutes and universals, then no compromise is possible. To recognise the validity of other opinions is to relativise truth.[51] Those who disagree are blind, devious, or mistaken; and in any case they are simply wrong. 'No compromise!' is a typical fundamentalist slogan and war-cry. Those who appreciate the extent to which the Tea Party and evangelical fundamentalists gained control of the Republican party in the States over the past five years will not have been at all surprised at the deadlock in US government for most of President Obama's first term of office. The Tea Party well illustrates Karen Armstrong's description of fundamentalism as 'a religion of rage'.[52] As the Moral Majority in the early 1980s and the Tea Party in the past decade well illustrate, a fundamentalist religious mindset is all too likely to transpose into a fundamentalist political mindset. No compromise![53]

The next phase in fundamentalist attitude to the other, as again attested by the religious fundamentalism of the States over nearly a century, is *intolerance*. Since those who disagree with the fundamentalist are disagreeing with the truth, they are not only wrong, but their alternative views are a threat to the truth. They cannot be tolerated. The claim to certainty, even if only in religious truth, means that those who dispute that truth are blind or wilfully perverse. And even co-religionists who wish to believe and practise differently are all too readily treated as heretics or apostates to be coerced or expelled. All religious systems have a tendency in that direction. Which is why when the religious system acquires political power, then look out! American fundamentalism is by no means the only one to provide warning cases in point.

The extreme phase of fundamentalist attitude to the other is the conviction that the other provides such a threat to the fundamentalist's truth and certainty that it should be suppressed. Part of the strategy here is to demonise the opposition. Here we see the root of President Reagan's categorisation of Russia as 'the evil empire', and George W. Bush's lumping together Arab nationalist Iraq, Islamist Iran and communist North Korea as the 'axis of evil'. Here too we see the root of the Republican right's dismissal of opponents as 'not really American', not truly 'one of us', or the refusal of a surprising proportion of Republicans to believe that Obama is truly an American citizen, born in America. Moreover, a typically fundamentalist view is that the opposition, the other, should not be given the privilege of free speech to spread its untruth. Instead the untruth should be suppressed. Preferably it should be extirpated, by violent means if necessary. Here we see the root of the policy of extraordinary rendition, whereby those suspected of dangerous untruth can be abducted and held in confinement for years without legal recourse. In the Christian West we no longer burn heretics, but we seem to think that it is somehow morally acceptable to send unmanned drones with their deadly armaments to hover over and occasionally strike at Pakistani villages, never mind the 'collateral damage'. The point I am making, of course, is that a fundamentalist mindset, born in the southern States of America, has reached far, not only into inter-church and inter-faith relations, but also into America's national politics and into the international politics which affect us all.

In short, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the Protestant fundamentalism of *The Fundamentals*, with its focus on inerrancy and literal interpretation of the Bible, with its confusion of faith with certainty, and with its intolerance and unwillingness to compromise, is indeed a threat in today's world. James Barr concludes by noting 'the frightening alienation of fundamentalism from the main stream of church life and theology'.[54] But the threat that Protestant fundamentalism poses in north America goes well beyond the ecclesiastical sphere into the realms of national policy and international relations. And it is by no means the only fundamentalism which poses such a threat.

[50] Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 4, 14-15

[51] Ruthven, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 44-9.

[52] Armstrong, *Battle for God*, p. 216.

[53] See further Armstrong, *Battle for God*, pp. 309-16, on the Moral Majority. As she notes, 'a religious vision which sees certain principles as inviolable, and, therefore, nonnegotiable' will always find compromise difficult (p. 316). In November 2011 the *New York Times* quoted Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, speculating that the Tea Party position in Congress was perceived as 'too extreme and not willing to compromise' (Wikipedia, 'Tea Party Movement').

[54] Barr, *Fundamentalism*, p. 338.

Nayef Al-Rodhan Prize for Transcultural Understanding

THE NAYEF AL-RODHAN PRIZE was founded by Dr Al-Rodhan in 2012 after discussions with Sir Adam Roberts (President of the British Academy 2009-2013) had identified the need for a significant prize in the field of international relations – and, more generally, transcultural understanding. Dr Al-Rodhan has written extensively on the subject, and hopes that the prize will bring scholarly contribution to the forefront of public debate on the issue. The Nayef Al-Rodhan Prize for Transcultural Understanding is the Academy's most valuable prize, and will be awarded annually at least until 2017.

At a ceremony held at the British Academy on 4 July 2013, the inaugural Nayef Al-Rodhan Prize was awarded to Karen Armstrong – in recognition of her body of work that has made a significant contribution to inter-faith understanding.

Dr Nayef Al-Rodhan (St Antony's College, Oxford; Director, Centre for the Geopolitics of Globalisation and Transnational Security) said: 'The idea of a shared history, the knowledge of our debt to each other and the urgent need to nurture positive and responsible transcultural relations are important. Pursuing transcultural work is not just a wonderful, moral, elegant, intellectual pastime. It is actually a prerequisite to a successful global system in a globalised world. In the old days, you could get away with some things, although not for very long. In today's world of instant connectivity and deepening interdependence, it is impossible to ignore a state or a culture or a sub-culture, no matter how distant, how different or how dysfunctional. We are in it together, because of globalisation. Unless everybody wins, none of us will win.'

Professor Dame Helen Wallace, Foreign Secretary of the British Academy, who had chaired the prize jury, said: 'We at the British Academy are wholeheartedly committed to promoting international and transnational engagement, and this prize gives us a wonderful way of recognising outstanding contributions to this objective.'

Dr Nayef Al-Rodhan, Karen Armstrong, and Professor Sir Adam Roberts FBA, at the British Academy on 4 July 2013.

Professor Dame Helen Wallace FBA, who chaired the prize jury, said: 'Karen Armstrong is a world-renowned scholar, author and commentator. Her work focuses on commonalities of the major religions, and is celebrated for bringing together different faith communities and encouraging mutual understanding of shared traditions. Karen Armstrong addresses big themes with wide resonance.'

The following is an edited version of ***Karen Armstrong****'s acceptance speech:*

I have become convinced over the years that unless we learn to treat other people as we would wish to be treated ourselves, and learn to appreciate – not merely to 'tolerate' – our significant and revealing differences, the world is simply not going to be a viable place. I sometimes give a lecture entitled 'Compassion: Nice idea or urgent global imperative?' This is a pivotal and dangerous moment in world history, and we all have a duty to do whatever we can in our own particular field – in the media, education, business, politics or the arts – to increase our understanding of our neighbours in the global village that we have created.

Our world is more deeply interconnected than ever before; we are linked together on the World Wide Web. Our financial institutions are interdependent: when markets fall in one part of the world, stocks plummet all around the globe that day; the state of our own economy is affected by the economies of China or Africa. What happens today in Gaza or Afghanistan today can have violent repercussions tomorrow in London or New York. Yet still, so often, we speak as though we ourselves, and our culture and civilisation are in a special, separate, privileged category. This no longer chimes with the realities of the world we live in. One of the most urgent tasks of our time must surely be to build a global community where people of all ethnicities and ideologies can live together in mutual respect.

The science of compassion

In the very early days of Channel 4, I was commissioned to work in Jerusalem on a documentary series on St Paul; there I encountered Judaism and Islam. So parochial was my religious understanding at that time that I had never seen Judaism as anything but a prelude to Christianity and had rarely given Islam a single thought. But in Jerusalem, where you are constantly confronted by all three of the Abrahamic faiths, you become aware not only of the conflict between these faiths, but also of their profound interconnections and similarities. I pursued this in depth in my book *A History of God*.

During my research for this book, I came upon a footnote that turned my life around in Marshall G.S. Hodgson's magisterial three-volume work, *The Venture of Islam*. Commenting on an esoteric form of medieval Islamic mysticism, Hodgson cited the great French Islamist Louis Massignon, who had insisted that the historian of religion must approach premodern traditions with, what he called, 'the science of compassion'. We cannot, Massignon said, approach the spiritualties of the past from the vantage point of post-Enlightenment rationalism. We have to leave our 20th-century perspective and, in a scholarly manner, make the intellectual, social, economic and political milieu that gave birth to these ideas such a vibrant reality for ourselves that we could imagine feeling the same. In this way, said Massignon, you broaden your horizons, and make a place for the other in your mind and heart. It followed that when, for example, I was writing about the Prophet Muhammad, I had to enter the mind of a man living in the hell of 7th-century Arabia who sincerely believed that he had been touched by God. Unless I could lay aside my 20th-century scepticism and embrace this mindset insofar as I could in a scholarly but empathetic manner, I would miss the essence of



'Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths' (1996) is one of the books for which Karen Armstrong was awarded the Nayef Al-Rodhan Prize for Transcultural Understanding. Others include 'A History of God: The 4,000 Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam' (1993), and 'The Great Transformation: The Beginning of our Religious Traditions' (2006)

Karen Armstrong speaks at the award ceremony, held at the British Academy on 4 July 2013.

Muhammad. Today this is a challenge not only for the historian, but for us all: we cannot have a peaceful world unless we hospitably open our minds to the 'other'.

Socrates

This compassion and respect is also central to the rational tradition of the West, as founded by Socrates.

When people engaged in conversation with Socrates, they thought they knew exactly what they were talking about. But after half an hour of Socrates' relentless questioning, they found they did not know the first thing about such essential matters as courage or beauty or justice. A Socratic discourse, as described by Plato, nearly always ends with a moment of shocking *aporia* – of radical doubt – as the participants experienced the depth of their ignorance. Yet that painful moment, Socrates said, made one a philosopher. On the last day of his life, he said that he was wise in only one respect: that he knew he knew nothing at all. A truly rational person, Socrates insisted, must subject every single one of his or her received opinions and most stridently-held convictions to stringent examination. We cannot achieve transcultural understanding unless we lay aside the omniscience that characterises so much contemporary discourse and realise how little we truly know about one another.

Socrates also said that a truly rational debate would be ineffective if it was not conducted in a gentle and kindly manner. There was no point entering into dialogue unless you were prepared to be profoundly changed by the encounter and allow your conversation-partner to unsettle some of your certainties. Today, however, our discourse tends to be extremely aggressive: in politics, the media and academia, it is often not enough for us to seek the truth, we also have to defeat and even humiliate our opponents; indeed, 'dialogue' often simply means bludgeoning our opponents to accept our own opinions – an attitude that we can no longer afford.

Ibn Arabi

At about the same time as I learned about the science of compassion, I came upon this quotation from the great 13th-century Sufi philosopher Muid ad-Din ibn al-Arabi, which immediately resonated with me. He was talking about religion, but I think it can also apply to any political, national, or intellectual ideology that we hold dear and can help us to achieve a truly transcultural understanding:

> Do not praise your own faith so exclusively that you disbelieve all the rest; if you do this you will miss much good; nay, you will fail to recognise the real truth of the matter. God, the omnipresent and omniscient, cannot

be confined to any one creed, for he says [in the Quran]: 'Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allah.' Everybody praises what he knows; his God is his own creature and in praising it, he praises himself. Consequently he blames the beliefs of others, which he would not do if he were just, but his dislike is based on ignorance.

The Persians

Every single one of us has pain. Unless we learn to appreciate the pain of others – even our enemies – we can never achieve a peaceful, viable world. The Greeks understood this. During the 5th century, they invented the genre of tragic drama which put suffering on stage and made the audience watch a man or woman in extremity. The plays usually reflected a problem that was currently preoccupying Athens. Periodically, the leader of the Chorus would turn to the audience and tell them to weep for such polluted human beings as Oedipus, who had violated every taboo in the book. And the Greeks did weep – because they believed that weeping together created a bond between people.

The earliest tragedy to come down to us was Aeschylus' *The Persians;* it is one of the very first accounts we have of a painful encounter between East and West. Aeschylus presented this drama about seven years after the Greeks achieved a landmark victory over the Persians at the naval battle of Salamis. But before that battle, the Persian army had rampaged through Athens, looting, burning, and trashing the city. Yet in his tragedy, Aeschylus was asking the Athenians to weep for the Persians. There is no triumphalism, no gloating. The play makes us see Salamis from the point of view of the defeated. The Persians are presented as a people in mourning; they are hailed as a sister nation, equal to the Greeks in dignity and grace. Could we put on a play in the West End presenting the events that followed 9/11 in such a way that we not only enter into the perspective of the Muslim world but weep for their pain?

This must surely be our task today. Instead of using our own pain as a springboard that incites us to inflict more suffering and so initiate an escalating spiral of violence, we must approach the tragic events of our time with accuracy and empathy. We need to cultivate the science of compassion that enables us to transcend our own interests and lay aside our personal, national and cultural agendas in the interests of peace, broadening our horizons and making a place for the other in our minds and hearts.

The stained glass of Merton College, Oxford

TIM AYERS

The British Academy's sumptuous two-part catalogue of *The Medieval Stained Glass of Merton College, Oxford* was launched at a reception in the college on 19 April 2013. It is the latest in the British Academy's Corpus Vitrearum Medii Aevi (Catalogue of Medieval Window Glass) series. Further information can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/

The catalogue's author, Dr Tim Ayers, is a Senior Lecturer in the History of Art at the University of York, and is a Vice-President of the international Corpus Vitrearum.

Glass treasures

The medium of stained glass works with transmitted light and colour to create its effects. As William Morris, the father of the arts and crafts movement, recognised, and specifically in relation to the glass of Merton College which he knew well, stained glass is also an essentially monumental and architectonic art. It is integral to Gothic architecture, illuminating its spaces in different ways. It has the power to display monumental and brightly illuminated images in specific places – to create messages and meanings, and to write – literally and figuratively – on the building itself, defining the spaces that it encloses. Such potential can give stained glass a particular importance in buildings that make as much play with their windows as Merton chapel.

There has been no doubt for a long time that the stained glass of Merton College is of exceptional interest. Already in the 19th century, both Morris and the architect George Edmund Street had recognised that the chapel contained one of the best-preserved schemes of stained glass to survive from early 14th-century England. It is rivalled only by the nave of York Minster. Of the college's stained glass, this is undoubtedly the greatest treasure, but it is only part of an exceptional inheritance. There are also remains in or from the library, the hall, the warden's lodgings and even the rooms of fellows, all with chapters in this book. The glass from the medieval library, for example, is a survival of international importance, integral again to the building, as one of the earliest of a new kind of library room in the later middle ages. This is the earliest glass to survive in the windows of any English library or, as far as I know, on the continent. Imagine the disadvantages of a library without glass! And here as elsewhere, the windows contained messages about the institution, including repeated images of the *agnus dei*, John the Baptist's acclamation of Christ, relating to the special role of John the Baptist as patron saint of the college (Figure 1).

Figure 1. *A window in Merton College's library. The motif in the circular boss bears the inscription 'Ecce agnus dei' – 'Behold, the lamb of God'. Photo: English Heritage NMR.*

Detection

The primary purpose of the Corpus Vitrearum Medii Aevi series is to make the surviving inheritance of medieval stained glass accessible: in the worst case, to record it against destruction; but also to make it available for study. It is a difficult medium to understand, because of how it is made. Constructed of many small pieces of glass held together with lead, the medium is inherently fragile. Glass may be broken and lead loses its tensile strength. Over many centuries, pieces or panels may be moved, and whole windows may be dismembered and recycled elsewhere. So stained glass study is first a painstaking process of detection. A careful assessment needs to be made of the history of any given panel, in relation to the surviving material.

Merton's stained glass is very extensive and has had an unusually complicated restoration history. It has long been known that Samuel Caldwell of Canterbury Cathedral, the restorer who worked on the chapel and library in the 1930s, set out to deceive the viewer. He wanted to make the glass look coherent and original. I knew about that before I started, but I quickly discovered that there had been another restoration in the mid-19th century, on similar principles. My job was to untangle these interventions, and so to establish what we are looking at today, by inspecting every piece of glass, where necessary from

Figure 2. *From the former east window in Merton College's chapel, now in the north transept. The Crucifixion, by William Price of London, 1702. Photo: C. Parkinson.*

scaffolding. The findings are presented in the catalogue, which contains over 200 illustrations, with related diagrams.

Chronology

To make its task completable, the British Academy's Corpus Vitrearum sets a chronological cut-off date of 1540, approximately at the Reformation, but it allows the inclusion of later glass in a less detailed way, if the author so chooses. I had to decide, therefore, whether to include this later glass, or not. At Oxford, this question is particularly pressing, because the commissioning of glass painting never really stopped in the university. In the 17th century, many colleges were filling up their chapel windows with painted glass, as part of the high church aim to promote the beauty of holiness in worship, supported in the first half of the century by Archbishop Laud. At Merton, the great east window was inserted as late as 1702, by a London glass painter called William Price. It was very much in the same tradition of high church Anglican worship, however, revived after the restoration of Charles II in 1660. Indeed, it was paid for by Alexander Fisher who, as subwarden, had witnessed the destruction of the old window in 1651.

In many ways, Fisher's new window completed a medieval scheme that had otherwise survived intact into the 17th century. As historians and art historians have realised, this later glass painting is interesting, both for the study of imagery in contemporary worship and for the revival of monumental painting in 17th- and 18th-century England. In my opinion, the college made the right decision, therefore, to redisplay the Price window in the north transept (previously in store at the Stained Glass Museum at Ely Cathedral) as part of the Millennium celebrations (Figure 2); it is the only surviving picture window by the founder of the most important family of glass painters in southern England during the whole of the 18th century. For the present project, it seemed arbitrary to cut across the extraordinary continuities, like this, that are such a part of the college's history. The book therefore includes short entries for all of the stained glass in the college.

Archives

While the surviving glass itself has been a central, magnificent and challenging object for study, another major opportunity was presented by the richness of the college archives, as a source of a different kind. Several colleges at Oxford and Cambridge have both extensive surviving glass and surviving accounts that relate to it, but nowhere are they so early. Roger Highfield has published the 13th-century account rolls that record the construction of the chapel between 1288-89 and 1296-97. Less attention has been given to the unpublished accounts for the following decade and a half, which record the furnishing of the building with altars, statues, a screen, benches and sets of vestments and service books. So, if the building was nearly finished by 1296-97, it was apparently not brought into use for some time. There is documentary evidence for the construction of wood chapels, hitherto unexplained, to serve college and parish, in the meanwhile. The previous parish church on the site had presumably been demolished. Yet again the study of stained glass needs to go hand in hand with the history of the buildings that contain it.

For the craft of the glass painter, too, the accounts are exceptionally rewarding. The glazing of the new choir is recorded in the first decade of the 14th century. The entries include a delivery of glass specifically for the new chapel in 1305-1306, brought from Thame, in Oxfordshire. Then between November 1310 and May 1311, there were deliveries by cart of a further twenty-five loads of glass; in such quantities, and in the context of other activity at the time, this must also have been for the chapel. No recipient is named for the payments, but in 1307 and 1310 other payments, some quite large, were made to a glazier called William de Thame. The recorded delivery of glass from the town of Thame itself suggests that he was actually based there. So it is highly likely that the deliveries in 1310-11 were from this business. If so, William is one of the two earliest named glaziers in England whose work survives. The other is the Master Walter whose name appears in the fabric accounts for Exeter Cathedral in the first decade in the 14th century. So the Merton accounts have probably brought to light the maker of the stained glass in the choir of the chapel.

Happily, it has been possible to put further flesh on these bones. On the one hand, a whole group of stained glass in the Thames Valley is related to the choir glazing stylistically, so it was probably made by the same people. On the other hand, by good fortune, William seems to feature in other archival sources. In the first decades of the 14th century, a glazier of this name appears in the archive of charters for medieval Thame that survives at Rousham Park (Oxfordshire), and in the tax rolls of royal government. These suggest that Thame was a centre for glass painting in the first half of the 14th century. By 1327, there are no less than 5 people called 'Glasiere' in a tax roll for that year, and a Robert de Thame is later found working at the Palace of Westminster, in 1351. So this is a remarkably well documented case of a local glazing workshop; but why Thame? Oxford was a much bigger town by 1300. I can't answer that question with certainty, but Thame was well networked in a variety of ways. It was a regional hub, a medium-sized town owned by the bishop of Lincoln, and the seat of one of the richest prebends in Lincoln Cathedral. It was on a good road and river system. I also suspect that the glaziers were working closely with nearby quarries, like the one at Wheatley. We know from the Merton accounts that Wheatley supplied most of the stone for the chapel. So here again, the relationship between stained glass and architecture may have been important.

Community

Beyond the craft itself, the book also sets out to explore ways in which this kind of evidence has wider applications. In particular, how were stained glass and architecture shaped by the demands of this particular institutional context, to construct in turn the physical environment for

Figure 3. *From a window in Merton College's chapel. An Apostle, probably St Matthias. Photo: English Heritage NMR.*

the community of Merton College down the centuries? How did the college go about developing a variety of identities for itself in the stained glass of places for worshipping, studying, eating, sleeping and engagement with the outside world? The general introduction sets out to explore these issues, from the 14th to the 19th century. As an example, let me take the chapel again. The glass here shows clearly how a university college, now so familiar but then so new, engaged with the kinds of imagery that were being developed by other social groups and ecclesiastical institutions in the 14th century.

Merton can claim to be the model for the graduate college in the English late medieval university, in its statutes, self-government and lavish endowments. The founder's statutes of 1264 and 1274 established new standards that were quickly copied. Its buildings set new standards, too. The church that was begun in 1288-89 was planned on an unparalleled scale. The windows of the choir were, and still are, its most exceptional feature architecturally. The glass that filled them expressed in various ways the character and ambition of Walter Merton's foundation. The chapel was where its members gathered for worship and celebrated their place within the Christian body, on earth and in heaven. In the east window, appear the arms of England and of the de Clares, earls of Gloucester, royal benefactors and overlords respectively of the founder's lands in Surrey. Making use of the art of heraldry, the identifying code for the highest order of society, these shields marked the place of the college within the kingdom of England.

In the central lights of the 14 side windows, overlooking the stalls for the community and the sanctuary, there are 14 standing figures of Apostles and Evangelists – so a full set, as two evangelists were also apostles (Figure 3).

Gathered around Christ, and often shown ruling with him in heaven, the Apostles were represented in contemporary churches of many kinds; they were the first Christian community, the model for monastic convents and for the new orders of the friars in the 13th century. In the present context, they are highly appropriate to a new kind of scholarly community, preparing for service in royal government or the institutional church.

The windows also celebrate the success of a Merton education. Praying before the apostles are 24 scholars, in caps and academic gowns of various colours, each one associated with the name of Master Henry Mansfield: 'Magister Henricus de Mamesfeld me fecit' (Figure 4). In extent, this is a truly remarkable commemoration, apparently representing a single individual. There is no equivalent in contemporary English or continental stained glass. It has been observed rightly that the closest comparison is with royal monuments, in the multiple images of Queen Eleanor of Castile (d. 1290) on the Eleanor Crosses and on her tombs, established by her husband Edward I, just a few years earlier. Mansfield was a fellow of the college by 1288-89, graduating later as a master of arts and a doctor of theology. At the time when the glass was made, in 1310-11, he had left the college and was chancellor of the University of Oxford, so his career was flourishing. In just a few years, he would be elected dean of Lincoln Cathedral. On a long view, this alumnus is the first of countless examples in the stained glass of educational institutions around the world.

Figure 4. *From a window in Merton College's chapel. A kneeling scholar; over his head, the inscription on the scroll reads 'Magister Henricus de Mamesfe[l]d me fecit'. Photo: English Heritage NMR.*

Research and collaboration

The Corpus Vitrearum series is intended to encourage further study. This volume makes the stained glass at Merton available for the first time to art historians and historians, suggesting new approaches to the art and architecture of the late medieval university. There are opportunities here for future research. Many colleges in Oxford and Cambridge contain large collections of stained glass, but only those of King's College, Cambridge and now Merton have yet been analysed and published.

Corpus Vitrearum Medii Aevi is one of 50 major infrastructural British Academy Research Projects. It is also part of an international intellectual community founded in the aftermath of the Second World War to publish all medieval stained glass.[1] The international Corpus meets every two years, with meetings of an associated conservation community in each alternate year – so this is an active network. For the Merton volume, I would not have been able to work out the history of the remarkable post-medieval German glass in the library without the advice of German colleagues. Many other individuals and bodies have contributed, including English Heritage, which photographed all of the windows at the beginning of the project. These are available to all, in colour, on the AHRC-funded Corpus Vitrearum website (www.cvma.ac.uk).

[1] The international Corpus Vitrearum project operates under the auspices of the Union Académique Internationale. For more information, go to http://cvi.cvma-freiburg.de/

'Aspects of Art': The lecture series

DAWN ADÈS

Dawn Adès is Professor of Art History and Theory at the University of Essex, and a Fellow of the British Academy. In 1995, she delivered the Aspects of Art Lecture on 'Marcel Duchamp and the Paradox of Modernity'.

The 'Aspects of Art' Lectures were endowed a century ago by Henriette Hertz, who also founded the Bibliotheca Hertziana, in Rome in 1912, a library that remains a crucial resource for historians of Italian Art. Aspects of Art, one of three lecture series endowed by Hertz, were to be 'on some problem or aspect of the relation of Art in any of its manifestations to human culture; Art including Poetry and Music as well as Sculpture and Painting.' Initial debate on how this generous rubric was to be interpreted is evident in the changing headings for the lecture series in the first few years. The first was announced as 'First annual lecture on aspects of art, including poetry', the next two as the second and third 'annual lecture on art in relation to civilization'. The lectures were not subsequently further defined other than being on 'Aspects of Art'. On one occasion (1946) a proposed lecture was judged not to meet the terms of the Trust: a Council minute for 20 February 1946 recorded that 'Mr Geoffrey Webb, who was employed with the British Commission in Germany, had found himself unable to prepare his lecture on Baroque Art. He had offered a lecture on the position of works of art in Germany, but it was considered that this did not come sufficiently within the terms of the Trust, and it was agreed to suspend the Lecture for the present year and to invite Mr Webb to deliver it in 1947' – which he did. Would the lecture on art in Germany at this moment have been judged too close to reportage, or was the subject too raw?

Lectures have been fundamental to the British Academy's activities from the start, and the Aspects of Art Lectures introduced an important strand dedicated to subjects otherwise absent from the programme. A few of the lectures did include poetry, following Hertz's wishes, notably the first three lectures in the series – the lectures by Maurice Barrès and Emile Verhaeren, and Laurence Binyon's 'English poetry in relation to painting and the other arts'. However, the fact that other Academy lecture series were dedicated to poetry probably contributed to the increased tendency for Aspects of Art Lectures to focus on the visual arts, architecture and music. While the majority have been on the visual arts and architecture, it was understood from the start that music should be included, although only three out of the 49 lectures delivered up to 1984 were on music topics. On first scanning the lecture titles I thought the 1919 lecture entitled 'Rhythm' was about music, but it turned out to be something very different. There were two successive musicology lectures in 1985 and 1986, on Josquin and on Plainchant, but since 2000 music and the visual arts have alternated. With the exception of 1985/6, lectures since the Second World War have no longer been annual.

The first five lectures were primarily concerned with contemporary art and poetry, setting current practices in relation to history and tradition. In the 1920s classical topics dominated, including a lecture on 'Vergil's creative art', while broadly speaking the Renaissance and Baroque took over in the post Second World War period. This was probably regarded as safer ground than the battles over Modernism that galvanised some of the earliest lectures. After that early flurry, very few lectures have dealt with 20th-century let alone contemporary subjects. Most address the broader cultural or historical context and the importance of the topic in relation to the state of research in the subject. The majority of the topics are Western European, though the Middle East and China also figure.

War

The first lecture took place in the middle of the First World War. The President of the Academy, Viscount Bryce, in his Address for 1915, noted that the Academy intended to continue its regular activities despite the War, with one exception: 'The year that has passed since the last general meeting of the Academy has been an Annus Mirabilis, full of unexpected and terrible events. The Council has thought it better not to let these events disturb the even tenor of our way... The Academy has carried on its meetings and public lectures, making no change save one. The Council has this year proposed no foreign men of learning to be elected as Corresponding Fellows.' The first lecturers chosen for the Aspects of Art series were two of the most prominent literary figures from Britain's closest war-time allies, France and Belgium: Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) and Emile Verhaeren (1855-1916). Barrès gave the first lecture in French, in 1916, on 'Le blason de la France, ou ses traits éternels dans cette guerre et dans les vieilles épopées' (The coat of arms of France, or its eternal traits in this war and in the old epics). Writer, politician and

The Henriette Hertz Fund

Henriette Hertz (1846-1913)

The Academy's earliest benefactors

Henriette Hertz, who died 100 years ago in 1913, was one of the British Academy's first benefactors.

Established by Royal Charter in 1902, the Academy struggled for funds in its early years – it would not be until 1924 that it would receive its first annual grant from the Treasury. However, prior to the First World War, the Academy's indefatigable Secretary, Israel Gollancz, managed to persuade a very close circle of *emigré* Jewish friends to support the Academy's activities through endowments. The primary purpose was to establish funds for the furtherance of research in particular subject areas; a spin-off benefit was the establishment of a number of series of public lectures, which served to raise the Academy's profile.

The Academy's first endowment came in 1907 from Constance Schweich, who established the Leopold Schweich Fund in memory of her father, to support research into 'Ancient Civilisation with reference to Biblical Study' – including the series of 'Schweich Lectures' on this theme.[1] In 1910, Constance Schweich's aunt, Mrs Frida Mond, gave the Academy money for research 'in the various branches of English Literature'; this time, two lecture series were supported – the 'Warton Lectures' on English poetry and the 'Shakespeare Lectures'.[2]

In 1914, the Academy received a further endowment in the form of a bequest from Frida Mond's close friend, Miss Henriette Hertz.

Henriette Hertz

Henriette Hertz was born in Cologne on 6 January 1846. She was good friends at school with Frida Löwenthal. When, in 1867, Frida and her husband, Ludwig Mond, moved to England, it wasn't long before Henriette joined them to keep her friend company. And when Ludwig became a wealthy industrial chemist, Frida, Ludwig and Henriette were able to enjoy a lavish life of travelling and entertaining. In 1889, the three of them acquired space in the Palazzo Zuccari in Rome, and established an open house there which quickly became a centre of cosmopolitan intellectual life in the city.

As a young girl Henriette had developed an interest in the history of art. In Rome she decided that she wanted to improve the conditions of scholars studying Italian art history: 'I think the time is ripe to break down those barriers constituted by nationality and gender'. She built up a collection of books on Italian art, supplemented by volumes from Frida Mond's private library; and, together with her extensive collection of photographs, this formed the basis of a library which Henriette established at the Palazzo Zuccari – and which still exists today. The Bibliotheca Hertziana opened to scholars in 1912 on the occasion of the 10th International Congress of Art Historians which was being held that year in Rome.[3]

The Henriette Hertz Fund

As well as being in the same close set as those who had already supported the Academy generously, by now Henriette Hertz had her own intimate connection with the Academy: in 1910, Israel Gollancz had married her niece, the painter Alide Goldschmidt.

In her will of November 1911, 'Miss Henriette Hertz, of "The Poplars", Regent's Park, London, and of the Palazzo Zuccari, Rome', bequeathed £6,000 to the British Academy. After her death on 9 April 1913, a Declaration of Trust was drawn up (November 1914) for 'the Henriette Hertz Fund'. Following the terms of the will, the purposes of the Fund included the support of: a 'Lecture or Investigation or Paper on a philosophical problem' (the first 'Philosophical Lecture' was delivered in December 1914); a 'Lecture or Investigation or Paper on some problem or aspect of the relation of Art in any of its manifestations to human culture' (the first 'Aspects of Art Lecture' was delivered in 1916); and a 'Public Lecture on some Master-Mind considered individually with reference to his life and work specially in order to appraise the essential elements of his Genius' (the first 'Master-Mind Lecture' was delivered in 1916).

All three lecture series remain to this day important elements of the Academy's programme of events.

Part of the Bibliotheca Hertziana in the Palazzo Zuccari, Rome

[1] See Graham Davies, 'Leopold Schweich and his Family', *British Academy Review*, 12 (January 2009), 53-57.
[2] The Academy would receive further money from Mrs Frida Mond (d. 1923), including in her will.
[3] www.biblhertz.it/en/institute/history-of-the-institute

member of the Académie française, Barrès was the most famous French intellectual and patriot of his time. He had been a radical and nonconformist in his youth, moving in symbolist circles, but took the anti-Dreyfus side in a case that divided France, and became the leader of an ethnic nationalism. The lecture was a defiant celebration of France, emphasising the importance and contemporary relevance of ancient epic poetry and imagery in the resistance to Germany. Barrès recounts heroic and tragic episodes from the trenches, linking their spirit to the Chansons de Geste, to the literature of the crusades and to Corneille. Viscount Bryce, in his Address on 14 July 1916, said: 'We listened two days ago to [a lecture] by M. Maurice Barrès on the Spirit of France as displayed in old French epic poetry and again revealed in the present war.' All the lectures of that year, including the 'Aspects of Art', were, he said, of the highest merit.

Emile Verhaeren, poet and playwright, died in November 1916, before his lecture took place. 'An aesthetic interpretation of Belgium's past' was read in French on 17 March 1917 by the Belgian Minister. Verhaeren sums up a civilisation at a moment of national anguish, because of the German occupation and destruction of Louvain and its library. Unfortunately the two poems Verhaeren had planned to read during his lecture were not included in the published version. The choice of two major European figures during the crisis of the war exemplifies the Academy's outward-looking, international stance and sense of solidarity with a Europe under threat; at the same time each lecture is strongly nationalistic in tone. There is no hint of the new voices that were transforming poetry and the visual arts, rejecting traditional modes of creation in the search for a new language of modernity. Not all of these were reacting against the war. Some, like Apollinaire or the Italian Futurist Marinetti, made it part of their new aesthetic, but cultural and political nationalism together with literary and artistic traditions were generally rejected by the avant-garde.

Modernism versus the traditional

The clash between Modernism and more conventional art and literature dominates the next few lectures: 1918, Laurence Binyon 'English poetry in relation to painting and the other arts': 1919, D.S. MacColl, 'Rhythm', 1920 Sir Reginald Blomfield, 'The tangled skein: art in England 1800-1920'; 1921 William Rothenstein, 'The Compass and Disabilities of contemporary art'. The level of disaffection or downright opposition to Modernism varies, from the relatively moderate opinions of Binyon to the fierce resistance of Blomfield. Unfortunately we have no record of the 1921 lecture by William Rothenstein on 'The Compass and Disabilities of contemporary art', which must have been a response to Blomfield's 1920 lecture, nor that of D.S. MacColl in 1919, 'Rhythm', which may well have partially defended modern art. Their absences is a pity because they could have thrown light on the long and damaging controversies in England about modern art and the notorious failure of the national collections during the first decades of the 20th century to acquire work by contemporary foreign artists such as Picasso and Matisse. Rothenstein was a painter and writer on art, and from 1920-1935 Principal of the Royal College of Art. Although relatively conservative as an artist himself, he encouraged his students, such as Henry Moore and Edward Burra, to experiment.

The third lecture in the series, and the first on English Art (as it was invariably called at the time), was given by Rothenstein's friend Laurence Binyon, who, unusually, lectured twice; the only other person to do so was Anthony Blunt. Binyon was not only a poet but also an art historian and curator, and specialist in the art of the Far East. His second lecture in 1936 was on 'Chinese art and Buddhism'. His 1918 lecture, 'English poetry in relation to painting and the other arts', is one of the few in the series to engage seriously with the relationship between the arts and poetry, and this brings him into a dialogue with modernist notions of the specificity of the medium; his position is ambiguous, because while on the one hand sensitive to this, his main concern was for the exercise of the imagination which for him meant a connection with poetry. Quoting Walter Pater, for whom all arts aspire to the condition of music, he argues that this implies a criticism of poetry, so that 'artists and art critics today have a curious horror of the intrusion into art of anything suspected of being literature.' Popular painting, he says, has 'become more and more enslaved to the unconstructive nowhere-leading doctrine of naturalism; it lets the rhythmic element die out more and more'; having lost its relationship with poetry painting deserts its own proper basis and inspiration. He disliked the Pre-Raphaelites, and ended his lecture with Keats, the 'most pictorial' of poets. When painters, he argued, applied his method to what they saw rather than what they imagined, instead of that distinctness of imagination which Keats required, 'we descend to a doctrine of minute fidelity to nature, which leads insensibly to the negation of art.' He blames 'a certain waste and division and incoherence' on the 'unrelatedness' of the arts. 'The arts have each their boundaries, each their separate felicities belonging to their medium. But it is well also to remember that they have their common spring of inspiration in the imaginative life, and it is that fundamental unity that best preserves them from chaos, triviality and caprice.'

Although MacColl's 1919 lecture 'Rhythm' wasn't published, he engaged in a polemic with Roger Fry in the *Burlington Magazine* the same year which gives an indication of his position. MacColl was an art historian, a regular critic in the Burlington and keeper at the Tate Gallery from 1906-1911. He has a reputation for championing modern art, but within limits. Two long letters to the Burlington strongly object to Roger Fry's recent articles on 'Line as a means of expression in modern art' (December 1918 and February 1919), which had argued that the revolution in art had released artists from the bond of representational accuracy, enabling them to find fuller expression, and rhythmic harmony, in free lines. MacColl objected 'To substitute for the research of natural rhythms a violent or arbitrary "distortion" as the general principle of drawing is to caricature without the caricaturists' motive and threatens sterility in design.' Although Binyon, MacColl and Rothenstein in various

ways supported a moderate modernism, this did not extend to cubism, to Picasso, Matisse and Kandinsky, or to abstraction. Sir Reginald Blomfield, an architect and designer of Italianate gardens, was uncompromisingly against modern art. His 1920 lecture, 'The tangled skein: art in England 1800-1920', is a diatribe against the 'revolution in art'. Admitting that 'all is not well with the arts', he ridicules those who 'ask us to scrap everything, traditions, associations, all the splendid inheritance of the past, and to paint, model and design with results unlike anything that has ever been on land or sea.' On the other hand there are those who 'believe that the arts … cannot be violently pulled to pieces and turned upside down without injury to civilization, who think it is neither necessary nor desirable to seek inspiration in the methods of the South Sea Islanders…' This is a dig against artists like Picasso and Derain who admired non-Western art. A survey of art and architecture since 1820, with Turner as the greatest hero, is followed by an interesting argument that the rot began with French Salon criticism in the 18th century, since when art has been dominated by critics and theorists. He objects to the invention of the term Academic Art as an Aunt Sally for the 'raging hosts of the revolutionaries', and then comes up to date with comments on the kind of contemporary art that has been lauded to the skies by the critics, such as the exhibition in London by a notorious French painter (Matisse). Blomfield found 'a collection of canvases that appeared to have no meaning at all and no object, except the negation of every quality of form, colour, and composition…' Even worse was a painter who 'by the mercy of Providence has not yet penetrated to England' but makes 'purely non-representative pictures' (this is probably Kandinsky). 'Art is to be an affair of hieroglyphics, of arrangements of forms and colours which are out of relation to observed realities, and indeed which need have no meaning at all, because there are always at hand the skilled art critic to supply the necessary hermeneutics, and the more unintelligible the artist, the better material for his ready eloquence and ingenuity.'

Figure 1. *(Above) Works by André Derain, one the painters discussed in John Golding's 1980 'Aspects of Art' Lecture: Self Portrait (1904); Big Ben (1905-6). John Golding (1929-2012) was a Fellow of both the British Academy and the Royal Academy; his Arco Iris (1991-2) hangs on the walls of the British Academy (below).*

History of art

These contentious issues around the contemporary situation of art were avoided almost completely in the succeeding lectures, which stick to the history of art and architecture, while covering a broad range of topics, including sculpture, painting, Greek pottery, prints, stained glass, medals, armour, illuminated manuscripts, miniatures, and architectural carving. There was no 20th-century topic until John Golding's 1980 lecture 'Fauvism and the School of Chatou: Post-Impressionism in Crisis' (Figure 1).

The condition of Art History in the UK was transformed as a side effect of the rise of Hitler. Germany had been the seedbed for the historical and critical study of art and of aesthetics, and many of the outstanding scholars from Germany and Eastern Europe took refuge in the UK during the 1930s. Among those who contributed to the Aspects of Art series after the war, having settled here, were Johannes Wilde, Edgar Wind and George Zarnecki. (Ernst Gombrich,



Figure 2. *The Prophet Daniel, Sistine Ceiling.*

Director of the Warburg Institute, did not. It's notable that the majority of the lecturers were from the Courtauld Institute of Art, rather than the Warburg.) Wind was Professor of Art History at Oxford, where he delivered a series of lectures on Michelangelo so popular that they had to be moved to the Playhouse. His Aspects of Art Lecture, 'Michelangelo's Prophets and Sybils' (1960), is one of the highlights of the post-war series. It followed on from Johannes Wilde's lecture on 'The Decoration of the Sistine Chapel' (1958), and the two are wonderfully complementary.[1] Wilde published relatively little in his lifetime, though his lectures at the Courtauld where he became Professor were legendary, so this published lecture is a rarity. He discusses the commission, structure and sequences of the paintings in the Sistine Chapel, while Wind explores the iconography of the Prophets and Sybils (Figures 2 and 3) and the role of the great preacher Savanorola.

Music

The increase of lectures on music reflects, at least in part, the expansion of the subject at universities. In 1986 David Hiley spoke on 'Thurstan of Caen and Plainchant at Glastonbury: Musicological reflexions on the Norman Conquest', which took as its starting point the murder of two monks at Glastonbury in 1081 or 1083 by Abbot

[1] Both Johannes Wild's 'The Decoration of the Sistine Chapel' and Edgar Wind's 'Michelangelo's Prophets and Sibyls' are reprinted in *Art and Politics in Renaissance Italy: British Academy Lectures*, edited by George Holmes, which is still available in paperback from Oxford University Press.

Thurstan's retainers, because they insisted on singing the wrong kind of plainchant. While not solving the difficulty of knowing what plainchant actually sounded like, the detective work in analysing the differences in ecclesiastical traditions and decoding the evidence in the surviving music books satisfactorily delivered the conclusion that Anglo-Saxon plainchant continued to be sung after the conquest, not only in England but in Normandy. Hiley is pleased to echo George Zarnecki, who concluded in his 900th anniversary lecture in 1966, '1066 and Architectural Sculpture', that Anglo-Saxon sculpture did not die an heroic death at Hastings. Hiley ends with a modest and convincing plea for musicology: There is satisfaction in being able to discover how things of innate beauty were created and transmitted, in identifying musical traditions; 'with capabilities such as these, musicology may deservedly occupy its place among the humanities, contributing to, as well as nourished by, other historical disciplines.'

Recently the controversial question of performance in relation to music and musicology was addressed by Nicholas Cook, in his 2013 lecture, 'Between Art and Science: Music as Performance'[2]. The music topics, though considerably fewer in number than those on art history, look to this outsider as perhaps more adventurous and more open to popular aspects of art. In 2003 Stephen Banfield spoke on 'Scholarship and the musical: reclaiming Jerome Kern', a fascinating account of this hugely prolific composer of popular sings including 'Ol' Man River'.

It has not been possible to do justice to the full range and significance of the Aspects of Art Lectures, nor to follow up the many interesting questions that have arisen. There is no doubt that they give a rich account of changes in taste, of the development of two disciplines over the last century and the ways these have been shaped by scholars.



Figure 3. *The Erythraean Sybil, Sistine Ceiling.*

[2] A video recording of Nicholas Cook's 2013 Aspects of Art Lecture may be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2013/

FROM THE ARCHIVE

Keynes and the British Academy

DONALD WINCH

When John Maynard Keynes was first proposed for election to Fellowship of the British Academy in 1919, his candidacy was considered by a 'Section' (a subject grouping of Fellows) composed of lawyers and economists. Mention was made of his academic book, *Indian Currency and Finance*, but his comparative youth and official preoccupations were cited as reasons why he had not published his fellowship dissertation for King's College, Cambridge, and why he had been obliged 'to defer many contemplated publications' (Figure 1). By the following year one at least of these publications had appeared with more éclat than was to prove comfortable. He was now sponsored by a newly-constituted 'Economic Science' Section chaired by W.R. Scott; and this time his name was passed on to and endorsed by the Academy's Council. To the surprise and dismay of all those who had supported his candidacy thus far, Keynes was blackballed at the 1920 Annual General Meeting on what were frankly admitted to be 'political' grounds. His name had to be withdrawn because – as Scott explained apologetically to Keynes – 'there was a very strong body of opinion which felt keenly that your election coming in the year of publication of *Economic Consequences of the Peace* would be likely to give offence in France'.

Donald Winch is Emeritus Professor of Intellectual History at the University of Sussex, Publications Secretary to the Royal Economic Society, and a Fellow of the British Academy.

The offending book had actually been published in mid-December 1919 and was an astounding commercial success: by the following July, as the Annual General Meeting of the Academy was taking place, sales reached 100,000. The book contained a relentless denunciation of the Versailles peace treaty and placed Keynes at the centre of fierce disagreements over the size of the reparations bill that Germany could be forced to pay without causing political and economic breakdown throughout Europe. In the domestic and international debate that followed, Keynes's condemnation of the reparations to be exacted from Germany, under pressure from France and other nations that had borne the brunt of military action, was widely regarded as pro-German and therefore anti-French.



9. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, M.A., C.B., of H.M. Treasury, and King's College, Cambridge.

(*a*) Bryce, F. Y. Edgeworth, Alfred Marshall, H. S. Foxwell, W. R. Scott, Haldane of Cloan.

(*b*) He is an Economist of quite remarkable power and acuteness; and has rendered services of exceptional value to the State at the Treasury, where he has been during the war, and on the Indian Currency Commission just before the war. The Treasury has entrusted him with work of extreme difficulty and responsibility. He has been a member of most of the financial commissions sent to foreign countries during the war, and is now a representative of the Treasury at the Peace Conference. The Report of the Indian Currency Commission showed unmistakable signs of his influence, especially where it varied the recommendations of the Fowler Commission, and in many of its valuable suggestions upon Indian banking and Indian note issues.

(*c*) Indian Currency and Finance, 1913; Articles and Reviews in the Economic Journal, Statistical Journal, New Quarterly; publication interrupted by the war of a dissertation relating to the mathematical foundation of the theory of statistics.

Mr. Keynes is comparatively a young man, and the considerable time he has devoted to public affairs, as well as to the Editorship of the Economic Journal, has obliged him to defer many contemplated publications.

Figure 1. *Extract from an agenda paper listing candidates nominated for election to the Fellowship of the British Academy in 1919 (BA434/1).*

Frustrated hopes

The rebuff to Keynes came as a blow to Scott's hopes of injecting young blood into a barely viable Section composed of himself, a 52-year-old Glasgow professor, and four distinguished but querulous septuagenarians: Alfred Marshall (Cambridge), Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (Oxford), Herbert Somerton Foxwell (University College, London), and Joseph Shield Nicholson (Edinburgh). They had been five, but Archdeacon William Cunningham (Cambridge), an economic historian and founding fellow, had died before Keynes could be given his second airing. At 37, Keynes would have been one of the youngest persons ever elected to the Academy.

Rejection was also a blow to the hopes of those who wanted to see the Academy occupy a more prominent role in public affairs. One of the signatories of Keynes's first nomination form was the lawyer, R.B. Haldane, the author of a report on the machinery of government in 1918 that aimed to build on experience of the use of scientific experts in government during the war by creating an economic general staff along the lines of a mixture of the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research and the Committee on Imperial Defence. For Haldane, and possibly for James Bryce, a co-signatory in 1919, the Academy would acquire a greater sense of purpose if it could become a national repository for expertise in the economic, social, and political sciences. Keynes fitted this image perfectly, and later joined the first of the organisations designed to act as an economic general staff within government, the Economic Advisory Council set up by the Second Labour Government in 1930.

Grievance

Keynes could hardly complain about the public furore his condemnation of the peace treaty had been designed to arouse, but he clearly felt that what Scott told him about the nature of the Academy's rejection constituted a justifiable grievance. A scholarly institution that allowed political considerations to interfere with its views on the merits of candidates was not one he wished to join. As he wrote to Scott:

> ... after what has happened, I must ask you to withdraw my name from the list of candidates in future years. The Academy have avowedly taken political considerations into account in electing; and this seems to me so ruinously opposed to the whole conception of any learned or scientific body, with which one would wish to be associated, that I am decidedly of the opinion that I should prefer to remain outside

Keynes was not reacting to the Academy's conduct in his own case alone. Scott had informed him that Arthur Cecil Pigou, Keynes's professorial colleague at Cambridge, had also been rejected on grounds that Keynes considered to be 'discreditable to the electing body'. That Pigou, who had been appointed as Marshall's successor in 1908, was not elected to the Academy until 1927 was largely due to opposition within the Economics Section from Foxwell, Nicholson, and Cunningham, the last two being supporters of Foxwell's claim to be Marshall's rightful heir. The disapproval of this trio was originally based on differences of opinion on questions of economic theory and method and the political stances revealed during Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign in 1903. During the First World War Pigou had compounded his offence as a cosmopolitan free-trader to this group of 'national' economists by successfully applying for release from military duties on conscientious grounds as a pacifist. Since Keynes had also registered as a conscientious objector to conscription for libertarian reasons, he was naturally concerned by what he was told about Pigou's position. When Pigou, in turn, learned of the circumstances surrounding the rejection of Keynes seven years before his own election, he mirrored his junior colleague in expressing regret that he had allowed himself to join an academic body that was guilty of discrimination on political grounds.

If these episodes had been more widely reported at the time, they would have been harmful to the reputation of the Academy – more so than to Keynes's professional standing. The Academy was still an organisation hoping for but consistently being denied government support, and still lacking the authority attached to the body it sought to emulate, the Royal Society. Keynes did not suffer a setback and was not short of signs of recognition of his standing as an economist. After *Economic Consequences of the Peace*, he was also a significant public figure with growing economic and other journalistic resources at his command.

Sources

As things transpired, however, most people first learned about this hiccup in Keynes's career in 1977, when some of the letters exchanged by Keynes, Scott, and Pigou appeared in the volume dealing with Keynes's activities edited by Elizabeth Johnson for the Royal Economic Society's edition of his collected economic writings.[1] Keynes's first major biographer, Roy Harrod, had passed over the episode in silence, something he was prone to do in the case of what might be regarded as negative aspects of Keynes's career. Robert Skidelsky in the second volume of his mammoth trilogy devoted four sentences to it based on the material reprinted in the edited writings. Arguably, this could be justified in light of Keynes's subsequent withdrawal of his misgivings about the Academy: his nomination in 1929, listing the offending book under his 'scientific and political' works, masks the interest attached to the earlier rebuff (Figure 2). But since history deals with processes and personalities as opposed merely to final outcomes, the episode is worthy of more attention in the light of additional information now available.

Elizabeth Johnson did not use all of the material relating to the Academy that can be found in Keynes's papers. Other relevant collections of papers and correspondence can also now be consulted. Of these,

[1] *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, Volume XVII, pp. 164-6.



a. To be signed by not less than THREE, nor more than SIX Fellows of the Academy.

(a) (*Signed*) [a]

W.M. Scott
H.S. Foxwell. A.L. Bowley
W.C. Stamp
A.C. Pigou

(*b*) The above-named is proposed on the following grounds:—

He is an economist of remarkable power and acuteness. His services to the State have been of exceptional importance, as a member of the Indian Currency Commission (1913-1914), as Principal Representative of the Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, and as Deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council (January to June 1919). He has contributed materially to the advancement of economic knowledge by his work as editor of the Economic Journal since 1912, and has developed greatly the importance & utility of the Royal Economic Society. At Cambridge he is an enchanting teacher & is editor of the Cambridge Economic Handbooks. Moreover he is recognized, both at home and abroad, as a leading authority on the theory of Probability.

(*c*) The following are his principal published works:—

Scientific: - Indian Currency & Finance, 1913
A Treatise on Probability, 1921
A Tract on Monetary Reform, 1923
The End of Laissez Faire, 1926

Scientific & Political: - The Economic Consequences of the Peace 1919

Figure 2. *Extract from the nomination certificate proposing John Maynard Keynes for election to the Fellowship of the British Academy in 1929 (BA424).*

undoubtedly, the most interesting because least discreet are those centring on Foxwell. Although some scholars had access to the main collection of these papers when they were in private hands, they have recently been sold to Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan and are not yet available to the world at large. Fortunately, much of the correspondence between Foxwell and Scott that has a bearing on the Academy has been preserved in collections that are still open for inspection.

More interestingly, perhaps, the British Academy's own archive is now being put in order by the librarian and archivist, Karen Syrett, potentially releasing further documentation. The letter from George Saintsbury to the Secretary of the Academy, Israel Gollancz, displayed in Figure 3 comes from the Academy archive. It goes along with a similar letter from Nicholson to the President, Frederic Kenyon, which shows that Scott was not entirely accurate when he assured Keynes that opinion within the economists' Section was solidly behind his nomination in 1920. Secure in his anti-German convictions, Nicholson knew what was wrong with the use of economic expertise to support leniency on the reparations issue: 'I have often said that in my judgement Mr Keynes is the ablest of the younger economists but the greater the ability the greater the responsibility.'

Keynes in the Academy

Once elected, Keynes made an early and significant contribution by taking the initiative in getting Beatrice Webb elected to the Academy in 1931, the first woman to be honoured in this way. Those who were opposed to this departure from tradition confined their misgivings to private communications. Foxwell, no friend to Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Figure 4) or the institution they had created, the London School of Economics, complained that the Academy had delivered a 'marked slight' to Sidney in favouring his wife, particularly when it was widely known – or so Foxwell thought – that Sidney was responsible for three-quarters of the work published under their joint names. Keynes was pursuing what might best be described as a Bloomsbury version of feminism, an agenda he had revealed in 1921 when censuring the sexual discrimination involved in the exclusion of women members of faculty at Cambridge from enjoyment of the status and emoluments available to men.[2] As her diaries show, Beatrice Webb allowed her name to go forward to please Keynes and the director of the London School, Alexander Carr-Saunders. She can hardly be described as an enthusiastic recruit, either to a Section that did not at the time include sociologists or to an academy

[2] *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, Volume XXVIII, pp. 415-6.



1 Royal Crescent
Bath

July 13 1920

Dear Sir Israel Gollancz,

As it is, unfortunately, impossible for me to attend the meeting of the British Academy on the 21st inst, I venture to trouble you with the following matter. I am not quite certain to what extent the rules or the practice of the Academy may allow or disallow remarks from absent members on proposed elections. But to the utmost extent to which it may be permissible, I beg to demur to the election of Mr Keynes. My protest has nothing to do with the [redacted] candidate's fitness as an economist; as I am not a member of the section proposing him, such a protest would be in all senses impertinent. But at the present moment, and for some considerable time to come, his election could not fail to be regarded to some extent here, and to a much greater extent abroad, as a pronouncement by the Academy of approval on his recent book. Once more, the abstract merits or demerits of that book as an exercise in Economics do not matter. It is for the time not political economy but politics pure and simple. As such his approval of it, which will inevitably be assumed, will be regarded as a discouragement in France, as an encouragement in Germany and (perhaps worst of all) as a definite expresion of political partisanship in this country. I can imagine few things more unfortunate for the Academy than the first two of these results, nothing more unfortunate than the third. And therefore I venture to repeat my most earnest hope that this ill-omened candidature will be either withdrawn or decisively rejected.

I remain

Yours very faithfully

George Saintsbury

To Sir Israel Gollancz
Secretary of the British Academy

Figure 3. *George Saintsbury FBA to Sir Israel Gollancz, Secretary of the British Academy, 13 July 1920 (BA358).*

dominated by elderly 'Oxford donnish' men. Nor did Keynes's initiative open any floodgates. It took another 13 years for the next woman to be elected, and the trickle that followed did not become a steady stream until much later.

Keynes took his turn as chairman of the Academy's Economics Section in 1940. The duties chiefly consisted of guiding the Section towards consensual decisions on electoral matters, a task he performed with more tact and diplomacy than he was accustomed to employ when accepting or rejecting articles for the *Economic Journal*. Whereas the editor's decision was final, Keynes's preferences among candidates for election were subject to modification and rejection. This can perhaps best be illustrated from one interesting case involving Joan Robinson, a Cambridge follower of Keynes who was part of the 'circus' that helped him make the transition from the analytical framework of his *Treatise on Money* (1930) towards that underpinning his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936). A year after Beatrice Webb's death in 1943, Keynes proposed Robinson for election as her successor. Possibly because this proposed woman-for-a-woman move involved more opportunistic feminism than academic logic it was unsuccessful: Joan Robinson would be elected 14 years after she had first been proposed by Keynes. Gender balance did not become an official Academy aspiration until much later.

Beyond his own work, Keynes's entrepreneurial energies in the academic field were chiefly confined to the activities of the Royal Economic Society: he became secretary to the Society not long after he became editor of the *Economic Journal* and retained the post until a year before his death. It was an executive role that carried with it control over the Society's finances. In 1944 he was asked by John Clapham, President of the Academy and a fellow King's man, whether he would be prepared to be the next President. Keynes's answer is unknown, but we do know that the Annual General Meeting held in May 1946 recorded 'several expressions of opinion in favour of the nomination of Lord Keynes' for President. Had he not died the previous month, full circle might have been reached, beginning with his rejection by the same body 26 years earlier.



Figure 4. *John Maynard Keynes (right) with Sidney and Beatrice Webb. The photograph was taken by Keynes's wife, Lydia Lopokova, on 7 August 1926, at Passfield Corner, Hampshire. Photo: Keynes Family Archive.*

Why support the British Academy?

SINCE ITS EARLIEST YEARS the British Academy has been privileged to receive support in the form of legacy donations from its Fellows and friends. Many of the earliest benefactors were drawn from a small circle personally linked to the Academy's first Secretary, Sir Israel Gollancz (see p. 65 of this issue). In his Presidential Address of 1918, Sir Frederic Kenyon expressed his thanks to those who had already given funds to the Academy:

> One cannot express too warmly the gratitude of the Academy to the generous benefactors who have chosen this way of demonstrating their sense of the value of intellectual culture, and who have selected the Academy as the medium of their gifts. I hope their example may be widely followed. It is to be hoped that in this country, as has long been the case in France, it will become a thing recognized and taken for granted that persons with money at their disposal, and interested in the progress of human intellect, and in the honour of their country as a leader in intellectual culture, will give or bequeath sums of money to the Academy, either for specific objects in which they are interested, or to be administered at the discretion of the Academy.[1]

The majority of legacies over the years have been received from the Academy's own Fellows and other academics, who recognise the Academy's commitment to scholarship, and feel that the discipline to which they have dedicated their life's work will continue to be appreciated and valued by the Academy. There are currently about 30 individuals who have pledged to leave a sum of money or a particular item or items to the Academy in their will. But why should they choose to give to the Academy?

The British Academy as a guardian of scholarship

Many academics have long and happy associations with a particular institution. Indeed, they may have spent their entire academic career in one place and feel a great affinity with their department and colleagues. However, as one Fellow has put it:

> Such are the vicissitudes of modern university life that there is no guarantee that what has been created and sustained by an individual or group in favourable circumstances will retain a recognisable identity. Many university departments are under threat, and who is to say which will be the next casualty?

Under these circumstances, the British Academy seems to be a more stable and durable institution, one that will continue to be capable of administering the limited funds from my legacy in a responsible fashion. If my university should decide to retain a field in which it once had the status of pioneer and leader, its devotees would be welcome applicants for support from my fund.

In short, by giving resource to the Academy, an individual can ensure that their field of interest continues to be supported, regardless of fluctuations in levels of interest at individual universities.

It is not just Fellows of the British Academy who feel this way. Robin Lovelock spent his undergraduate and postgraduate days and much of his academic career at the University of Southampton, continuing as a Visiting Senior Research Fellow in Social Work Studies for twelve years after taking early retirement in 2001. Robin and his wife Jill, also a Southampton graduate, who had a long and successful career as a local government officer, have chosen to leave a proportion of their estate to the Academy.

The remit of the Lovelock Fund (an endowed fund whose initial capital is likely to be approximately £500,000 at today's values) will be fairly broad, supporting a combination of lectures, prizes and research awards, as appropriate. Its overarching aim is consciously akin to that of the well-known Tanner Lectures on Human Values (based at the University of Utah and elsewhere): 'to advance learning and research concerning the human condition'. Its more particular focus will be on the normative reasoning involved in intellectual enquiry of all kinds and in political and public endeavour. As Mr Lovelock explains: 'Although most of my research and writing was around social work and social and health care, my intellectual home has always been in political theory and the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences.' He sees that the Academy understands the academic interests motivating his and his wife's gift, and that this will be reflected and sustained in the ways the Lovelock Fund will be used in the long term.

Legacies like that of the Lovelocks demonstrate the strength of the British Academy to support and promote research and scholarship, and thereby shed light on major issues of the day, and make informed and trusted contributions to public debate.

[1] Sir F.G. Kenyon, 'The Position of an Academy in a Civilized State: Presidential Address [4 July 1918]', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, [8], 44. Sir Frederic went on to stress the particular value of 'funds which might be used, at the discretion of the Academy, for the assistance of research'.

Figure 1. *Professor Neil Smith FBA and his wife Saras have recently established the Neil and Saras Smith Medal for Linguistics – the design of which is illustrated here. This is the first British Academy medal for linguistics, and the first of its kind in the UK. The medal will be awarded for the first time in 2014, to a linguist whose career has demonstrated the highest standards of achievement and scholarship. In addition to their recent £10,000 gift, Neil and Saras are leaving a percentage of their residual estate to the Academy to endow the medal in perpetuity.*

Transforming a discipline

Professor William Doyle FBA and his wife Christine contacted the Academy very recently after deciding to leave the residue of their estate to the Academy for a fund to support French History. Professor Doyle spent much of his career at the University of Bristol where, however, there was no tradition of research in French history. The Academy, therefore, seemed a more appropriate destination for a sum likely to be in seven figures. A sum of this size has the potential to transform the study of French History, and the broad remit of the Academy's work means it has the potential to do so internationally. It is intended that the fund should be used flexibly to pursue innovative approaches to the study of French history and the history of the French-speaking world.

Mutual benefit

Professor Sir Brian Harrison FBA, a historian, and his wife Victoria are leaving to the Academy both his academic papers and a generous gift which will generate (with careful management) investment income that is more than sufficient for the Academy to look after them. Sir Brian thinks that possession of Fellows' papers would collectively enhance the Academy's standing, but realises that it can undertake such responsibilities only if accompanied by adequate endowment. He has therefore placed no restrictions on the Academy's use of any income that remains from investing the fund: it can be used to support the Academy's priorities as they evolve. The Academy particularly values unrestricted income, which frees it to pursue opportunities independently of statutory funding, and will be happy to enter into discussions with other Fellows who may wish to reach a similar arrangement.

Strength in numbers

The majority of gifts pledged to the Academy are of a more modest size, but are nevertheless extremely important. They are a valuable reminder of the high regard in which the Academy is held by academics across the broad range of its disciplines. These smaller pledges are often made by those with considerable pressure on their resources – with families or friends to provide for, or a favourite charity to which the majority of funds are committed – and as such they are particularly appreciated. There are, of course, a variety of motivations involved. Whether it is because of the Academy's support for early career scholars, or its international reach, or its role as a champion of the humanities and social sciences, an increasing number of Fellows are choosing to make a lasting commitment to its work.[2]

Four- and five-figure funds are not managed individually as a matter of course, but are added to the Academy Development Fund (ADF), from which unrestricted income is used to support new and strategically important activities at the Academy. Professor Charles (Charlie) Moule FBA (1908-2007) left £30,000 of unrestricted capital to the Academy in his will. If just 30 people followed Professor Moule's example, in time the ADF would be strengthened by a further £1,000,000. In this way relatively modest gifts make an important and lasting difference to the Academy's independence and ability to carry out its work.

The Fund is now valued at some £5,000,000 and is a valuable and powerful resource. Without the ADF the Academy would not have had sufficient financial security to be able to embark on the expansion into No. 11 Carlton House Terrace in 2010. Now that investment has paid off: the ADF is regularly supplemented by income from external room bookings, through Clio, the trading arm of the Academy.

Tax breaks make gifts more affordable

Though tax relief is rarely the primary reason for making a charitable donation, changes to inheritance tax laws made in 2012 make charitable donations more affordable. The laws were changed to give benefit to those who leave at least 10% of their taxable estate to charity.

Careful investment

In the main legacies are used to create invested funds from which a proportion of the income each year is re-invested, and a proportion spent to further the aims of the fund. In recent years the Academy's investments have performed extremely well, so the value of its private funds have grown. It is the Academy's policy (assuming sufficient income) to spend the equivalent of 4 per cent of the capital value of its endowed funds each year. If over- or

[2] The recent threat to the sustainability of the British Academy's Small Research Grants scheme spurred many Fellows to make donations to the Academy. See 'British Academy Small Research Grants: an anniversary worth celebrating', *British Academy Review*, 21 (January 2013), 29. The establishment of the Academy's 'Research Fund' enables any gift to be restricted to funding research, if preferred.

under-spending occurs then income may be re-invested for a year or so, or additional awards made, if appropriate. The Lovelock Fund, for example, with a value of £500,000 would be expected to generate some £20,000 per annum of expendable income.

Thanks

The Academy is indebted to those who choose to leave a gift in their will to support its work. As a token of thanks a lunch is held each autumn to which legators and their partners are invited. If you have included – or are considering – a gift in your will to the British Academy please do get in touch so we can thank you too! Our Development Officer, Jennifer Hawton, would be pleased to hear from you, and is available to discuss your specific plans (on 020 7969 5258, or j,hawton@britac.ac.uk). Further information is available via www.britac.ac.uk/Legacies.cfm

Figure 2. *One of the most significant legacies in recent years is that of Professor Ray Pahl FBA (1935-2011). He gave his collection of modern British art to the British Academy shortly after its expansion into No. 11 Carlton House Terrace. Professor Pahl's impressive art collection was amassed over a period of 40 years through some careful buying and 'trading up'. The paintings Professor Pahl and his family gave to the Academy are worth some £250,000 and proudly adorn the walls of the Marks Room in No. 10 and the first floor Gallery in No. 11. Professor Pahl's children have been closely involved with the Academy and its plans for the canvasses since his death. Illustrated is 'Black Sun Newlyn' (1982) by Sir Terry Frost (1915-2003).*